

# Green Planning in Australia and Canada: Dead or Alive?

TON BÜHRS

---

Green planning has been hailed as a new and promising stage in the development of environmental policy, as it provides a more comprehensive and integrated approach to environmental problems. Since the late 1980s, green plans (under a variety of labels) have been adopted by many governments, including those of Canada and Australia. In both countries, however, green planning efforts have come to grief and their green plans have been proclaimed 'dead'. This demise of green planning is analysed and underlying factors are discussed. It is argued that, despite the considerable obstacles to sustained green planning, there are strong reasons for reviving it in these countries.

---

## Introduction

Green planning involves the development of more comprehensive and integrated approaches to environmental problems. In particular, it has been associated with the adoption by governments of policies, plans or strategies that have sustainable development as their expressed goal. It has been hailed as a new and promising stage in the development of environmental policy [Johnson, 1995], and adopted in many countries, both in the North [Dalal-Clayton et al., 1996] and in the South [Falloux and Talbot, 1993].

In some countries, however, green planning efforts have come to grief. The Canadian Green Plan and the Australian Ecologically Sustainable Development Strategy have both been declared 'dead' or 'moribund'. Although green planning is an ambitious undertaking anywhere, and encounters difficulties in many countries [Dalal-Clayton et al., 1996], the Australian and Canadian experiences might be seen as an indication that it is perhaps most problematic, if not impossible, in countries with a federal system of government.

---

Ton Bührs is a Senior Lecturer in the Environmental Management and Design Division of Lincoln University, Canterbury, New Zealand. The author would like to thank Chris Rootes and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.

1996; Jänicke and Jörgens, 1998; Johnson, 1995]. It has been estimated that, by 1994, more than 100 countries had adopted some form of green plan [Carew-Reid et al., 1994: 40].

In recognition of the environmental dictum that 'everything is related to everything else', green planning is an approach to environmental policy development which sets out to address environmental issues on the basis of an analysis of their linkages with other issues, policy areas, and factors or roots across sectors [Carew-Reid et al., 1994: 25; Falloux and Talbot, 1993: 19, 25-6]. National environmental (policy) plans and sustainable development strategies can be characterised as examples of rational (comprehensive) policy development, involving the formulation of (more or less specific) objectives across sectors (policy integration) for the medium to long term, and the means of achieving them. Rooted in the rational policy tradition, the approach is based on the assumption that environmental problems can be (re)defined in terms of identifiable causes and effects, and managed or solved by purposeful courses of action ('making sustainability concrete'). Stated differently, green planning can be seen as a form of 'environmental governmentality' [Darier, 1996]. In origin and practice, it is a political-bureaucratic response to environmental demands that leaves governments and bureaucracies 'in control'.

Such faith in the capabilities of governments and bureaucracies does not go unchallenged, however. If anything, during the 1980s and 1990s, the belief in the ability of the state to resolve problems and to steer society has declined rather than grown with the ascendance of 'New Right' thinking and governments in many countries. Taken at face value, the rise of green planning seems to go against the prevailing trend of deregulation, the reduction of 'state interference', and the devolution of responsibilities towards the private sector and communities. But the contradiction may be more apparent than real. The degree of control over societal actors and action exerted by governments through green planning may be minimal, as many plans or strategies are primarily exhortatory (or even symbolic) exercises rather than prescriptive or mandatory [Bührs and Bartlett, 1997; Hoberg and Harrison, 1994].

Green planning can be regarded as just one pathway towards sustainability that needs to be combined with institutional reform and social mobilisation to be effective. The greatest (potential) strengths of green planning lie in making sustainability concrete, in the sense of setting yardsticks for demonstrable (often measurable) improvements in environmental quality, in generating or strengthening public support for environmental measures (as objectives and the rationale for them are made explicit), and in enhancing transparency and accountability (as the environmental performance of public and private actors is measured against

these yardsticks). But on its own, it will run into institutional walls, and without action and support 'on the ground' it will fail to bring about practical change. However, combining these pathways is also problematic, as they are rooted in different, in part conflicting, epistemologies, ideologies and interests. Governments often choose the path of least (political) resistance rather than what seems or is ecologically desirable or necessary. Nevertheless, if progress towards a more sustainable world is to be made, ways will have to be found to combine these approaches in mutually supportive ways [Bührs and Aplin, 1999].

Existing approaches to green planning are not only diverse [Jänicke and Jörgens, 1998: 28], but vary also in their practical outcomes or implications. Some green plans are, as in the Netherlands, strongly 'substance oriented' in the sense that they contain very specific, non-negotiable objectives and targets that have been more or less imposed on target groups [Dalal-Clayton et al., 1996: 133-47; VROM, 1998]. Other green planning approaches (such as those underlying New Zealand's Resource Management Act and the draft Canadian Green Plan) put emphasis on the need to strengthen processes towards sustainable development, often accompanied by institutional reforms, and contain few specific objectives or targets [Gale, 1997; Bührs and Bartlett, 1993: 122-32; Jänicke and Jörgens, 1998: 37-9; Johnson, 1995: 68-87]. Some may bring about significant improvement in environmental quality, but other initiatives may amount to little else than symbolic policy-making [Bührs, 1996; Bührs and Bartlett, 1997]. Therefore, to establish how meaningful green plans are requires empirical research and analysis.

Research on green planning developments undertaken so far indicates that the nature and effects of such efforts are varied. Numerous factors and issues that have affected the relative success or failure of green plans have been identified, and various lists of conditions to enhance the effectiveness of green planning formulated. Factors include (but are not confined to): high level political support, public consultation and participation, rigorous analysis, the degree of institutionalisation of green planning, the presence and capacity of a lead agency, resources, opposition by vested interests, the clarity of objectives and priorities, effective communication, broad public understanding, effective implementation, and close monitoring [Dalal-Clayton et al., 1996; Falloux and Talbot, 1993; Jänicke and Jörgens, 1998; Johnson, 1995; Lampietti and Subramanian, 1995; Lopez-Orat, 1997; Margullis and Bernstein, 1995].

Although this research reflects a growing measure of agreement about what makes green planning work, and many analysts provide recommendations or steps for successful green planning, there is no single formula for, or overarching theory of, green planning. Nor can or should

there be. Given the historical, socio-cultural, economic, bio-physical, political and other differences among countries, environmental policies inevitably follow different paths. This is not to say that there is no value in comparing notes and experiences or that ideas or lessons from one country cannot be put to work in another. Moreover, some of the important obstacles to effective green planning are international and systemic, and are likely to require common action if they are to be overcome. In a world of interdependence, 'sustainability in one country' is not a realistic option.

Comparing the Australian and Canadian experiences seems useful not only because in both countries green planning has been pronounced 'dead', but because they are both territorially large, and have federal political systems and a common (British) political-historical heritage. Despite the many important differences between them it seems plausible that the demise of green planning in both has something to do with these common features. May it be that green planning in big, federal systems, with a non-corporatist political tradition,<sup>2</sup> is more difficult than in unitary political systems with a history of corporatism and/or 'impositional' policy making (such as the Netherlands and France) [Richardson, 1982]? Is durable green planning on the federal level possible or even desirable?

### The Canadian Green Plan

Canada was among the first Northern countries to adopt a green plan. Apparently, the Conservative government of Brian Mulroney saw reason to develop a green plan in the high public profile and level of support for environmental issues at the time, the associated expectation of political pay-off, and a need to bring Canadian domestic environmental efforts in line with its international image, in part related to the prominent role Canadians played in the Brundtland Commission [Doern and Conway, 1994: 118; Gale, 1997: 100; Toner, 1994: 232-3; Toner and Doern, 1994: 401].

Blessed with strong Prime Ministerial backing, the Minister for the Environment, Lucien Bouchard, set out to formulate a coherent framework for Canada's environmental policy. Largely an in-house job of Environment Canada (the Department of the Environment), the draft plan had two main strands: the need to change Canada's decision-making systems in order to promote sustainable development, and a set of programmes for specific problems and policy areas. For political reasons, the government chose to emphasise the latter (a chapter on decision-making was relegated to the end of the plan), and attached a considerable sum of money (\$3 billion) to the plan's programmes in the expectation of satisfying many groups and demands [Gale, 1997: 106-7; 109-10; Toner, 1994: 237; Toner and Doern, 1994: 396-7].

Although an extensive consultation process took place after the draft plan had been produced, this was considered by many as a hurried 'add-on' at best [Gale, 1997: 111; Johnson, 1995: 91], and a sham at worst, as it did not allow for genuine public input [Runnals, 1998]. Given that the plan contained proposed budgetary measures, it was treated with the customary secrecy associated with the budget process. The discussion document used in the consultation process was different from the draft plan, which was kept in the drawer. Contrary to the argument made by Falloux and Talbot [1993: 84-5] that 'public participation was pushed to the limit in the plan's development', and that the role of 'localities' and 'states' in the preparation of the Plan has been extensive, the Plan was produced in a top-down manner. As a result, the government failed to create a sense of shared ownership of the plan among environmentalists and other groups in society, many of whom were disappointed with it and saw it as 'nothing more than a green veneer over the *status quo*' [Gale, 1997: 108, 111; Toner, 1994: 239-43]. By contrast, industry and provincial governments, who initially were quite apprehensive about the Plan as they feared that it would be accompanied by an increase in federal regulation and taxes, appeared happy with the outcome, as it adopted a voluntary approach, posed no threat to the autonomy of provincial governments, and effectively led to an increase in regional spending [Gale, 1997: 111-13].

Furthermore, Environment Canada failed to arouse warm feelings for the plan among other government departments. On the contrary, failing to consult properly even within government circles, it managed to antagonise important officials in other key government agencies, such as the Department of Finance. Bureaucratic resistance to the Plan was reinforced by the perception that Environment Canada used it to increase its own power [Gale, 1997: 110, 112]. Although various government departments participated in the plan for the pool of finance that was attached to it, they never bought into the philosophy or rationale behind the plan [Runnals, 1998].

Environment Canada, riding the wave of strong political support for the Green Plan, saw its position in the bureaucratic system rise to unprecedented heights. To enhance its capacity to produce the Plan, experienced people, including a senior economist, were brought in from other government departments [Toner, 1994: 240]. From a government agency at the periphery, Environment Canada moved to the centre of decision-making in Ottawa to the point where it in some respects it took on the role of a central agency [Brown, 1992: 25-6]. The rise in the political importance of environmental issues was also reflected in, and boosted by, the establishment of a Cabinet Committee of the Environment after the elections in 1989. Furthermore, the environment minister was made a

member of the powerful inner cabinet (the Cabinet Committee on Priorities and Planning) [Gale, 1997: 103; Toner and Doern, 1994: 402].

Because of the way the Green Plan came about, it was strongly identified with the government of the day and with Environment Canada. With the change of government in 1993, government support for the Plan evaporated. It had been the intention of the architects of the Plan that it should be revised three or four times before being consolidated into a more durable policy by around the year 2005, but the department was unable to convince the new Liberal government of the merits of that idea [Slater, 1998]. Although not formally abandoned, by 1995 various rounds of budget cuts effectively ended the Plan. In 1998, commentators agreed that Canada's Green Plan was '(stone) dead' and was unlikely to be revived under the government of the day [Emmett, 1998; Slater, 1998; Smith, 1998; Toner, 1998].

What the results of the Green Plan have been is hard to assess. Two 'progress reports' were produced by Environment Canada in 1992 and 1993, but no systematic evaluation of its outcomes has been undertaken. Although Johnson notes that the government started 36 major initiatives since the Plan was adopted [Johnson, 1995: 99], it has been argued that the main policy instruments relied upon have been concerned with generating and disseminating information, and that surprisingly few measures have been taken directly to protect the environment [Hoberg and Harrison, 1994]. Although about half the people questioned in a survey thought that the Plan has had some effect [Morrison, 1997: 68], various commentators expressed the view that its substantive effects, in terms of environmental quality, have been very limited [Conway, 1998; Nyberg, 1998; Runnals, 1998; Toner, 1998].

The gain in stature of Environment Canada that accompanied its leading role in the development of the Green Plan proved as vulnerable as the plan itself. Although the Liberal Government came to power in 1993 with an environmental agenda and apparent commitment, it failed to live up to this promise [Toner, 1994: 253-7; Juillet and Toner, 1997: 180, 193-201]. Budget cuts, departmental reorganisation, the abolition of the Cabinet Committee of the Environment, and a loss of experienced staff eroded Environment Canada's power and capacity [Toner, 1994: 251-2]. By 1998, the department was allegedly 'in a mess' [Olivastri, 1998], and so weak that it was no longer capable of fulfilling its core functions [Conway, 1998].

Although the Green Plan may not have had many immediate environmental effects, some argue that its main significance has been to raise environmental awareness within the bureaucracy [Conway, 1998]. This claim is possibly even harder to assess than the substantive environmental effects of the Plan, but what is clear is that following its

demise, there has been a shift towards an emphasis on institutional and procedural change to promote sustainability, rather than on the formulation of substantive environmental policy at the federal level.

In 1995, honouring a promise made in its election manifesto (the 'Red Book'), the Liberal government of Jean Chrétien established the Office of the Parliamentary Commission of the Environment and Sustainable Development (CESD) [CESD, 1998: Ch.8: 21]. The Office oversees the production and implementation of sustainable development strategies by all government departments. The new Liberal government, not wanting to associate itself with the Plan, had come up with something 'better' of its own [Emmett, 1998; Smith, 1998; Slater, 1998].

To what extent the CESD effectively contributes to the 'greening of the bureaucracy', and whether this in turn is leading to more sustainable practices and environmental conditions remains to be seen. The first sustainable development strategies, produced in 1997, display significant shortcomings. Almost all departments failed to formulate clear and measurable targets, and many strategies 'appear to represent less a commitment to change in order to promote sustainable development than a restatement of the status quo' [CESD, 1998: Ch.1 - Main Points]. In many departments, the strategy has been produced in a rather perfunctory manner by lower-ranking officials, reflecting the low level of priority or importance assigned to them. Rather than strengthen their environmental capacity to produce their strategies, other departments had them drafted for them by outside consultants [Conway, 1998]. So far, the strategies have had little or no demonstrable effects on environmental outcomes or unsustainable practices [Slater, 1998].

One of the difficulties is that departments formulate their own criteria for their environmental performance, and that no environmental performance indicators, and/or an overall plan or policy that stipulates what is required by whom and when to achieve a more sustainable situation and practices, have been formulated. Without an overarching framework it is not possible to determine whether what is undertaken by departments is sufficient or adequate in terms of Canada's overall environmental performance. Although the state sector plays a significant role in the management of Canada's resources and environment, it is unrealistic to expect that a more sustainable situation can be achieved without the involvement and the formulation of clear expectations and requirements of the private sector.

Arguably, however, the efforts of the CESD and government departments (which are required to revise their sustainable development strategies every three years) are part of an ongoing learning process. Environmental performance indicators are likely to be sharpened over time.

Departments may become increasingly concerned about the exposure of their environmental performance, and may improve their act. At some stage departmental strategies may be combined into an overarching sustainability strategy [Emmett, 1998].

In some respects, the move towards an emphasis on institutional change and processes can be seen as a recognition of the difficulties of a more substantive approach to green planning in Canada. Although the failure of the Green Plan 'experiment' [Morrison, 1997: 70] can in large part be attributed to a lack of political will, and to entrenched bureaucratic (development) interests, various commentators have argued that the prescriptive form of green planning adopted in the Netherlands could never work in Canada, given the size of the country, the geographical and social diversity within its borders, and the federal system of government [Conway, 1998; Emmett, 1998; Nyberg, 1998; Smith, 1998; Toner, 1998].

### The Australian Ecologically Sustainable Development Strategy

Developing strategies has been the preferred means of addressing environmental problems in Australia: since the 1980s, many national strategies have been adopted, including ones dealing with conservation, greenhouse issues, waste minimisation and recycling, ozone protection, drought, biological diversity, and water quality [Fowler, 1993: 117]. In addition, and indicating the popularity of the rational policy approach, many other policy statements, guidelines, codes, standards and measures have been adopted at federal and state levels.

Arguably, the flagship is the Ecologically Sustainable Development (ESD) Strategy. At the national level, this has been the most comprehensive strategic effort, addressing developments in 33 sectors as well as cross-sectoral themes. It contains commitments to a raft of objectives, mostly general, using terms such as 'promote', 'encourage', 'review' and 'develop'. Endorsed by the Commonwealth and all state governments in 1992, it has been followed by numerous other strategies, programmes and actions, and by the incorporation of ESD principles into some sectoral legislation, notably with regard to fisheries, agricultural and veterinary chemicals, state-owned corporations, and planning legislation in some state jurisdictions [ICESD, 1996].

The ESD process started in June 1990 with the release by the federal Government of a public discussion document on a proposal to develop a National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development (NSES) [CoA, 1990]. The initiative came from Prime Minister Hawke, whose environmental 'conversion' is reflected in his earlier Statement on the Environment [Hawke, 1989]. As in Canada, reasons for the initiative had

much to do with the rise in electoral significance of environmental issues at the time [Beder, 1993; Crook and Pakulski, 1995], and with a perceived need to respond to international developments, in particular the publication of the Brundtland report.

The discussion paper was heavily criticised by Australia's four main environmental organisations (Australian Conservation Foundation, Greenpeace, The Wilderness Society, and World Wide Fund for Nature - Australia) for being fundamentally flawed and for tacking some ecological considerations on to an ongoing commitment to economic growth [Hare, 1990].

Hawke's preferred policy style has been referred to as consensual [Crowley, 1997: 10; Fowler, 1993: 1]. In line with this, the following stage of the development of the ESD Strategy took a more consultative approach, involving about 150 participants from a broad range of public and private organisations. Nine working groups were established to produce reports for the sectors of agriculture, forestry, fisheries, manufacturing, mining, energy use, energy production, tourism and transport. Further reports on intersectoral issues and the greenhouse issue were presented by the three chairs. The final Strategy was released by the end of 1992 [CoA, 1992].

Although the process by which the Strategy was produced was largely consensual, it was not broadly participatory. It has been pointed out that a majority of the participants (78) were senior government officials, many of whom represented development-oriented departments. Only 24 people represented environment, consumer and justice movements [Diesendorf and Hamilton, 1997: 286-8]. Consultation with and input from the wider community was limited to two consultation meetings at a very late stage. Beder [1993: xiv-xv; 287] notes that as the ESD working group meetings occurred behind closed doors, participation was in effect confined to a select few people, that 'dissenters' (in particular those of a 'deep-green' complexion) were marginalised, and that the process inhibited wider public debate on ESD. As the process was perceived to be structured in favour of vested interests, Greenpeace and the Wilderness Society withdrew.

Disillusion with the Strategy was further fuelled by the way the government treated the 500 recommendations put forward by the working groups. Although environmentalists felt that some of these recommendations reflected real progress achieved in some of the working groups (notably on Energy Use, Transport, Tourism, and Fisheries), this was to a large extent negated by the fact that some key recommendations were watered down in the final Strategy, as a result of opposition from bureaucrats [Diesendorf and Hamilton, 1997: 293-5; Fowler, 1993: 9]. In the eyes of many of the people who had participated in the process, this last-minute intervention amounted to a lack of recognition for the hard work

undertaken by the working groups, and a disavowal of the consensus that had been achieved on important issues. As a result, the already small 'ownership' basis for the Strategy was further reduced.

On 7 December 1992, the Strategy was formally adopted by the Council of Australian Governments which noted that 'the implementation would be subject to budgetary priorities and constraints in individual jurisdictions' [CoA, 1992: 14]. An ESD Steering Committee was established to monitor and report on its implementation. In 1994, this task was combined with that of overseeing the implementation of the National Greenhouse Response Strategy which had been developed parallel to the ESD Strategy, and allocated to the Intergovernmental Committee on ESD (ICESD).

That the implementation of the ESD Strategy stumbled upon many difficulties already became apparent in the first report of the ESD Steering Committee. Although the Committee noted that within the States many initiatives had been introduced that promoted an ecologically sustainable development ethos, it also commented that many of the tools required to manage the change towards ESD (such as indicators which integrate economic, social and environmental performance at all levels of government) were not yet available. The Committee also argued that the absence of timelines made it difficult to assess progress on the implementation of the Strategy, and that a lack of financial resources had been a constraint on the ability of jurisdictions to initiate some of the action [ESD Steering Committee, 1993: 6].

Whether and how the ESD Strategy has been implemented, and what the effects thereof have been, is open to interpretation. On the one hand, many other strategies and initiatives which purport to promote sustainability have been developed following the adoption of the ESD Strategy, at the national level and even more at the state and local government levels. '... some two hundred policies, plans, strategies and programs are now claimed to support the overarching NSESD' [Dovers and Williams, 1997: 5]. At the national level, strategies have been adopted for forests, waste management and biodiversity [DEST, 1998a: 3], among others [Fowler, 1993: 4]. Since 1992, more than 100 programmes and projects in support of localising sustainable development have been launched, several of which seem promising in that they appear to enjoy a high level of commitment and support [Diesendorf and Hamilton, 1997: 296-8]. In as much as these developments can be attributed to the ESD process, and/or can be seen as its metamorphosis into more practical forms, the ESD process in Australia is far from dead. Given this degree of follow-up, Dovers [1997: 7] denounces the claim that 'ESD is dead'.

On the other hand, it is far from clear what the effects of all these initiatives are, and whether they amount to more than paper exercises in

stating a commitment to sustainability. In 1997, the Department of the Environment, Sport and Territories reported that the implementation of the ESD Strategy has occurred mostly in the areas of formal education and training, information collection and dissemination, community awareness, education and participation programs, but that it has been 'patchy' in other areas [DEST, 1997: 2]. Diesendorf and Hamilton [1997: 293-5] argue that very little has been implemented apart from more studies, inquiries and reviews.

Notwithstanding these apparent contradictions, a few things are clear. First, the implementation of the ESD Strategy has occurred in an uncoordinated manner; it has been left to individual government departments, states, and local governments to give consequence to the Strategy in ways that they deem desirable. Second, the means for systematically assessing the implementation of the Strategy and its effects are missing. Third, the claim that the numerous 'sustainability initiatives' at the different levels of government following the adoption of the ESD Strategy are proof that *the Strategy* is alive, is highly problematic as many of these initiatives have been undertaken independently of the Strategy and not as part of a deliberate implementation of its components. Even though the notion of sustainability may be alive and have become an integral if not dominant part of the discourse at various levels of government, the Strategy, as a deliberate effort to operationalise what sustainability means and a co-ordinated network of programmes and action, seems dead indeed.

Support for the latter interpretation can be found in the fact that since its adoption the Strategy has not been revised or revisited by the Government, despite declarations of intent to do so [Commonwealth of Australia, 1996:3; DEST, 1998a:3]. Various analysts argue that since the change of Prime Minister in 1991, political commitment to the Strategy (and environmental issues in general) has declined [Crowley, 1997: 3, 12-13; Dovers, 1997: 8-9]. Like Canada's Green Plan, the Australian ESD Strategy has been described as a (failed) experiment, a one-off event that is unlikely to be repeated [Papadakis, 1993: 128-34; Doyle and Kellow, 1995: 149-50]. One commentator argued: 'Over time, many strategies have seen the light in Australia. But very few have lived for long. The test whether a strategy has any meaning lies in whether it is succeeded by a second version' [Matthews, 1998]. The ESD Strategy may therefore share the fate of the National Conservation Strategy for Australia that was adopted in 1983, but which 'soon faded and achieved little, lacking implementation plans, enforcement, resourcing or institutional support. It was soon forgotten ...' [Dovers and Williams, 1997: 5].

In Australia, as in Canada, the demise of green planning at the federal level has been followed by a greater emphasis on institutional reform rather

than the development of substantive environmental policy. But whereas the reforms in Canada (the establishment of the Parliamentary Commissioner of the Environment and the requirement upon government departments to produce sustainable development strategies) are formally and explicitly based on the promotion of sustainable development, the proposed reforms in Australia seem to be driven more by the political dynamics of Australia's federal system of government (and a desire to reduce the power of the federal government to halt development initiatives within the states) than by an intention to redesign the institutional framework on the basis of the sustainability principle. The proposals, described as the greatest and most comprehensive shake-up of environmental legislation in recent times, affecting over 20 Commonwealth statutes [DoE, 1998], were prepared in a hurry and released early in 1998 with little provision for meaningful public input or consultation. They add fuel to the already strained relations between the environmental groups and the federal government, and appear to mark a return to a more adversarial rather than co-operative style of environmental policy development [Davis, 1998; Hoggarth, 1998; NSW Environmental Defender's Office 1998].

In summary, green planning in both Canada and Australia has been characterised by strong central government control, circumscribed participation, a narrow 'ownership' basis, non-systematic implementation and monitoring, and premature death. In both cases, the green plan or strategy was adopted in the expectation of political rewards which did not materialise in large part because of the way the process was handled and potential supporters alienated. Consequently, from their very start, the green planning exercises in Canada and Australia failed to create a broad and strong sense of public ownership and were closely associated and identified with the government of the day. When governments changed, and/or lost their enthusiasm because the expected political rewards failed to materialise, their commitment towards green planning also crumbled. As the institutional basis for green planning had been weak from the very start, and was even further reduced over time, the green plans faded into oblivion.

The experience in Australia and Canada has done nothing to promote green planning. On the contrary, it seems to have further compromised the idea of rational-comprehensive and integrated environmental policy development at the national level in these countries, and eroded the already shaky support for such an approach among political leaders, bureaucrats, and environmentalists, to the point where few people now advocate a revival or repeat of what have been called 'experiments'.

### Obstacles to Sustained and Effective Green Planning

In the following discussion, the focus is not so much on the conditions that affect the introduction of green planning [Toner and Doern, 1994], but on factors that appear to influence its ongoing viability and effectiveness. Its demise in Canada and Australia shows that sustaining green planning is problematic, particularly because of a lack of sustained political support. But what explains this weak(ening) support?

Four sets of main factors or issues can be identified: issues associated with a federal system of government; political-economic factors; vested bureaucratic interests; and a weak green planning community (constituency).

First, the demise of green planning in Canada and Australia might be blamed on the fact that both countries have federal systems of government. Environmental policy development is complicated by the division of responsibilities between the federal government on the one hand, and provinces/states on the other. As there is uncertainty about the boundaries of their respective mandates, and provinces/states strongly guard against perceived federal infringements on their powers, federal-province/state relations have been strained at times [Kellow, 1996; Harrison, 1996: 167]. Green planning initiatives by the federal government have been treated with suspicion by the provinces/states, and seen as a possible means for the federal government to extend its powers over them. As the provinces/states did not play a major role in the preparation of the Green Plan and ESD Strategy, but were likely to be saddled with an important part of the burden of their implementation, it is not surprising that they felt little inclined to embrace these initiatives. Green planning is going nowhere if states/provinces simply do nothing or adopt symbolic policies at best.

The issue of federal-state/province relations is complex and not easily resolved. Although in Canada relations have been co-operative most of the time (albeit less so in more recent years), and in Australia they have moved from more confrontational during the 1980s to more co-operative in the 1990s, important obstacles to coherent environmental policy development between the levels of government remain. In particular, the institutional framework for co-operative environmental policy development in both countries is still rudimentary and rather undemocratic, as it occurs primarily at the executive level (of Ministerial Councils), without sufficient and durable institutional support, and with little or no input from the broad range of relevant constituencies. As Skogstad [1996: 125] argues: 'A more intractable institutional barrier [than federalism] to coherent environmental policies has been weak or ineffective *intergovernmental* mechanisms to coordinate environmental and developmental issues and interests.' So far,

'executive federalism' has been the main mechanism for environmental policy co-ordination between the two levels of government in both Canada and Australia. Although this may be appropriate when hard political decisions need to be made (and bargained about), it is not suitable for the preparation of policies on environmental issues that transcend individual states, and require careful analysis and the development of coherent responses. Given that such decisions are made behind closed doors without extensive input from affected parties, it is also not conducive to the development of effective policies.

But even if federal and state/provincial governments co-operate, this does not necessarily imply a high level of commitment to green planning. A co-operative approach (in Australia based on a 'concurrent' interpretation of the constitution which puts an emphasis on shared responsibility for environmental matters rather than a 'coordinate' interpretation which sees a sharp and hierarchical division of responsibilities [Doyle and Kellow, 1995: 144-50; Kellow, 1996]), does not by itself resolve the problem that the governments of states/provinces are perceived by many to be captured by development interests, compete with each other economically, and consequently assign low priority to environmental matters [Harrison, 1996: 20-24; Kellow, 1996: 137-9]. As Harrison notes: 'Neither collaboration nor competition is an end in itself. A more important question is co-operation or competition between whom and for what purpose' [Harrison, 1996: 173]. Whether a co-operative approach is more effective than an 'impositional' approach (as in the United States) to get the states to strengthen their environmental commitment and institutions, remains to be proven.

Whether by default a federal government is more inclined to take environmental interests more seriously than state/provincial governments is also debateable. Although at times federal governments have taken a strong position against states/provinces that allowed environmentally damaging developments to proceed, such cases have been relatively rare and confined to times when the environment was riding high in public opinion [Harrison, 1996: 163]. That such instances are mostly inspired by political considerations rather than an intrinsic environmental commitment is also suggested by the fact that in Australia such fights were picked with the governments of less populated ('peripheral') states (with a smaller representation in Parliament) [Kellow, 1996: 147]. In Harrison's terms, federal governments are normally quite happy to 'pass the buck' for environmental matters to the provinces [Harrison, 1996]. For both Australia and Canada it has been argued that the issue is not that the federal governments do not have enough power with regard to environmental issues, but their reluctance to use the powers they have [Harrison, 1996: 164; Holland, 1996: 8; Kellow, 1996: 153]. Even in those instances where

they use their powers, Harrison notes, there is still the tendency to take measures of a largely symbolic nature [Harrison, 1996: 17, 29, 164].

Therefore, although federalism may complicate green planning, it should not be assigned prime responsibility for its demise in Canada and Australia. Rather, as Kellow notes: '... the considerable constitutional bases for Commonwealth action on environmental grounds are no longer at issue. The key questions about Commonwealth involvement are political' [Kellow, 1996: 142]. Federalism is not the main cause of, or excuse for, weak environmental policy or action, but rather functions conveniently as a screen for a lack of political will to act at both levels of government.

More fundamental to the difficulty of building sustained support for green planning in Canada and Australia may be political-economic factors. The dynamics of capital accumulation and market expansion are the driving forces behind an increasingly globalised political-economic system that commodifies social and environmental values, and treats them as means rather than ends [Athanasidou, 1996; Korten, 1995; Polanyi, 1944, 1957]. Since the early 1980s, many governments have elevated rationalist economic policies to an almost religious status. Despite the rhetoric of sustainability, social and environmental values consistently are treated as luxuries, or as means for promoting economic growth [Bührs and Bartlett, 1997]. Under this regime, environmental measures that are seen as a threat to economic growth stand little chance of being introduced. Worse, in many countries, including Australia and Canada, environmental policies and institutions have been, or are at risk of being, dismantled, and environmental expenditure cut, because they are perceived as obstacles to economic growth and development [Christoff, 1994; Toner, 1996].

Although these factors are at work in most if not all countries, they are arguably of greater significance in countries whose economies are heavily dependent on the export of natural resources, like Australia and Canada. Fundamentally, under the prevailing economic system and policies, the state of the economy in these countries relies on increasing resource exploitation and export, especially given the ongoing deterioration in the world price of many primary products relative to industrial goods and services. Given the structure of their economies, it may be significantly more difficult for Australia and Canada to operationalise the concept of sustainable resource management than, say, for the Netherlands, which relies heavily on resource imports. This may also help to explain why notions such as 'ecological modernisation', the 'factor four (or ten) revolution', and 'industrial ecology', which are based on the assumption that economic and environmental gains can be made by reducing the use of resources, have been slow to catch on in Canada and Australia compared to some European countries [Jänicke and Jörgens, 1998: 31; Runnals, 1998; Toner, 1998].

Being resource-rich and big countries, both Australia and Canada may experience less environmental pressure than smaller, more densely populated and industrialised countries. This does not imply, however, that the pressure that they exert on the global environment is not significant. Both Australia and Canada are high energy consumers, and are among the highest greenhouse gas emitters per capita in the OECD [OECD, 1998: 146-7]. Although in part this can be attributed to their size and geography, which may make it difficult, if not impossible, for these countries to bring their consumption and emission levels to those of smaller and more densely populated countries, this does not mean that there is no scope for *reducing* these levels significantly. However, the domestic pressure to do so is likely to be less in Canada and Australia than in countries that depend heavily on resource imports.

Third, associated with these political-economic issues, vested bureaucratic interests are important to explain the difficulty of sustaining political support for green planning. A green plan may be perceived by many agencies and business interests as a threat rather than an opportunity, and may therefore be resisted and resented [Bühns, 1996; Dovers, 1997]. Apprehension about the implications of green planning for their mandates, especially among development oriented government departments, and misgivings about the (potential) rise of the environmental ministry or department in the bureaucratic hierarchy, played a role in both Australia and Canada. In Australia, the involvement of senior officials in the production of the ESD Strategy was inspired foremost by a concern that it would put restraints on economic development, whereas in Canada government departments joined the process mainly to tap into the considerable amount of funding attached to the Green Plan. In both countries, many government departments never really bought into the rationale for green planning, and lost interest as soon as the main issues were decided. In Canada, there was even a backlash against the environment department, as senior bureaucrats in more powerful departments had been rubbed the wrong way in the process.

There is no easy way to overcome these obstacles. Tact and diplomacy may help to mitigate bureaucratic territorialism, but cannot surmount it. Given the way bureaucratic mandates are usually structured and formulated, the idea that environmental and development interests can be reconciled quickly runs into brick walls. Although environmental awareness within the public service may be higher now than ten years ago, there are as yet few signs that environmental considerations are given any other status than afterthoughts. Whether the obligation on government departments to regularly produce a sustainable development strategy, as introduced in Canada, will lead to a greening of the public service remains to be seen. But

even if that were to be the case, it is no substitute for green planning, as this requires a far greater degree of co-ordination and integration between departments than is presently occurring. To achieve that, a more fundamental restructuring of bureaucratic mandates on the basis of sustainability goals may be required. Although that may seem too radical a proposition at this time, the idea is compatible in principle with the 'New Public Management' ideology that has become so dominant in many countries [Hood, 1991], and the associated emphasis on 'management by objectives'. The main issue, of course, is that as yet environmental goals carry insufficient weight to be assigned such a fundamental status.

Finally, a fourth set of reasons why the support for green planning in Canada and Australia has not been sustained can be found in the failure of their green planning processes to build or strengthen a wider green planning community or constituency. Although the introduction and continuation of green planning depends on political support at the highest political level [Falloux and Talbot, 1993: 51, 79; Fowler, 1993: 1; Toner and Doern, 1994: 396], governments and (Prime) Ministers come and go, whereas the opposition and resentment against green planning are likely to remain. For a green plan or strategy to survive, it is indispensable for its support base (or constituency) to be broadened and strengthened sufficiently to withstand a loss of political interest or worse.

Whether a green plan finds ongoing support within government circles and the wider society depends in large part on the process by which it has come about. In some cases (as in the Netherlands) a green plan based on an independent, scientific analysis of the environmental problems facing the country may find acclaim and support across political boundaries and successive governments. This 'Dutch scenario' assumes that the scientific findings on which such a plan is based are not strongly contested, that the level of public concern about the environment remains sufficiently strong, and that 'target groups' are willing to accept the objectives and targets specified in the plan as legitimate and fair.<sup>3</sup> In such a situation, governments and societal groups (including industry) effectively buy into the plan on the basis of its credibility, a sense of necessity and urgency, and the understanding that everyone is held accountable for 'doing their bit'.

Where these conditions do not exist, a sense of co-ownership of a green plan will need to be created by the active involvement of people and groups who have a stake or interest in (causing or resolving) environmental problems. As that means virtually everyone in society this poses an immense challenge and brings with it enormous transaction costs. Ideally, instead of being controlled from the top, the green planning process is democratic and 'bottom-up', involving all those who choose to be involved, from individual citizens, neighbourhood groups and local governments, to

interest organisations, the business sector, state or provincial governments, government departments and members of Parliament. In this scenario, green planning is not confined to the production of one central plan, but involves developing a set of interlocking local, regional, state/provincial, and national plans that involve as many people as possible.

Increasing societal input is not necessarily a smooth process, however. Although participatory policy development and dispute resolution is widely advocated, it is fraught with theoretical and practical difficulties [Amy, 1990; Dahl, 1970; Warriner, 1997]. It may generate rather than abate conflict and frustration (especially initially), takes much time and effort, and requires attentiveness to the potential for manipulation and capture. There are no commonly agreed formulae as to how it can or should be done, but the green planning process needs to be inclusive and democratic to enjoy sustained support.

### A Revival of Green Planning in Canada and Australia?

With so many odds against it, it would be easy to write off green planning as a viable option. The Green Plan in Canada, and the ESD Strategy in Australia are sometimes referred to as failed experiments that are unlikely to be repeated. It has also been argued that for these countries, given their size and the diversity contained within their borders, it is neither realistic nor desirable to develop comprehensive environmental policy plans similar to those adopted in the Netherlands. Quite appropriately, these countries have a federal system of government that assigns a key role in the development of environmental policy to the states and provinces [Kellow, 1996: 149]. Moreover, from an environmental point of view decentralised environmental decision-making (for instance, in bio-regions) is often seen as the way to go. So, are there any reasons for holding on to the idea of green planning at the federal level?

The discussion above contains several elements of a case for the revival of green planning. For a start, reverting to *ad hoc*, fragmented and reactive environmental policy-making is no real option if environmental problems are to be resolved rather than displaced and/or intensified. Green planning has to be done even if it is difficult [Bartlett, 1990]. Writing off green planning as impossible amounts to giving up an essential element in the effort to resolve environmental problems. Although sustainability can be advanced via the other two pathways mentioned earlier in the paper, institutional reform and social mobilisation, these also have their limitations, and will need to be complemented and supported at the policy level across all policy areas to avoid conflict with the activities of government at all levels, and of those involved in the implementation of policies.

A second factor encouraging the revival of green planning lies in international environmental developments. Increasingly, international agreements are negotiated that require countries to meet specific objectives or targets with regard to key environmental issues, such as the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. As these issues touch upon many areas of economic and environmental activity, they function as a lever for the development of more comprehensive and integrated environmental policy.

A third source for the likely revival of green planning in Canada and Australia lies in the fact that internationally the practice of green planning is still spreading steadily (with Germany being one of the countries that has recently adopted it), and has become a norm promoted by international organisations, such as the OECD and World Bank. The OECD, in its environmental performance reviews of Canada and Australia, urges both countries to breathe life into their green planning efforts [OECD, 1995: 111; OECD, 1998: 15] and continues to promote the development of a more integrated approach to environmental policy making in general [OECD, 1996a; 1996b]. Increasingly, Canada and Australia risk being perceived as laggards if their green planning efforts are not sustained.

Actually to revive green planning in Australia and Canada, however, requires more than good reasons. Good reasons have to be argued convincingly and effectively in the political arena by forceful and skilful advocates. But even then, much depends on the political orientation and commitment of those in power, and it is well possible that the chances of reviving green planning are slim without a change in government or political leaders. Meanwhile, the onus is on its advocates (the 'policy entrepreneurs' [Kingdon, 1984]) to keep the idea alive, strengthen its support basis, and to be ready to put forward a convincing case when the time comes.

More broadly, the chances of putting green planning back on the political agenda in Australia and Canada depend on developments in public support and demands for environmental issues, and the incidence of 'crises' or 'focusing events', on the national and/or international level [Kingdon, 1984]. As environmental problems keep mounting, and policies continue to be weak or ineffective, the demand for a more forceful and effective approach to environmental problems is likely to return.

*article received December 1998; final version accepted August 1999*

### NOTES

1. A view expressed by people interviewed by the author in Canada as well as Australia. The OECD, in its review of environmental policies of Canada and Australia, makes virtually identical statements about the status of green planning in both countries, noting that 'efforts

- are (now) directed at *breathing life* [emphasis added] into Canada's (Australia's) sustainable development policy agenda [OECD, 1995: 111; OECD, 1998: 15, 37]. See also Christoff [1994: 362-3].
2. This does not mean to say that, at times, the governments in these countries have entered into negotiated agreements with major interest groups (such as the 'Accord' with the trade unions concluded under the Hawke/Keating government in Australia). But such an approach has been the exception rather than the rule, and dependent on particular leaders rather than an element of the political culture in these countries.
  3. So far, both conditions have been largely met in the Netherlands, although at some stage an employers' organisation withdrew its support for the Dutch policy plan as targets for combating acid rain had been set without its agreement [Wallace, 1995: 59], and the status of environmental issues on the public agenda has declined in recent years. Public willingness to contribute to resolving environmental problems remains high, however [RIVM, 1997: 17].

## REFERENCES

- Amy, Douglas (1990), 'Environmental Dispute Resolution: The Promise and the Pitfalls', in: Norman J. Vig and Michael E. Kraft (eds.), *Environmental Policy in the 1990s. Toward a New Agenda*. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, pp.211-34.
- Athanasiou, Tom (1996), *Divided Planet. The Ecology of Rich and Poor*, Boston, MA: Little, Brown.
- Bartlett, Robert V. (1990), 'Comprehensive Environmental Decision Making: Can It Work?', in Norman Vig and Michael Kraft (eds.), *Environmental Policy in the 1990s: Towards a New Agenda*, Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, pp.235-54.
- Beder, Sharon (1993), *The Nature of Sustainable Development*, Newham, Vic: Scribe Publications.
- Brown, Paul (1992), 'Organizational Design as Policy Instrument. Environment Canada in the Canadian Bureaucracy', in Robert Boardman (ed.), *Canadian Environmental Policy: Ecosystems, Politics, and Process*, Toronto: Oxford University Press, pp.24-41.
- Brown, Lester R. (ed.) (Annually), *State of the World: Vital Signs*, London: Earthscan Publications.
- Bührs, Ton (1996), 'Green Plans: A New Generation of Symbolic Environmental Policies?', paper presented at the ECOPOLITICS X Conference, Australian National University, Canberra, 26-29 Sept.
- Bührs, Ton and Robert V. Bartlett (1993), *Environmental Policy in New Zealand. The Politics of Clean & Green?*, Auckland: Oxford University Press.
- Bührs, Ton, and Robert V. Bartlett (1997), 'Strategic Thinking and the Environment: Planning the Future in New Zealand?', *Environmental Politics*, Vol.6, No.2, pp.72-100.
- Bührs, Ton and Graeme Aplin (1999), 'Pathways Towards Sustainability: The Australian Approach', *Journal of Environmental Management and Planning*, Vol.4, No.3, pp.315-40.
- Carew-Reid, Jeremy et al. (1994), *Strategies for Sustainable Development: A Handbook for their Planning and Implementation*, London: Earthscan Publications. In association with IUCN and IIED.
- Christoff, Peter (1994), 'Environmental Politics', in V. Brett, M. Goot and V. Gillespie (eds.), *Developments in Australian Politics*, Melbourne: Macmillan, pp.348-67.
- Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development [CESD] (1998), *Report of the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development to the House of Commons*, Ottawa: Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development.
- Commonwealth of Australia (CoA) (1990), *Ecologically Sustainable Development: A Commonwealth Discussion Paper*, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.
- Commonwealth of Australia (CoA) (1992), *National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development*, Canberra: AGPS Press.
- Commonwealth of Australia (CoA) (1996), *Australia's Report for the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development*, Canberra: DEST.

- Conway, Tom (1998), Interview, 10 Sept. 1998, Ottawa: Resource Futures International.
- Crook, Stephen and Jan Pakulski (1995), 'Shades of Green: Public Opinion on Environmental Issues in Australia', *Australian Journal of Political Science*, Vol.30, pp.39-55.
- Crowley, Kate (1997), 'Nature, Culture, and the Green State: Policy Challenges and Complications in Australia', paper presented to the Environmental Justice Conference, University of Melbourne, 1-3 Oct. 1997.
- Dahl, R.A. (1970), *After the Revolution*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Dalal-Clayton, Barry et al. (1996), *Getting to Grips with Green Plans: National-Level Experience in Industrial Countries*, London: Earthscan.
- Darier, Éric (1996), 'Environmental Governmentality: The Case of Canada's Green Plan', *Environmental Politics*, Vol.5, No.4, pp.585-606.
- Davis, F. (1998), 'Howard's Plan to Trash Environmental Laws', *Green Left Weekly*, 311, 25 March, pp.3-4.
- Department of the Environment, Sport and Territories (DEST) (1997), *Summary Report on the Implementation of the National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development*, <http://kaos.erin.gov.au/portfolio/esd/nseedssumpt.htm>
- Department of the Environment, Sport and Territories (DEST) (1998), *Reform of Commonwealth Environment Legislation. Consultation Paper*, Canberra: Department of the Environment.
- Department of the Environment, Sport and Territories (DEST) (1998a), *National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development* (<http://kaos.erin.gov.au/portfolio/esd/nseeds/nseeds.htm>).
- Diesendorf, Mark (1998), Interview, 23 April 1998, Sydney: Institute for Sustainable Futures.
- Diesendorf, Mark and Clive Hamilton (eds.) (1997), *Human Ecology, Human Economy. Ideas for an Ecologically Sustainable Future*, St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin.
- Doern, G.Bruce and Thomas Conway (1994), *The Greening of Canada: Federal Institutions and Decisions*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Dovers, Stephen (1997), 'Institutionalising Ecologically Sustainable Development: What Happened, What Did Not, Why, and What Could', paper presented at the Academy of Sciences Symposium 'The Ecologically Sustainable Development Process', Canberra, 28-29 Oct. 1997.
- Dovers, Stephen and Jann E. Williams (1997), 'Implementing the Convention on Biological Diversity: The Australian Experience', paper delivered to Southern Connections II Conference, Valdivia, 6-11 Jan.
- Doyle, Timothy and Aynsley Kellow (1995), *Environmental Politics and Policy Making in Australia*, Melbourne: MacMillan.
- Dror, Yehezkel (1983), *Public Policymaking Reexamined*, 2nd edn., New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
- Dryzek, John S. (1997), *The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Emmett, Brian (1998), Interview, 26 Aug. 1998, Parliamentary Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development, Ottawa: Office of the Auditor General of Canada.
- ESD Steering Committee (1993), *Summary Report on the Implementation of the National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development*, Canberra: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.
- Etzioni, Amitai (1967), 'Mixed Scanning: A "Third" Approach to Decision-Making', *Public Administration Review*, Vol.27, pp.385-92.
- Falloux, François and Lee M. Talbot (1993), *Crisis and Opportunity: Environment and Development in Africa*, London: Earthscan Publications.
- Fowler, Robert J. (1993), 'New National Directions in Environment Protection and Conservation', paper presented at the Environmental Outlook Conference, Sydney, 10-11 Nov.
- Gale, Robert J.P. (1997), 'Canada's Green Plan', in Martin Jünke, Alexander Curius and Helge Jörgens, *Nationale Umweltpäne in Ausgewählten Industrieländern*, Berlin: Springer, pp.97-120.
- Hare, W.L. (ed.) (1990), *Ecologically Sustainable Development. A Submission*, Collingwood, Vic: Snap Printing.

- Harrison, Kathryn (1996), *Passing the Buck: Federalism and Canadian Environmental Policy*, Vancouver: UBC Press.
- Hawke, R.J.L. (1989), *Our Country, Our Future: Statement on the Environment*, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.
- Hoberg, George, and Kathryn Harrison (1994), 'It's Not Easy Being Green: The Politics of Canada's Green Plan', *Canadian Public Policy*, Vol.20, No.2, pp.119-37.
- Hoggarth, M. (1998), 'Red Hot and Green', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 27 March, p.11.
- Holland, Kenneth M. (1996), 'Introduction', in Holland, Morton and Galligan [1996: 2-15].
- Holland, Kenneth M., Morton, F.L. and Brian Galligan (eds.), (1996), *Federalism and the Environment: Environmental Policymaking in Australia, Canada, and the United States*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Hood, Christopher (1991), 'A Public Management For All Seasons?', *Public Administration*, Vol.69, No.1, pp.3-19.
- Intergovernmental Committee for Ecologically Sustainable Development (ICESD) (1996), *Report on the Implementation of the National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development 1993-1995* (Canberra, Department of the Environment, Sport and Territories).
- Jänicke, Martin and Helge Jörgens (1998), 'National Environmental Policy Planning: Preliminary Lessons from Cross-National Comparisons', *Environmental Politics*, Vol.7, No.2, pp.27-54.
- Johnson, Huey D. (1995), *Green Plans: Greenprints for Sustainability*, Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press.
- Juillet, Luc and Glen Toner (1997), 'From Great Leaps to Baby Steps: Environment and Sustainable Development Policy Under the Liberals', in Gene Swimmer (ed.), *How Ottawa Spends: 1997-98: Seeing Red: A Liberal Report Card*, Ottawa: Carleton University Press, pp.179-209.
- Kellow, Aynsley (1996), 'Thinking Globally and Acting Federally: Intergovernmental Relations and Environmental Protection in Australia', in Holland, Morton and Galligan [1996: 135-56].
- Kingdon, John W. (1984), *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, Boston, MA, Little, Brown.
- Korten, David C. (1995), *When Corporations Rule the World*, West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press.
- Lampietti, Julian A. and Uma Subramanian (1995), *Taking Stock of National Environmental Strategies*, Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Lopez Ornat, Arturo (ed.) (1997), *Strategies for Sustainability Latin America*, London: Earthscan/IUCN.
- Margulis, Sergio and Janis Bernstein (1995), *National Environmental Strategies: Learning From Experience*, Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Matthews, Peter, Interview, 3 April 1998, Director, Canberra: Environment Australia.
- Morrison, Peter (1997), 'Canada's Green Plan: An Expression of the Popular Will?', in Alan Frizzel and Jon H. Pammatt (eds.), *Shades of Green. Environmental Attitudes in Canada and Around the World*, Ottawa: Carleton University Press, pp.55-73.
- NSW Environmental Defender's Office (1998), *Preliminary Comments on the Reform of Commonwealth Environment Legislation' Consultation Paper*, Sydney: Environmental Defender's Office.
- Nyberg, Gene (1998), Interview, 3 Sept. 1998. Corporate Secretary and Director of Operations, National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy, Ottawa.
- OECD (1995), *Environmental Performance Reviews. Canada*, Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
- OECD (1996a), *Integrating Environment and Economy. Progress in the 1990s*, Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
- OECD (1996b), *Building Policy Coherence: Tools and Tensions*, Public Management Occasional Papers, No.12. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
- OECD (1998), *Environmental Performance Reviews. Australia*, Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
- Ollivier, Beatrice (1998), Interview, 3 Sept. 1998. Executive Director, Ottawa: Friends of the Earth.

- Papadakis, Elim (1993), *Politics and the Environment: The Australian Experience*, St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin.
- Polanyi, Karl (1944; 1957), *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
- Redclift, M. (1987), *Sustainable Development*, London: Methuen.
- Richardson, J. (ed.) (1982), *Policy Styles in Western Europe*, London: George Allen & Unwin.
- RIVM (1997), *Milieubalans 97. Het Nederlandse Milieu Verklaard*, Alphen aan den Rijn: Samsom/H.D. Tjeenk Wllink bv.
- Runnals, David (1998), Interview, 15 Sept. 1998, Senior Fellow and Program Director Trade and Sustainable Development, Ottawa: International Institute for Sustainable Development.
- Skogstad, Grace (1996), 'Intergovernmental Relations and the Politics of Environmental Protection in Canada', in Holland, Morton and Galligan [1996: 103-34].
- Slater, Robert (1998), Interview, 26 Aug. 1998, Senior Assistant Deputy Minister of the Environment, Ottawa: Environment Canada.
- Smith, Richard (1998), Interview, 26 Aug. 1998, Principal, Sustainable Development Team, Ottawa: Office of the Auditor General of Canada.
- Toner, Glen (1994), 'The Green Plan: From Great Expectations to Eco-Backtracking ... to Revitalization?', in Susan D. Phillips (ed.), *How Ottawa Spends 1994-95: Making Change*, Ottawa: Carleton University Press, pp.229-60.
- Toner, Glen (1996), 'Environment Canada's Continuing Roller Coaster Ride', in Gene Swimmer (ed.), *How Ottawa Spends 1996-97. Life Under the Knife*, Ottawa: Carleton University Press, pp.99-132.
- Toner, Glen (1998), Interview, 25 Aug. 1998, Professor, School of Public Administration, Ottawa: Carleton University.
- Toner, Glen and Bruce Doern (1994), 'Five Political and Policy Imperatives in Green Plan Formation: The Canadian Case', *Environmental Politics*, Vol.3, No.3, pp.395-420.
- VROM (Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer) et al. (1998), *National Environmental Policy Plan 3: The Summary*, The Hague: VROM.
- Wackernagel, Mathis and William Rees (1996), *Our Ecological Footprint. Reducing Human Impact on the Earth*, Gabriola Island, BC: New Society Publishers.
- Wallace, David (1995), *Environmental Policy and Industrial Innovation: Strategies in Europe, the USA and Japan*, London: Earthscan Publications.
- Warriner, G. Keith (1997), 'Public Participation and Environmental Planning' in Thomas Fleming (ed.), *The Environment and Canadian Society*, Toronto: International Thomson Publishing, pp.171-200.
- World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) (1987), *Our Common Future*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.