THE GREENING OF NEW ZEALAND: TOWARDS A NEW PARADIGM?

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1. Introduction.

Since the late 1980s a second wave of environmentalism sweeps through the world. The first wave, in the early 1970s, had apparently failed to bring about the changes required to effectively deal with, or at least allay, the environmental concerns that were raised. On the contrary, the level of concern seems to have reached new heights, fuelled by such events and manifestations as the Chernobyl disaster, the Exon Valdez oil spill, the discovery of the ozone hole, and the gradual rise in global temperatures associated with the greenhouse effect. What governments have been doing to combat environmental degradation has come to be perceived as too little, too late.

The inadequacy of government performance with regard to environmental problems seems to vindicate those in the green movement who argue that a technocentric approach to the environment is not good enough, and that much more radical change in our societies is required to stem the tide of environmental decay. Instead of relying on "end of [redacted]pipe[redacted]" solutions to contain or reduce the *effects* of environmental problems, we need to address their *causes*, which, according to critics, are to be found in the dominant values of modern societies, in our lifestyle and ideas of a "good life", and in our attitudes and behaviour towards nature and resources. In other words, a change in dominant social (or cultural) paradigm (DSP) is required to avoid total, self-inflicted, global destruction.

In this paper, first, some evidence of the growth in support for "the environment" in New Zealand will be presented. Secondly, the question whether this increase signifies a shift towards a new social paradigm will be addressed. Finally, the limitations of an exclusive focus on values and behaviour in assessing social paradigm change will be discussed.

2. The "Greening" of New Zealand.

The growing support for environmental values in New Zealand, and rise in environmentally conscious behaviour, manifests itself in a variety of ways. Firstly, there has been considerable growth in support given to environmental groups. Secondly, considerable support for environmental issues has been expressed in public opinion surveys. Thirdly, in the economic sphere, the phenomenon of "green consumerism" is gaining in significance. Also, companies seem to pay more attention to environmental matters, for instance, in annual reports and through the introduction of environmental auditing. Fourthly, in the political sphere, support for a the environment has seen the revival of a Green Party, and an environmental "bandwagon" effect.

Support for Environmental Organisations.

One of the most readily measurable indicators of the rise in support for environmental values can be found in the degree of support for environmental organisations. Environmental groups are a manifest expression of commitment to "the environment", and support for those groups can be measured in membership numbers and income from donations, subscriptions, and sales. Figures of some of the major environmental organisations in New Zealand are summarised in Table 1.

TABLE 1
SUPPORT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS IN NEW ZEALAND

	No. members (000)		Income ($NZ 000)	
	1985	1991	1985	1991
Royal Forest & Bird Protection Society	43.8	62.0	358	1,167[a]
Greenpeace	4.0[b]	170.0[c]	453	2,227[d]
Maruia Society	9.8[e]	11.8	238[e]	336
Total	68.6	243.8	1,049	3,730

[a]. The figure includes net income from sales.
[b]. Before the bombing of the Rainbow Warrior; after the bombing numbers went up to 11,000 by the end of 1985.
[c]. Number of "supporters" (including those who make donations).
[d]. Figure for 1990; in 1991 income from donations, subscriptions, fundraising and sales dropped to $NZ 1,302 050.
[e]. Figures for beginning 1989; the Maruia Society was formed in May 1988, merging the Native Forests Action Council (NFAC) and the Environmental Defence Society (EDS).
Sources: Royal Forest & Bird Protection Society of NZ Inc., Annual Reports 1985, 1991; Greenpeace, Annual Reports 1985, 1990, 1991; Belinda Davies, Maruia Society.

Support for these organisation grew significantly between the mid 1980s and 1991, with Greenpeace showing the most spectacular increase. Greenpeace's

success is undoubtedly influenced by the bombing of the Rainbow Warrior in Auckland Harbour in 1985, sparking off a wave of indignation about the French action, and boosting sympathy for Greenpeace and its cause, in particular the halting of French nuclear testing in the Pacific. Also other organisations, however, have seen a rise in public support, as reflected in membership numbers and financial income from subscriptions, donations, and sales.

Increased membership and income enable these organisations to appoint more paid staff. Forest & Bird now has twenty people on the pay-roll (nine in 1985), Greenpeace 74 (two in early 1985), and the Maruia Society six. This is in addition to the number of volunteers who also do considerable amounts of work for these organisations (800 for Forest & Bird, 150 for Greenpeace, 12 for the Maruia Society).

It should be noted, however, that the financial base of these organisations remains vulnerable, dependent as it is on public goodwill and support. That a continuation of financial support on past levels cannot be taken for granted is most clearly demonstrated in Greenpeace's case. A significant drop in income brought the organisation into the red in 1991, forcing it to take some painful measures.

Overall, support for environmental groups has significantly increased in the last five to six years, and can be interpreted as a sign of growing environmental awareness. With respect to numbers of members or supporters, these environmental groups are now amongst the principal interest groups in New Zealand, outstripping various traditionally strong sectoral interest groups such as Federated Farmers (approximately 25,000 members) and trade unions. Inevitably, however, direct membership of environmental groups is likely to remain confined to a particular section of the public, and it is therefore necessary to also rely on other indicators to gauge the level of public support for environmental values in society.

Public Opinion On Environmental Issues.

Not many studies on the degree of concern or support for environmental matters have been conducted in New Zealand. Only a few surveys have been found addressing these matters, and their results will be summarised below.

The 1989 New Zealand Study of Values (Gold and Webster, 1990) included questions on attitudes towards the environment, and found that protection for the environment came fourth in the ranking of top priorities, after reducing unemployment, maintaining law and order, and fighting crime. Environmental protection, however, was seen as an urgent problem, requiring immediate attention, by 85% of the respondents. This was backed up by 64% who also expressed the view that an increase in Government spending was needed in this area (Gold and Webster, 1990).

Support for environmental protection in the NZSV survey is more controversial than for the first three priorities, in the sense that there is more disagreement along political party lines (more support from Labour and non-voters than from National voters), age groups (more support amongst the young and middle aged than from older people), and along educational record lines (more support from the better educated). These findings concur with overseas findings in identifying political orientation, age, and education as the most important discriminatory factors with regard to environmental support (Dunlap and Van Liere, 1978).

A second survey undertaken in 1989, by Colmar and Brunton, covered behaviour, in particular consumer behaviour, as well as opinions regarding the environment (Colmar and Brunton, 1989). On the basis the responses, the researchers identified four consumer segments. The first group, 28% of the respondents, were labelled the "Deep Greens", comprising those people who hold strong environmental attitudes, even to the extent that they find the environment "the most important issue". These people make big personal efforts to translate this view in their behaviour (recycling, buying organic food, avoiding products sold in plastic packaging). They are prepared to pay more for environmentally friendly products, and try to learn more about environmental issues. They watch little TV, but read books and information magazines, are socially and culturally active, and go for walks or tramps. Most of these people are female (72%), well-educated, and have a high combined income

The second segment, 22% of the respondents, were characterised as "Green Pragmatists". This group comprises those who are concerned about environmental issues, particularly those that affect themselves, but who do not go to the same length as the first group to translate their views into behaviour.

People in this category tend to regard environmental issues as transient, and less important than unemployment. These people tend to be older, poorly educated by today's standards, and belong to the lower socio-economic class. They are often retired people, who have grown up in a world where thrift and avoiding waste were important.

The third segment, 25% of the respondents, were called "Green Faddists", and consists of people who are not really interested in green issues, but who conform to environmental behaviour not requiring much effort, such as using ozone friendly sprays, and buying other products labelled as environmentally friendly. These people are fashion conscious, run electronic appliances, and use plastic cards. They rely on TV as their main information source, watch videos, eat takeaways, and are socially active. They tend to be younger (under 40), have middle to high incomes and households with school-age children.

The fourth segment identified in the Colmar and Brunton survey are the "Green Indifferents", 25% of the respondents. They have the least knowledge of green or social issues, and the least interest in knowing about them. They belong to the lower socio-economic class, are generally poorly educated, punch the timeclock, and live from pay packet to pay packet. This group consists for two thirds of males.

Another result coming forward from the poll was that most respondents laid the responsibility for solving environmental problems with governments, whereas only 8% felt an individual responsibility to address these issues. An even smaller segment, 5%, indicated a preparedness to participate in various forms of protest action to support environmental issues.

A third poll, consigned by NBR-Mattingly in October 1991, asked four questions: (1) "Is New Zealand currently protected adequately in terms of environmental issues?"; (2) "Do environmental groups receive too much publicity?"; (3) "Do you think that concern for the environment is costing New Zealand jobs?"; and (4) "Do you think that environmentalists are going too far in their demands?"

55% of those interviewed in the NBR poll thought that New Zealand is currently not adequately protected in terms of environmental issues, against 34% who found that it was. More than 60% do not think that environmental groups

receive too much publicity, or that environmentalists are excessive in their demands. More divided were the answers to the question on employment, with 47% thinking that concern for the environment costs jobs, and 40% who believed that it didn't.

Dissatisfaction with the degree of protection amongst NBR respondents was greater under females than males (59% as against 50%), and greatest in the 35-39 age group (67% compared to 61% of 18-24 year olds and 43% in the 55 plus age group). Support was lower among higher income groups (47% of those earning $45,000 as against 57% with an income less than that), and National voters (45% compared to 59% of the people supporting Labour). Again, political orientation, age, and sex come forward as discriminatory factors, but income also emerges as an explanatory factor.

Although these data hardly warrant the making of any generalisations about the general degree of concern or support for environmental matters in New Zealand, they indicate that concern and support are not confined to those directly supporting environmental groups. Many people apparently agree with environmental groups that present policies do not go far enough, and that "more" or "else" is needed. However, the data provide no insight into how much "more", or what "else", New Zealanders are in favour of, but seem to confirm overseas findings that environmental issues are not as salient or intensely held as other (e.g. economic or security) issues, as reflected in their relative ranking in the polls, and in the preparedness of few people to join in protest action (Dunlap, 1989). Also, most people think that this is an area where governments and other agencies carry prime responsibility, not they themselves.

A Greening of the Economy?

Other indicators for increased support for environmental values can be found in the economy. One such indicator is the phenomenon of "green consumerism", the sale of products or services which are considered to be "environmentally friendly". More and more products are advertised as being "green" and "good for the environment", ranging from spray cans not containing fluorocarbons as accelerant, to unleaded petrol, unbleached products, organically grown fruit and vegetables, more fuel economic cars, and less noisy aeroplanes.

As an indicator for measuring commitment to environmental values "green consumerism" is attractive, particularly because it connects commitment with *behaviour* as well as values. It provides people with an opportunity to *do* something about environmental protection on a day to day basis, and there is no doubt that changing consumer behaviour can be a potent force inducing producers to change their practices.

Whether products or services praised by producers as "green" or "environmentally friendly" rightly carry that label is, of course, subject to debate. It is a complex and contentious issue, with uneasy cut-off points between genuine commitment and commercial exploitation. "Green consumer guides" try to provide guidance, and the NZ Government, following the example of various other countries, recently introduced an environmental labelling scheme, "environmental choice" (Minister for the Environment, 1992). However, it could be argued that it doesn't matter, for the sake of measuring environmental *support*, whether or not a product or service is "really" green or not. It is the fact that people buy products which are *perceived* as "green", partly because of marketing activities, which should count.

The Colmar and Brunton study referred to above found that, in the 12 months previous to the survey, 60% of the New Zealand population had used ozone friendly spray, 49% had returned bottles to bottle banks, and 41% had used products with environmentally friendly labels. Also, 31% had refused to use products harmful to the environment, 26% had eaten organically grown food, and 25% had made a big effort to buy green products. Such figures suggest that a sizeable proportion of people in New Zealand already engage in various forms of "green" behaviour and "green consumerism".

Even more problematic is the measuring of the degree "green producerism". Although more and more products are advertised as "environmentally friendly", data on the sales of such products are hard to obtain. Many companies are secretive about the commercial record of these products. In an effort to obtain some data in this area, twenty-five companies in New Zealand were asked by the author to provide gross sales figures of products that they considered as "green". Only two companies were prepared to release some figures, six responded that data on these matters were confidential, one that no

figures on "green" products in particular could be given because they considered all their products to be "green", but most didn't even bother to respond.

In New Zealand's National Report to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Ministry for the Environment and Ministry of External Relations & Trade, 1991, 92), reference is made to an increasing receptivity in private enterprise to community desires for environmental responsibility. Support for that statement is provided in the form of examples, ranging from the elimination of CFCs, and the introduction of equipment to control water and air pollution, to the contribution of financial support for wildlife conservation (the kakapo and the kiwi). However, apart from the fact that various of these examples are likely to have been inspired by existing or anticipated legal requirements, or by a desire to polish a company's image, they are no proof of a more structural change in corporate behaviour.

A more systematic effort in measuring corporate support for environmental values has been undertaken on the basis of a study of the annual reports of corporations (Goodwin and Hille, 1992). Environmental constraints and opportunities affect corporate performance, and the treatment of such matters in annual reports can be interpreted as an indication of a company's environmental awareness. A scrutiny of the annual reports of the top 40 companies in New Zealand found that only 14 companies made reference to environmental issues, whereas 25 did not mention the environment at all. Six companies referred to environmental issues in passing ("minimal coverage"), another three included a statement implying some commitment to the environment, whereas four reports encompassed a more detailed discussion of environmental matters. Only one company, however, gave a comprehensive coverage of environmental issues, and expressed a commitment to the principle of sustainability. The study noted that the level of environmental reporting by companies in New Zealand compared unfavourably with that of some other countries, notably the United Kingdom and the United States.

These findings are confirmed in a comparative study of the priority given by chief executives in New Zealand and Canada to research topics, which showed that the environment ranked only 20 on the New Zealand chief executives' list, compared to 4 on the Canadian list (Cartner, 1991).

The relatively low priority of environmental values in the corporate sector in New Zealand is also reflected in the practice of environmental auditing in New Zealand. Corporate environmental auditing refers to the assessment of environmental aspects of a company's activities, and can also take place on various levels or degrees, ranging from assessing the extent of compliance with regulatory standards ("first stage"), and assessing compliance with a company's own environmental policy ("second stage"), to assessing company activities on the basis of the principle of sustainability ("third stage" or "cradle to grave" auditing).

According to a study of environmental auditing practices in New Zealand, only 35% of the companies responding to a survey appeared to have well-developed auditing programmes. The main reasons why companies engage in environmental auditing are to verify compliance with regulations (40%) or to identify risks (cost avoidance)(35%). Only 10% see it as a means for minimising environmental impacts or assessing environmental sustainability of company practices, and most of the companies in this category are foreign owned. The study concludes that New Zealand owned companies lag behind in the development of environmental auditing compared to overseas owned companies (Lambert, 1991).

Overall, the level of support for environmental values amongst New Zealand companies does not seem to be very high. Many companies apparently still need to discover that being environmentally aware can also mean good business. Very few have made a commitment to put their operations on an environmentally sustainable footing.

The Greening of Politics.

New Zealand was one of the first countries to give birth to a Green Party, the Values Party, established in 1972. Despite a good showing in the elections of 1972, and in particular of 1975, the party, obstructed by the electoral "first past the post" system, never gained a seat in Parliament, and gradually withered away, plagued by internal divisions and declining public support.

However, with the second wave of global environmentalism also spreading over New Zealand, a new Green Party arose from the ashes of the Values Party in 1990. Six months after it came into being, the party gained 6.9% of the votes in

the national elections, a good result considering that it had fielded candidates in only 71 of the 97 electorates, and that it had hardly produced an election programme.

In February 1992 the Greens joined forces with other small parties in an "Alliance" to contest the Tamaki by-election. The Alliance candidate, a Democrat, came close to defeating the National Party candidate in this traditional National stronghold. Given the success of the Alliance, also reflected in the election of some of its candidates in regional council by-elections, it seems likely that this formation of smaller parties will become a permanent feature on the political landscape, and a serious contender for the 1993 elections. Given the presence of the Greens in the formation, and the strong environmental programme adopted by the New Labour Party along with an egalitarian philosophy, it would seem that the Alliance may evolve into a strong green/red force in New Zealand politics.

The greening of politics in New Zealand is also reflected in the fact that both National and Labour now assign considerable space to environmental issues in their manifestos, trying to outcompete each other in presenting a green image. In government between 1984 and 1990, Labour initiated a large-scale reform of environmental legislation and administration, leading to, amongst other, the establishment of three new environmental agencies, and the introduction of the Resource Management Act.[1] National, trying to outbid Labour, promised, amongst other things, to reduce carbon-dioxide emissions faster than Labour (20% by the year 2000 instead of 2005), and to generate thousands of jobs on the basis of a "Task Force Green" programme.

Whatever the degree of genuineness of politicians' commitment to environmental goals and values, green demands and interests have become a force to be reckoned with. People expect governments to take these problems seriously. More than ever, environmental concerns have created a bandwagon effect, even in a time of economic recession and mass unemployment. It would appear, indeed, that the rise of environmental values in the political priority list of the public and politicians represents a significant shift away from traditional dominant values towards a new social paradigm.

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1. Although the Act was passed by the National Government in 1991, the bulk of the Act's substance was produced under the previous Labour Government. The new agencies were a Ministry for the Environment (replacing a Commission for the Environment), a Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, and a Department of Conservation.

3. A Shift In Social Paradigm?

The contention that the rise in support for environmental values is part of, or contributes to, a shift towards a new social paradigm has become a familiar phenomenon in the literature (Inglehart, 1977, 1990; Dunlap and Van Liere, 1978; Cotgrove, 1982; Milbrath, 1984). The argument can be approached from two sides. On the one hand, the growing support for environmental values can be seen as part of a broader development towards "post-materialist" values and culture change caused by an increase in physical and material security. On the other hand, it can be argued that environmentalism itself is a driving force behind the development of a new social paradigm.

Inglehart, a leading analyst of the first line of argument, argues that there is a demonstrable change in culture in societies which enjoy a high level of physical and material security. Materialist values such as economic growth, higher incomes, and strong defense have diminishing marginal appeal ("diminishing marginal utility"), and other values such as participation, freedom of speech, and protection of the environment, become more important. A generation grown up in prosperity and security will continue to assign greater value to post-materialist values, despite temporary set-backs in material living conditions. Cultural change occurs slowly as post-materialist generations move through the life-cycle (Inglehart, 1977; 1981; 1990).

The second line of argument is not incompatible with the first one, but puts greater emphasis on environmentalism as an independent variable in the shift towards a new paradigm. Environmentalism, embodying a growing recognition that people need to fundamentally change their values and lifestyles if continuing environmental degradation, or even environmental catastrophe, is to be avoided, is a is a driving force behind cultural change. A shift towards post-materialist values, in this view, although perhaps partly resulting from conditions of physical and economic security, sprouts also from a genuine concern about environmental degradation and from a recognition that existing lifestyles are unsustainable (Ophuls, 1977; Milbrath, 1984; Paehlke, 1989; Eckersley, 1989).

One major difficulty with the paradigm shift thesis is that of defining and measuring what "old" and "new" paradigms are. The terms materialist and post-

materialist are open for different interpretations. Flanagan, for instance, argues that Ingelhart's classification mixes three distinctive types of items, namely libertarian/post-materialist (e.g. participation, freedom of speech, tolerance of minorities, environmental protection), materialist (e.g. economic growth, high income, comfortable life), and authoritarian (e.g. strong defense, law and order, patriotism and discipline). Given that the questions which Inglehart uses to measure materialism comprise materialist and authoritarian items, his findings confuse a trend towards nonmaterialism (defined in terms of the relative priority attached to economic issues), with a shift from authoritarian towards libertarian values (Flanagan, 1987).

The difficulty of defining social paradigms also becomes apparent when environmentalists advocating a shift towards a new paradigm try to identify the core values which should underlie such a paradigm. Although many authors have identified the central values associated with old and new paradigms (See e.g. Ophuls, 1977; O'Riordan, 1981; Cotgrove, 1982; Milbrath, 1984; Paehlke, 1989; Colby, 1990), Cotgrove's assessment that, apart from the agreement that fundamental changes are needed in contemporary societies, the consensus among environmentalists evaporates, seem to a large extent valid (Cotgrove, 1982, 102). In particular, environmentalists disagree about the degree of control which is required over individual liberties, and there are divisions between "deep" and "shallow" environmentalists with regard to the place to be allocated to humans in the natural and societal order (Ophuls, 1977; Devall, 1980). As an ideology, environmentalism is influenced by, and compatible with, the three classical ideologies of liberalism, conservatism, and socialism, none of which has "an exclusive claim on environmental wisdom" (Paehlke, 1989, 103). Environmentalists struggle with the problem of how to organise the economy (what place to give to the free market?), and with issues such as economic growth (in particular with regard to developing countries), the distribution of resources and income (property rights, equity), and decentralisation (enhancing community control in the face of a concentration of power, also on a global scale). There is, therefore, no clear yardstick for measuring a shift in the direction of a new paradigm.

Another problem with regard to measuring paradigm shift is that there may be discrepancies between expressed values (e.g. through a questionnaire), and behaviour. As noted by Dunlap and Van Liere, "the link between attitudes and behaviour is often rather tenuous, especially when dealing with very general

attitudes as those embodied in the NEP (New Environmental Paradigm)" (Dunlap and Van Liere, 1978). The problem, although acknowledged by analysts (see also e.g. Milbrath, 1984, 17-18), has, however, received little attention in the form of work on the development of alternative indicators for paradigm change. Analysts of paradigm change continue to rely primarily on survey techniques measuring value change, apparently assuming, with Milbrath, that expressed values are more likely than behaviour to reflect what people "really" believe (Milbrath, 1984, 17-18). However, the relation between values and behaviour is not uni-directional. Behaviour is also subject to institutional constraints, and it seems to make little sense to discuss whether paradigm shift occurs without assessing the extent to which also institutions change. We will return to this issue in the next section.

What then, is the significance of the rise in support for environmental values in New Zealand, as indicated in the previous section?

With regard to values or attitudes, it should be noted that none of the surveys referred to in the previous section has been based on Inglehart's model, which makes comparison in terms of the degree of support for postmaterialism in New Zealand problematic. However, the New Zealand Study of Values provides a basis for some useful comparisons with surveys included in Ingelhart's recent publication.

A question on priorities among social goals in the New Zealand Study of Values contained authoritarian (law and order, fight crime), materialist (lower unemployment, living standards), and postmaterialist items (environmental protection, more say in government, and civil freedoms and liberties). The highest priority was given to lower unemployment (45%), but raising living standards received only a 9% score. If the scores for *first and second* priorities are combined, materialist values score 90%, authoritarian values 66%, and postmaterialist values 46% (Gold and Webster, 1990, Table 1.2).

Compared with the weighted results of surveys in nine West-European countries in 1988, New Zealand scores higher on support for materialist items (90% compared to 66%), higher on authoritarian items (66% compared to 53%), but considerably lower on postmaterialist items (46% compared to 80%). The total score for materialist support in Inglehart's definition (comprising materialist and authoritarian items) is 156 for New Zealand, and 119 for the

European countries (Inglehart, 1990, 98; Gold and Webster, 1990, Table 1-2). Although the NZSV survey does not provide the data to allow the calculation of the exact proportion of materialists and postmaterialists in New Zealand (those whose first two priorities are either materialist or postmaterialist), these data are a strong indication that the support for postmaterialist values in New Zealand is considerably lagging behind that in West-European countries.[2]

On the other hand, however, it appears that New Zealanders share the views of many people in other countries with regard to the need for social change. 64% of New Zealanders agree with the statement that our society must be improved through gradual reforms (compared to 73% in Britain, the U.S., Belgium, France, and Italy, 69% in Denmark and Luxembourg, 59% in W. Germany, and 50% in Norway. There is even a rather big proportion in New Zealand that is in favour of radical change (14%), compared to less than 10% in 18 out of 22 surveyed countries in Inglehart's study, putting New Zealand in line with countries like Mexico, Argentina, and Portugal (12, 13, and 14% respectively) (Inglehart, 1990, 39). On the other end of the spectrum, 22% of the New Zealand public wants to preserve the status quo or return to the traditional ways of the past (9 and 13% respectively) (Gold and Webster, 1990, 1, Table 1.1). It appears, however, that the desire for reform in New Zealand refers more to political and economic change (the macro dimension) than to a change of morals or values (on the micro dimension). On the basis of questions regarding morality issues, the authors of the NZSV report conclude that there is "a strong strain of moral conservatism in New Zealand concerning matters of personal lifestyle." (Gold and Webster, 1990, 25-26).

One area where change on the micro level has been studied in New Zealand is that of consumer behaviour. The Colmar and Brunton survey identified 28% of the respondents as "deep green", indicating a preparedness to go at considerable lengths to purchase environmentally friendly goods and services. However, it should be noted that such behaviour does not necessarily imply or coincide with a significant change in lifestyle. Green consumerism is not incompatible with materialist values, and may even contribute to a rise in consumption (e.g. by the sale of pollution control devices added to cars). Much of this behaviour is in the "easy" category of behaviour change, as indicated by the fact that it is also occurs among the "pragmatists" and "faddists" in the survey.

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2. It should be noted that the results may not be strictly comparable given the differences in batteries of questions used.

Although green consumerism is an expression of growing concern about the environment, it is not necessarily an indication of a change in behaviour on the basis of postmaterialist values. The proportion of "deep greens" identified in the Colmar and Brunton survey can therefore not be equated with the proportion of postmaterialist in the New Zealand population.[3]

Also the NBR-Mattingly survey does not provide data to support claims about a paradigm shift. Although the data could be interpreted as a sign that there is significant support in New Zealand for the introduction of tougher environmental policies (with 55% saying that New Zealand is not adequately protected in terms of environmental issues, and more than 60% indicating that environmental groups do not go too far in their demands), we do not learn what, and how much, change New Zealanders want, nor whether people are prepared to accept changes which would require a change in lifestyle or behaviour based on environmental or postmaterialist values. The question whether people think that concern for the environment is costing jobs (40% yes; 47% no), is not necessarily an indication of whether they are prepared to make trade-offs in this respect.

With regard to the upsurge in support for the environment in the political arena, one should be cautious not to equate the support for a Green Party with support for environmental issues, let alone for a shift in social paradigm. Given the nature of the electoral system in New Zealand, it is likely that at least part of that support is inspired more by dissatisfaction with the Government of the day than with a commitment to green issues. For instance, an NBR poll found that, despite the enormous upsurge in support for the Alliance in the Tamaki by-election, 63% of that support came from protest voters (*National Business Review*, 14 February 1992). On the other hand, however, it seems that the move in voting behaviour away from the two main parties is also a reflection of growing disillusion with politics and the political system in New Zealand.

More direct support for the postmaterialist thesis can be found in a poll among Green Party activists. The survey, conducted by Vowles and Miller, revealed that the value commitment of Green Party activists fits the post-materialist model, although imperfectly. Green Party activists, apart from being advocates for stronger environmental protection, and proponents of reduced

[3]. According to Inglehart's 1986-87 data, the Netherlands, with 25%. has the highest proportion of postmaterialists in the total population, followed by West Germany with 24%, Denmark with 18%, and the United States with 16%. Greece and Portugal, with 8% and 6% respectively, were at the tail end of the 12 countries compared (Inglehart, 1990, 93).

government spending on defence, are also overwhelmingly liberal, supporting social change favouring minority groups. However, they are suspicious towards trade unions and ambivalent with regard to the welfare state. In this respect they distinguish themselves from activists of the New Labour Party, also a party with a strong pro-environmental profile. The Greens, however, eminently fit the social profile of post-materialists: predominantly of the post-war generation, tertiary educated, relatively affluent, and belonging to the "new" middle class (Miller, R., 1991).[4]

Apart from this, however, very little is known about the environmental attitudes of particular groups such as industrialists, government officials, trade-unionists, and politicians in New Zealand. The data available on environmental attitudes in the corporate sector, discussed in the previous section, indicate that environmental commitment in this sector is shallow, and that environmental values do not have a high priority. If considered, environmental aspects primarily serve commercial interests (enhancing image, avoiding costs).

Overall, available data indicate that most New Zealanders do not (yet) give a higher priority to environmental or post-materialist values than to materialist values. Despite a high level of concern about environmental issues (particularly global ones), environmental problems do not receive a greater priority than reducing unemployment, maintaining law and order, and fighting crime, and are seen as only slightly more important than raising living standards. Other postmaterialist values than environmental protection, such as "more say in Government" and "civil freedoms and liberties", receive very little support (Gold and Webster, 1990, 3-4).

The data seem to confirm Dunlap's assessment that, although environmental issues are considered to be important by many people, they are not held intensely enough to have significant electoral impact. Most people continue to vote on the basis of other, more intensely held, values (economic, security related). Consequently, governments may well enjoy more flexibility ("permissive consensus") in this area than in more prominent policy areas, and only be electorally punished if they are perceived to explicitly trample environmental values (Dunlap, 1989).

[4]. In part, the "imperfect fit" may be due to the fact that other values than the ones used by Inglehart were used as proxy for post-materialism. This raises the broader question what values are appropriate for measuring "post-materialism", and to what extent these are inter-culturally comparable.

A question emerging from this assessment of the greening phenomenon in New Zealand is what the rise in support for environmental values actually signifies? If not a shift in paradigm, is it a temporary phenomenon which is bound to fade if environmental concerns are given more serious attention by governments? (Dunlap, 1989) Will concerns about policy failure in this area be accommodated by a continuation of the pragmatist or technocentric approach to environmental problems which has been predominant so far? Or will the growth in support for environmental values continue and deepen, possibly leading to a shift in social paradigm in the longer term?

4. The Prospects For Paradigm Change.

Following Inglehart's theory, the discrepancy between New Zealand and other western countries in the degree of support for postmaterialist values could be explained on the basis of economic factors. Although most western countries have experienced economic set-backs since the 1960s, New Zealand has seen a dramatic relative decline of its economic status amongst O.E.C.D. countries from 2nd (in GNP per capita) in the 1960s to 19th in 1992 (OECD, 1992). Whereas in other western countries postmaterialist support may have grown because of a continuation of prosperity and security for most of the younger generation, support for postmaterialist values among the generation growing up in New Zealand during the same period would not have kept pace, due to a decline in prosperity and economic security experienced by that generation.

Given the fact that New Zealand's economic plight, despite radical policy changes, has continued to deteriorate (certainly in terms of employment, a vital element in experiencing economic security), and because of the hugely unsettling effects of social policies introduced by the present Government, one would even expect a decline in support for postmaterialist values, and a further strengthening of materialist values. Although a proportion of the generation which has grown up in relative prosperity and security may continue to adhere to postmaterialist values, there is little basis, if we rely on Inglehart's theory, for expecting much support for such values among the generation that passes through its formative years in the present social and economic climate.

Economic conditions, however, only seem to explain part of the shift towards postmaterialism. Despite the fact that some countries, such as Germany, have experienced economic conditions much more favourable than New Zealand, support for postmaterialist values in those countries has still not exceeded beyond a minority, even amongst those age groups which have enjoyed high levels of security. The highest proportion of postmaterialists among age groups in the surveys discussed by Inglehart is found among the 15 to 24 old in Germany (in 1986-87), but is not higher than 35% (Inglehart, 1990, 93). Among occupational groups, the highest proportion of postmaterialists are expected to be found in the more secure professional and executive occupations, but also here, in the surveys covered by Inglehart, the proportion of postmaterialists does not exceed 50%, but varies between 20 and 30% in the countries with a higher economic standing than New Zealand, including Germany, the Netherlands, and Canada (Inglehart, 1990, 164). In other words, a high level of economic prosperity or security is not a sufficient condition for inducing a shift towards postmaterialist values.[5] Clearly, other factors play a role, and prevent *most* people from adopting such values.

In order to explain this phenomenon it is useful to return to the question of the relationship between values and behaviour, and the relation of both of these with institutions. Although it is true that people may be led to change their attitudes because of a change in conditions, such as prosperity and security, their values and behaviour are influenced by other factors as well. Notable among such factors are *social institutions*, culturally ingrained rules, norms, conventions, procedures and practices which allow, facilitate, prescribe, discourage, or prohibit behaviour. Institutions are socialising agents which tend to have a life of their own. They are enduring and, given their collective or social nature, not easily changed. They crystalise in symbols and organisations, and, because of the emotional appeal and vested interests they engender, often survive dramatic changes in conditions (March and Olsen, 1984).

Although a focus on institutions is nothing new (sociology derives much of its existence from their recognition), it can be argued that their importance has only recently been rediscovered in the study of politics and policy (March and Olsen, 1989). That rediscovery is partly due to the perceived shortcomings of approaches which have for a long time prevailed in the study of politics and

5. An even stronger rejection of Inglehart's thesis can be found in a recent study based on surveys in the U.S. and W. Germany which found no strong correlation between economic conditions and materialist or postmaterialist values. See Trump (1991).

policy, notably pluralism. Pluralism, with its emphasis on the demand side of the political process, has allegedly paid little attention to institutions (Nordlinger, 1981; 1988). However, also explanations of political behaviour based on assumptions of individual egoism, such as found, for example, in public choice theory, have tended to present a distorted view of institutions, regarding these as rather malleable, subject to manipulation or reform for the purpose of achieving desired goals (March and Olsen, 1989). However, although it may be true that many efforts of institutional, notably organisational, change have been undertaken by governments, it is also true that many of these efforts have proved to be failures in terms if the goals that they set out to achieve (March and Olsen, 1983; 1984; 1989; Scharpf, 1986). Conventions, practices, informal rules, and vested interests may continue to exert important influence despite organisational change.

In all spheres of life institutions impose constraints on changing values and behaviour, from the spheres of leisure and fashion, to the realms of work and politics. Although people may indicate their support for particular values, this does not necessarily mean that they behave conform to those values. People may, for example, support the view that it is environmentally preferable to use public transport instead of private cars, yet never or seldom do it. Some consumer behaviour is subject to deeply ingrained cultural habits and conventions, e.g. with regard to what should be on the menu, or to what are considered to be the ingredients of a "good life".

On the other hand, people may engage in forms of "green" activities without a commitment to fundamental value change. For instance, recycling may be inspired by economic motives (fundraising for school or club-activities), and may have little to do with the idea that we need to change our life-styles. Similarly, those who cannot afford a car and use public transport, may very well prefer to go by private car. It is plausible that surveys are more likely to reveal what people "really" want or value; however, we need to look beyond these preferences, and look at behaviour in its institutional context in order to assess what people can or can't *do*, are induced to do or constrained from doing.

Producer behaviour, under capitalist conditions, operates from the bottomline that profit must be made in order to survive, with consequences for the choice of materials, technology, and durability (from shelf life to built-in obsolescence). Ultimately, where environmentally desirable behaviour clashes

with the need to minimise costs and maximise revenue and profit, the environment will lose out. As a system, capitalism needs continued growth, even though such growth may increasingly be in the form of goods and services which require fewer physical resources ("angelization"). Under capitalism, people's lifestyles will continue to evolve on the basis of the need to sell "more".

If green consumerism and producerism are subject to institutional constraints, so is political behaviour. Despite the considerable support for the Green Party in New Zealand, it is unlikely that, without a reform of the electoral system, the Party (or the Alliance) will obtain a significant number of seats in Parliament, let alone participate in a government. Under the first past the post system it is very difficult to overcome the "wasted vote" syndrome, except in special circumstances. Not surprisingly, small parties in New Zealand see the introduction of a form of proportional representation as essential for their long-term survival.

Given the key role played by institutions in guiding people's values and behaviour, the question whether paradigmatic change occurs cannot be answered by only counting the numbers of individuals who express support for new values. Real social change only takes place when the criteria for "normal" or desirable behaviour change, as defined by institutions. An assessment of paradigm change, therefore, must also comprise institutional analysis to find out how institutions and institutional changes facilitate or obstruct a change of values and behaviour, or how they accommodate new demands arising from new conditions.

It should be noted that the use of the concept of paradigmatic change to identify a gradual process of culture shift as envisaged by Inglehart, a process whereby postmaterialist values slowly become those of the majority in society because of a succession of generations grown up in conditions of physical and economic security, may not be appropriate. Paradigmatic change, as described by Kuhn and others, is revolutionary, in the sense that it is swift and radical, even though it is preceded by a cumulation of "misfits" under the old paradigm (Kuhn, 1962; Cotgrove, 1982). If paradigmatic change also involves institutional change, as suggested in this paper, it may well be much less gradual than Inglehart foresees, but be more like a process of "punctuated equilibrium", in which long periods of stability are interrupted by short bursts of radical change (Krasner, 1984).

Whether paradigmatic change occurs, however, is ultimately dependent on the eyes of the observer. To what extent a change in values, behaviour, or institutions is paradigmatic depends on one's assessment of whether the changes are "fundamental" or not.

In the last eight years, New Zealand has passed through a period of institutional change which may well be called radical, if not revolutionary. In particular, changes have been introduced which have redefined the role of the State. These changes have not only important consequences for economic policy and behaviour, but also for environmental policy and behaviour. It is therefore theoretically possible that, despite the relatively low level of support for postmaterialist values in New Zealand compared to other western countries, these institutional reforms facilitate and encourage postmaterialist *behaviour* and value change. Whether this is the case or not, will have to be the subject of another paper.

5. Conclusion.

Since the late 1980s, New Zealand has, similar to many other countries in the world, experienced a new wave of environmentalism. Growing support for environmental issues has manifested itself in an increase in support for environmental groups, in opinion polls, in the phenomenon of green consumerism, in a display of interest in environmental matters by companies, in the revival of a Green Party, and in a green political bandwagon effect.

The rise in support for environmental issues and values could be seen as endorsement for thesis that a shift towards a new social paradigm is needed and underway. The upsurge can be interpreted as a recognition in societies that governments have failed to address environmental problems adequately, and that more fundamental changes, in policies and lifestyles, are required.

Yet, a closer look at the various manifestations of the rise of environmental support in New Zealand does not seem to support this thesis. Overwhelmingly, New Zealanders continue to adhere to materialist (including authoritarian) values, and do not appear to be ready for a radical change in their lifestyles and values. In part, this can be explained on the basis of Inglehart's

thesis, which posits a relation between economic prosperity and security on the one hand, and support for postmaterialist values on the other.

An explanation of paradigmatic change on the basis of a quantitative analysis of support for postmaterialist values, related to economic prosperity and security, is, however, incomplete. Paradigmatic change involves not only a change of values, but also of behaviour and institutions. Institutions impose important constraints on values and behaviour, and may explain why a shift towards postmaterialist values and behaviour has not been more widespread. On the other hand it would appear that radical institutional change, as experienced in New Zealand during the last eight years, may offer new prospects for a further dissemination of postmaterialist values and behaviour.

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