After Mao died in 1976 and a subsequent power struggle, Deng Xiaoping emerged as the de facto supreme leader in 1978, marking the beginning of a new era in China’s development. Deng set China on a path towards the gradual introduction of economic reforms involving market liberalisation and privatisation. Beginning in rural areas, farmers were allowed to sell crops above production quota for personal gain, while local collectively owned township and village enterprises (TVEs) were enticed with market incentives to increase production, especially of light industrial goods.[1] The approach proved very effective in boosting economic growth, on average by 8.4% between 1978 and 1992.[2] Its success opened the door for further reforms involving the part-privatisation of Chinese companies and for foreign investments by many multinationals attracted by cheap Chinese labour, integrating China into increasingly global production chains and making it the largest recipient of foreign direct investment in the so-called developing world.[3] Although questions have been raised about the precision and reliability of data on China’s reported growth rate of close to 10% over 30 years,[4] it is widely agreed to have been impressive. Between 1978 and 2015, the real consumption of rural and urban Chinese households is said to have increased, on average, 16 times[5] and 5 times for the bottom 50%.[6] The World Bank claims that, over the same period, some 850 million people have lifted themselves out of poverty.[7]
However, it has also been noted that these developments have been accompanied by a significant increase in inequality in both income and wealth, making China one of the most unequal societies in the world. Piketty notes that the top 10% income share rose from 27% to 41% of national income between 1978 and 2015, while the bottom 50% share dropped from 27% to 15%. Wealth inequality is even greater as “67% is owned by the top 10%, and the top 10,653 richest adults (0.001%) own 5.6% of total wealth, about as much as the bottom 50% (531 million adults).”[8] In 2021, China had 698 billionaires, second only to the United States with 724.[9] Yet, it has been argued that the rise in living standards does not seem to have led to a decline in feelings of “relative deprivation” among many Chinese.[10] Also, the state’s social welfare system was largely dismantled and what remained was piecemeal and regressive, and workers were practically denied any protection.[11] Many analysts have noted that the extent of inequality in China, along with the level of corruption that has fuelled it, has given rise to so much public concern that it threatens to undermine the legitimacy of the regime that officially still claims to be committed to socialism.[12]
Still socialist?
These claims can be regarded as hollow rhetoric. Labour, land and other natural resources have been commodified largely to the benefit of a new class or elite that includes “red capitalists” and state and party officials (at the local and the national level) in what has been referred to as a form of “kinship capitalism”, “network capitalism”, “power-elite capitalism” or “crony communism”.[13]Despite the government’s formal commitment to socialism, as noted above, it allowed or even promoted the emergence of a class of super-wealthy and a sharp rise in inequality in income and wealth, in conflict with socialist principles. It has been argued that the Chinese economy is “functionally” capitalist and that “the point has long since passed where China can be considered to be functionally socialist.”[14] Hence, it is highly debatable (and in my view unjustified) to still call China a socialist country. As the dominant Chinese ideology guiding the economic system is certainly not anti-capitalist, the CCP seems indifferent towards extreme inequality, and as production and consumption are no longer based on central planning but on “the market”, China clearly has departed from the three key principles of socialism that I have identified on the Socialism page. The main reason why it is classified here as a hybrid economic system is that the Chinese state continues to formally own a significant proportion of the means of production and that the regime seems determined to retain control over the economy while relying on the capitalist sector (“market economy”) as a growth engine. In that respect, the Chinese regime shares similarities with the Keynesian regimes that prevailed in the Western world in the decades following WWII, emphasising the important role of the state in preventing or softening economic volatility and in promoting full employment, economic growth, and rising standards of living, but minus the commitment to reducing inequality, upholding (liberal) democracy, and without reliance on corporatism to keep the peace. Also, compared to Western governments in the Keynesian era, the Chinese government seems more determined and capable to retain ultimate control over the economy, as it still owns around 60% of the corporate sector, including strategic industries, and thus has more control over crucial investment decisions.[15]
An environmental nightmare
When it comes to the environmental consequences of China’s “economic miracle” these have been nothing but calamitous. The rapid rate and scale of development have come at the expense of all three dimensions of the environment (ecological, resource and human-modified). The scale and seriousness of China’s environmental problems have been extensively reported by many observers and analysts and need not be elaborated upon here.[16] But the huge scale of resource exploitation and use, industrialisation, and consumption, and the associated levels of pollution of air, water and soils and their adverse effects on human health, ecosystems, and biodiversity, have produced a state of the environment that is highly disconcerting. While many of these problems have been apparent for years, over time, the situation has only become worse. That the present course is unsustainable has been admitted by some Chinese officials. Already in 2005, a Vice-minister of China’s State Environmental Protection Agency stated that the “Chinese miracle will end soon because the environment can no longer keep pace”.[17]
However, this view overlooks that China, like many other countries, increasingly makes up for the shortfall in its ability to provide for the insatiable wants (not just needs) of its population and economic system by exploiting and importing the resources of other countries. As the Chinese economy is expected to continue to grow, even if at a more modest rate of 4% or 5% per annum, the environmental repercussions are increasingly felt around the world. For one, it is already the largest emitter of greenhouse gases, and as it will continue to rely heavily on fossil fuels to meet its energy needs until at least 2030 or 2040, its emissions are also expected to increase until around that time.[18] In large part, this comes down to its dependence on coal. In 2016, coal provided close to 62% of the country’s energy use, and since 2011 China has consumed more coal than the rest of the world combined.[19] Still, in 2018, it started the construction of 28 GW of new coal-fired capacity. Although coal’s share in the energy mix is expected to decline to around 45% by 2040, coal consumption in absolute terms will still increase over the same period, be it by different estimates.[20] In 2009, China became a net importer of coal. In 2017, it also became the largest importer of oil in the world, and this dependence on foreign sources is likely to increase to around 80% of its demand in 2040.[21] China is also a significant source of transboundary pollution and remains the world’s largest producer of ozone-depleting substances.[22] There are also growing concerns about the social and environmental impacts associated with China’s foreign investments in mineral and coal extraction, agriculture and forestry, primarily to meet its own demands, and the large infrastructural projects (notably related to the Belt and Road Initiative) that provide an outlet for the overcapacity that it has built up in that sector.[23] Given the global environmental impacts of China’s economy, and its increasing dependence on the rest of the world to meet its demands, the future of China and that of the world are strongly intertwined.
Environmental integration efforts
Chinese governments have not been completely oblivious to the mounting environmental pressures and problems. Their existence has long been acknowledged and over time, the Chinese government has introduced a raft of institutions, policies, and actions to tackle them. In 1979, the Law for Environmental Protection was promulgated, as “the most comprehensive environmental protection law ever adopted in China”.[24] In 1986, an Environmental Protection Agency was established, which became the State Environmental Protection Agency in 1998 and was upgraded to a Ministry in 2008. Environmental protection was incorporated into the Constitution as early as 1978 and 1982.[25] Environmental damage was criminalised in the mid-1990s and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), allowing citizens to participate in the assessment of major projects, was institutionalised in 2003.[26] As Shapiro noted: “China has a reputation for having some of the most thorough environmental laws in the world”.[27] Moreover, China’s Five-Year Planning (FYP) system has integrated increasingly ambitious environmental goals and targets, which could be seen as a move towards (internal and external) environmental policy integration.[28] This is also reflected in the adoption by the Chinese government of overarching concepts like the “harmonious society”, “scientific development” and the “circular economy”,[29] which are interpreted in ways akin to the notion of sustainable development in the sense that they combine social, economic and environmental concerns and goals.
Observers also often note China’s record in the development of renewable energy as evidence of its commitment to and capacity for advancing sustainability. In 2005, China passed an ambitious renewable energy law and went on to become the world’s biggest producer of wind turbines and solar panels.[30] However, although the share of renewable energy sources in the production of electricity increased to more than 25% in 2016, hydropower accounted for more than three-quarters of this, and for 19% of total electricity production. Wind energy contributed close to 4%, and solar (PV) energy for 1.2% of total production in 2016, and 1.84% in 2017.[31] In absolute figures, from 2015 to 2016, coal-generated electricity capacity was expanded by 132,792 GW while that of wind and solar combined increased by 81,336 GW, which put the rapid rise of these renewables (often presented in percentages) in perspective.[32]
Moreover, the expansion of production from solar and wind seems to have encountered a bottleneck because of grid constraints and a saturated domestic market for solar panels, which in 2018 led the government to halt new solar projects.[33] China’s efforts in promoting renewable energy may indeed have been significant, but they look much less impressive when put into perspective. And then we have not yet even considered the environmental and social costs associated with their expansion, which have been very considerable, especially those associated with the construction of hydro dams, although those linked with the production of solar panels should also not be neglected.[34]
Reasons for environmental failure
A common theme in analyses of China’s environmental policies and integration efforts has been the existence of a large implementation gap. On paper, China’s institutions and policies look good or even impressive. In practice, the results and achievements fall far short of the expectations that they create. The OECD concluded that “Overall, environmental efforts have lacked effectiveness and efficiency, largely as a result of an implementation gap” [original emphasis], a finding that one finds repeated consistently in other assessments,[35] and that led one observer to conclude that “China’s environmental official policies are little more than slogans”.[36]
This raises the question of what accounts for the discrepancy between China’s official environmental policies and commitments and their implementation. Here, I will identify and briefly discuss four factors that can help explain that discrepancy and that pour more cold water over the argument that authoritarian regimes, and China in particular, are more effective in dealing with the environmental challenge than (liberal-) democratic government systems. These are the overriding priority of economic growth and development; the degree to which political-economic power has been devolved and decentralised; the role of networks in the distribution and exercise of power; and the weakness of civil society, including the environmental movement, linked to the authoritarian nature of the regime.
The overriding priority of economic growth and development has been a common feature of both capitalist and socialist systems. In this respect, it is no surprise that this is also the case in China’s hybrid economic system. If anything, the introduction of capitalist features from the late 1970s has only served to entrench economic growth as an imperative whereas, at least theoretically, this does not have to be the case in a socialist economic system. But there is no doubt that economic development has been a foremost priority for Chinese authorities at all levels as well as for the Chinese population. Economic growth and development and getting rich have become the dominant (materialist) values in Chinese society, substituting socialism even though this is still the official ideology, as reflected in the hollow rhetoric of party documents and statements by political leaders. The dominant importance of economic growth is such that, as many analysts have argued, the legitimacy of the political-economic regime has come to depend on it. That the level of economic development already achieved is not regarded by Chinese leaders as sufficient is reflected in the target of 6.5% average annual GDP growth put forward in China’s 13th Five-year Plan, and the expressed commitment “to [take care] avoid falling into the middle-income trap”, which would prevent it from achieving rich country status.[37] Even a slowdown in economic growth may threaten the very existence of the Communist Party. The recent emphasis by Chinese leaders on China’s long history and culture can be seen as an effort to buffet the regime’s legitimacy in the context of slowing economic growth, along with a return to stronger political suppression of dissent.[38]
Although environmental problems have been increasingly recognised as important, they have been addressed only to the extent that this is compatible with, or even conducive to, the economic growth imperative, even though, inevitably, environmental pressures continue to mount in the process. For that reason, authorities are not even interested in the effective implementation of environmental policies and regulations if this overriding priority risks being adversely affected. Chinese authorities also seem to have bought into the misleading idea based on the Kuznets curve that economic growth must come first before environmental problems can be addressed, more popularly known as the “pollute first, clean up later” philosophy.[39] This applies, in particular, to pollution control measures and equipment that increase costs and/or potentially affect output. By contrast, the development of solar and wind energy has offered new opportunities for economic growth, and it is therefore not surprising that this has received full support from the government.[40]
A second factor that helps to explain the failure of Chinese governments to convert national-level environmental policies into reality is the extent to which, notably with the reforms introduced since the late 1970s, economic power has been decentralised to the regional and local levels and devolved to the managers of private, part-privatised, and state-owned enterprises. Regional governments were granted significant taxation powers and, with the introduction of market reforms, regional and local (township) enterprises were given discretionary powers in decisions over production, investment, and incomes.[41] The process of marketisation and (semi-) privatisation devolved much economic power to managers for whom profit-making became the prime concern largely at the expense of workers’ rights.[42] Despite the official concentration of ownership and power at the national level, in practice, much of the power over economic decision-making now lies with political and industry elites at the regional and local levels that have a stake in continuous development regardless of the social and environmental costs.
The vested interests of these groups constitute a significant obstacle to the effective implementation of national-level environmental policies, and the integration of environmental concerns more generally.[43] The power of development interests combined with toothless environmental agencies that are even formally subordinate to local authorities has ensured a process of continuous environmental degradation that has made a mockery of the central government’s environmental rhetoric and policies. From time to time, especially after major environmental accidents that have led to large and strong local protests, the central government has clamped down on some major polluting industries to reassert its commitment to environmental protection. But what these actions amount to are at most environmental (clean-up) campaigns that leave the sources of pollution and environmental degradation untouched.[44] As one author concludes: “Despite its dictatorial reputation, the Chinese government seems less able to prevent an environmental meltdown than leaders in democratic nations because it is more addicted to growth. When it comes to protecting the environment, the authority of the authoritarian state looks distinctly shaky.”[45]
A third and related factor is how power is exercised. Power in China is exercised in informal networks (guanxi) and in a culture of mutual favouritism and expectations that affect who gets what, when and how, including positions, privileges, and opportunities for advancement. This makes environmental policy implementation far from straightforward, especially when political leaders and business executives, and even environmental officials, belong to the same networks. It also makes corruption an inherent element of the political-economic system, from top to bottom.[46] The reforms introduced from the late 1970s created new and considerable opportunities for personal enrichment that took corruption, cronyism and rent-seeking, and inequality in income and wealth, to such levels level that they began to taint the nominally socialist political system and erode the legitimacy of the Party.[47] Fear for this loss of legitimacy and the socially destabilising effects thereof, especially if combined with slowing economic growth, are likely to have played a role in President Xi’s moves towards clamping down on corruption as well as on dissidents, while at the same time trying to boost Chinese nationalism and public feelings of pride in China’s history and culture.
However, as Smith and others have pointed out, corruption is an endemic feature of the political system in the sense that it affects the power and support of officials and factions at all levels of government. The government may clamp down on some blatant cases of corruption to set an example and to retain its legitimacy, but if it were to address corruption full-scale, it would risk compromising the party and the political system as a whole. Corruption is prevalent at the highest levels, including the circle of “princelings”, the descendants of eight first-generation CCP veterans, and President Xi is said to be “as corrupt as all the rest”.[48] Many of the new rich have transferred their wealth to foreign accounts. Anti-corruption campaigns are therefore mostly symbolic and undertaken strategically to bring down political rivals. Meanwhile, behind the facade of “Socialism with Chinese characteristics”, the all-important goal is to preserve the supremacy of the Chinese Communist Party.
A fourth factor adversely affecting the implementation of environmental policy, and the effectiveness of these policies, in general, is the weak and limited role of civil society in the process of addressing the environmental challenge. Generally speaking, civil society plays a key role in identifying and raising social and environmental issues and feeding these into the political system as demands. How authorities deal with those demands affects the degree of political support for and the legitimacy of a political regime, and hence its stability. Civil society, through all kinds of organisations, also plays an important role in monitoring the effects of, and the implementation of policies, as policies work (or don’t work) depending on the people involved. Moreover, the self-organisation and activities of civilians are crucial for protecting the social fabric and functioning of society through numerous (voluntary) activities based on shared values, solidarity, and humanity, sometimes referred to as social capital. In short, a flourishing civil society has the capacity to deal with many problems itself and is crucial to identifying issues that can only be dealt with by collective action (policies) through the political system.
In China, civil society has been severely stifled in fulfilling these functions because of the authoritarian nature of its political system. Under the banner of “proletarian dictatorship”, the Communist Party, but de facto its supreme leadership, has tried to control all realms of social action and intercourse, formally justified based on the threats posed by anti-revolutionary elements and the need for, and the existence of, a revolutionary vanguard. This is also reflected in the way the government has reacted to the emergence of environmental concerns and organisations (NGOs). Still, in 1995, it was noted that no environmental movement worth mentioning existed, that citizens had to petition for the right to organise and that until then no application for the setting up of an environmental group had been approved.[49] Although this has significantly changed since then, and a large number of NGOs estimated in the thousands have emerged addressing all kinds of issues on all levels, their existence remains regulated and their activities circumscribed. The imposition of constraints is based on the fear that groups use environmental causes to pursue political change, challenging the political system and vested interests, as happened in Eastern European countries.[50] Although many (formally illegal) NGOs have not bothered about applying for formal approval and registration,[51] the Chinese authorities keep control over what kinds of issues can be raised and how, including by regulating the role of and funding provided by foreign NGOs, through internet surveillance and control, and by arresting and locking up those who are considered to have gone too far or who are perceived as a threat or a potential source of social and political unrest.[52]Ironically, it is the stifling of NGOs that has fuelled the widespread mass protests (referred to as “mass incidents” by the authorities) that undermine the political stability and legitimacy of the regime, all the more so when they are brutally repressed. As Watts notes: “With no democracy, China’s government was being held accountable by riot”.[53]
Although it has been argued that the environmental movement in China is evolving into a sophisticated branch of civil society that the government can no longer ignore,[54]it appears that under President Xi Jinping the trend towards liberalisation has been reversed.[55] If anything, the Chinese political regime has become more repressive and totalitarian, as reflected in its suppression of ethnic groups (such as the Uyghurs), the creation of an all-encompassing surveillance state that makes “Big Brother” look like an amateur, and the introduction of a “social credit” system that rewards and punishes every individual citizen for “desirable” and “undesirable” behaviour.[56] The dominant role of the state in controlling societal groups can be seen as a case of Gramscian penetration of society by the state, aiming to keep a grip on thinking and developments in society.[57]
At the same time, economic growth has been accompanied by the evolution of an increasingly materialist society that treats the environment as an afterthought. It has been said that China has become a Western-style consumerist society in which getting rich has become the dominant value.[58] The signal for abandoning socialist ideals and embracing materialism was given by Deng Xiaoping who proclaimed that “to get rich is glorious”.[59] As the public has come to expect a continuing rise in living standards, this feeds back into an ongoing commitment by the regime to economic growth, confirming it as a political-economic priority. Maintaining social and political stability (harmony), and overcoming divisiveness, out of fear of political disintegration, is frequently referred to by analysts as a top priority of the Chinese state, motivating its reliance on a strong authoritarian state and a dominant leader.[60] Yet, the social fragmentation that has accompanied China’s development will be hard to counter. Hua sketches China’s social situation in gloomy terms as characterised by individualism, competition, materialism, inequality, pollution, corruption, waves of suicide among party officials, and political nihilism – “only money counts”.[61]
A beacon of dystopia
To summarise, China’s authoritarian mixed political-economic regime combines several features that make it very unlikely that it will, or even can, address the environmental challenge effectively. Its socialist system has been transformed into a mixed economic system in which economic growth and industrialism have become as dominant as in capitalist systems, in part because of the legacy of the preceding socialist system, in which economic growth based on industrialisation was already defined as a priority, and in part, because the regime’s legitimacy has increasingly come to rely on the delivery of rising standards of living. Also, (semi-) privatisation, corporatisation and marketisation have introduced capitalist imperatives, even if the state retains ultimate control over the economy. But the de facto departure from a planned economy implies that even the theoretical possibility of moving towards an environmentally sustainable socialist economic system, away from the dependence on industrialism, has been discarded, notwithstanding the continued use of socialist rhetoric by Chinese leaders. At the same time, the authoritarian features of the regime, at all levels, make it very difficult if not impossible for civil society, including environmental advocates, to change and adapt the political-economic system and its policies to advance environmental integration. Arguably, rather than offering an example or model for environmental integration to the rest of the world, the Chinese political-economic regime, of all political-economic systems, combines all the biggest obstacles to addressing the environmental challenge effectively. As an authoritarian form of state capitalism, China’s political-economic regime might be considered the worst of all worlds, combining the worst features of capitalism with the absence of the limited freedoms associated with liberal democratic political systems. Its growing industrial-technological prowess combined with the totalitarian ambitions of the regime does not imply that it will or can address the environmental challenge more effectively than any other system. Rather, it offers an insight into the kind of dystopian political, social, and environmental future that awaits the whole world if it were to follow in its path.
References
[1] Yueh, Linda (2011), Enterprising China: Business, Economic, and Legal Developments since 1979. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 161-177.
[2] Ryan, Megan and Christopher Flavin (1995), “Facing China’s Limits”, in Brown, L. R. (ed.) State of the World 1995. London: Earthscan, 116.
[3] Yueh, Linda (2011), Enterprising China: Business, Economic, and Legal Developments since 1979, 26; Harvey, David (2005), A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 135.
[4] Wikipedia (2019), Economy of China, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_China#GDP_by_Administrative_Division (Accessed: 19 November 2019); World Bank, The (2019), The World Bank in China, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview (Accessed: 19 November 2019).
[5] Cai, Fang et al. (2018), “40 Years of China’s Reform and Development: How Reform Captured China’s Demographic Dividend”, in R. Garnaut, et al. (eds.), China’s 40 Years of Reform and Development 1978 – 2018. Canberra: Australian National University, 5-24, 17.
[6] Piketty, Thomas, et al. (2018), Capital Accumulation, Private Property and Rising Inequality in China, 1978-2015. HKUST Working Paper Series. St. Louis HKUST Institute for Emerging Market Studies, 31.
[7] World Bank, The, The World Bank in China. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview (Accessed: 19 November 2019).
[8] Piketty, Thomas et al. (2018), Capital Accumulation, Private Property and Rising Inequality in China, 1978-2015, 30-32.
[9] Dolan, Kerry A., et al. (2022), Forbes World’s Billionaires List. The Richest in 2021, Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/billionaires/#34b4aba8251c (Accessed: 18 January 2022).
[10] Knight, John (2013), “Inequality in China: An Overview”, The World Bank Research Observer, Vol.29, No.1, 1-19.
[11] Smith, Richard A. (2015), “China’s Communist-Capitalist Ecological Apocalypse”, real-world economics review, No.71, pp.19-63; Economy, Elizabeth (2004), The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China’s Future. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, Loc 358; Paradise, James F. (2016), “The Role of “Parallel Institutions” in China’s Growing Participation in Global Economic Governance”, Journal of Chinese Political Science, Vol.21, No.2, 149-175, 169; Jacques, Martin (2009), When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order. New York: Allen Lane, 197-198.
[12] Jacques, Martin (2009), When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order, 194-195; Shapiro, Judith (2012), China’s Environmental Challenges. Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press, Loc 1801; Peck, Jamie and Jun Zhang (2013), “A Variety of Capitalism … with Chinese Characteristics?”, Journal of Economic Geography, Vol.13, No.3, 357-396, 357-396, 379-380; Smith, Richard A. (2015), “China’s Communist-Capitalist Ecological Apocalypse”, 49, 57-58; Knight, John (2013), “Inequality in China: An Overview”, The World Bank Research Observer, Vol.29, No.1, pp.1-19; Ni, Vincent (2021), “‘Poverty Divides Us’: Gap between Rich and Poor Poses Threat to China”, The Guardian, 1 July.
[13] Peck, Jamie and Jun Zhang (2013), “A Variety of Capitalism … with Chinese Characteristics?”, 381-383.
[14] Ibid., 368-369.
[15] Meyer, Marshall W. (2014), China’s Mixed-Ownership Enterprise Model: Can the State Let Go?, K@W Network, Wharton University of Pennsylvania, https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/will-chinas-mixed-ownership-enterprise-model-work/ (Accessed: 23 April 2019); Piketty, Thomas, et al. (2018), Capital Accumulation, Private Property and Rising Inequality in China, 1978-2015; Duncan, Andrew Allen (2015), Semi-Private: Exploring the Deployment of Mixed-Ownership Enterprises in China’s Capitalism. Doctor of Philosophy. Irvine: University of California; Yueh, Linda (2011), Enterprising China: Business, Economic, and Legal Developments since 1979.
[16] For a few relatively recent sketches of the disastrous state of the Chinese environment, see Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2007), OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: China. Paris: OECD; Shapiro, Judith (2012), China’s Environmental Challenges; Watts, Jonathan (2012), When a Billion Chinese Jump: How China Will Save Mankind–or Destroy It. London: Faber & Faber; Smith, Richard A. (2015), “China’s Communist-Capitalist Ecological Apocalypse”; Economy, Elizabeth (2004), The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China’s Future.
[17] Quoted in Smith, Richard A. (2015), “China’s Communist-Capitalist Ecological Apocalypse”, 21.
[18] Climate Action Tracker (2019), China, https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/china/ (Accessed: 27 November 2019); Flavin, Christopher and Gary Gardner (2006), “China, India and the New World Order”, in L. Starke (ed.) State of the World 2006. New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company,3-23, 8-11; Watts, Jonathan (2012), When a Billion Chinese Jump: How China Will Save Mankind–or Destroy It.
[19] China Power Team (2019), How Is China’s Energy Footprint Changing?, China Power, https://chinapower.csis.org/energy-footprint/ (Accessed: 27 November 2019).
[20] International Energy Agency (IEA) (2019), World Energy Outlook 2017: China. https://www.iea.org/weo/china/ (Accessed: 28 November 2019); Smith, Richard A. (2015), “China’s Communist-Capitalist Ecological Apocalypse”, 37.
[21] China Power Team (2019), How Is China’s Energy Footprint Changing?
[22] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2007), OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: China, 274-276, 292.
[23] Ray, Rebecca, et al. (2015), China in Latin America: Lessons for South-South Cooperation and Sustainable Development Boston: Global Economic Governance Initiative (CEGI) Boston University, Centre for Transformation Research (CENIT), Research Centre of the University of the Pacific (CIUP), Global Development and environment institute, Tufts University; Teese, Patrick (2018), Exploring the Environmental Repercussions of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, EESI (Environmental and Energy Study Institute), https://www.eesi.org/articles/view/exploring-the-environmental-repercussions-of-chinas-belt-and-road-initiativ (Accessed: 27 November 2019); Watts, Jonathan (2019), “Belt and Road Summit Puts Spotlight on Chinese Coal Funding”, The Guardian, 25 April; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2007), OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: China, 302.
[24] Jan, George P. (1995), “Environmental Protection in China”, in Dwivedi, O. P. and V. D. K. (eds.), Environmental Policies in the Third World. A Comparative Analysis. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 74-75, 78.
[25] Mao, Yu-shi (1997), “China”, in M. Jänicke and H. Weidner (eds.), National Environmental Policies. A Comparative Study of Capacity-Building. Berlin: Springer, 237-255, 246-247.
[26] Shapiro, Judith (2012), China’s Environmental Challenges, Loc 1355.
[27] Ibid., Loc 1356.
[28] Jan, George P. (1995), “Environmental Protection in China”, 76-77; Shapiro, Judith (2012), China’s Environmental Challenges, Loc 1320.
[29] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2007), OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: China, 15; Yuan, Zengwei, et al. (2006), “The Circular Economy: A New Development Strategy in China”, Journal of Industrial Ecology, Vol.10, No.1-2, 4-8.
[30] Flavin, Christopher and Gary Gardner (2006), “China, India and the New World Order”, 11; China Power Team (2019), How Is China’s Energy Footprint Changing?
[31] Wikipedia, Renewable Energy in China, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Renewable_energy_in_China (Accessed: 29 November 2019).
[32] Ibid.
[33] Wikipedia, Wind Power in China, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wind_power_in_China (Accessed: 29 November 2019); China Power Team (2019), How Is China’s Energy Footprint Changing; Wikipedia, Solar Power in China, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solar_power_in_China (Accessed: 29 November 2019).
[34] Economy, Elizabeth (2004), The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China’s Future, Loc 3935-4007; Watts, Jonathan (2012), When a Billion Chinese Jump: How China Will Save Mankind–or Destroy It, Loc 1177, 1218, 1336-1353; Wikipedia, Solar Power in China; Union of Concerned Scientists (2013), Environmental Impacts of Solar Power, https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/environmental-impacts-solar-power (Accessed: 29 November 2019).
[35] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2007), OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: China, 178; Shapiro, Judith (2012), China’s Environmental Challenges, Loc 412-426, 1379-1391, 1956-2179; Ryan, Megan and Christopher Flavin (1995), “Facing China’s Limits”; Economy, Elizabeth (2004), The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China’s Future, Loc 2068.
[36] Watts, Jonathan (2012), When a Billion Chinese Jump: How China Will Save Mankind–or Destroy It, Loc 7289.
[37] Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (2016), The 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China (2016-2020). Beijing, http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201612/P020161207645765233498.pdf (Accessed: 5 November 2019), Chapter 1; McKinney, Jared (2018), “How Stalled Global Reform Is Fuelling Regionalism: China’s Engagement with the G20”, Third World Quarterly, Vol.39, No.4, 709-726, 713-714.
[38] Johnson, Ian (2016), “Ghosts of Chinese History”, Guardian Weekly, Vol.195, No.3, 26-29; Huang, Yasheng (2013), “Democratize or Die: Why China’s Communists Face Reform or Revolution”, Foreign Affairs, Vol.92, No.47-54.
[39] Mao, Yu-shi (1997), “China”, 244; Jan, George P., “Environmental Protection in China”, 82; Economy, Elizabeth (2004), The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China’s Future, Loc 4495-4555.
[40] Economy, Elizabeth (2004), The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China’s Future, Loc 3455; Wikipedia, Solar Power in China.
[41] Yueh, Linda (2011), Enterprising China: Business, Economic, and Legal Developments since 1979. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 88-89.
[42] Harvey, David (2005), A Brief History of Neoliberalism, Chapter 5.
[43] Economy, Elizabeth (2004), The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China’s Future, Loc 124-125; Watts, Jonathan (2012), When a Billion Chinese Jump: How China Will Save Mankind–or Destroy It, Loc 7263-7265.
[44] Economy, Elizabeth (2004), The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China’s Future, Loc 371; Shapiro, Judith (2012), China’s Environmental Challenges, Loc 1368.
[45] Watts, Jonathan (2012), When a Billion Chinese Jump: How China Will Save Mankind–or Destroy It, Loc 7328-7330.
[46] Peck, Jamie and Jun Zhang (2013), “A Variety of Capitalism … with Chinese Characteristics?”; Smith, Richard A. (2015), “China’s Communist-Capitalist Ecological Apocalypse”, 48-51.
[47] Economy, Elizabeth (2004), The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China’s Future, 283; Jacques, Martin (2009), When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order, 283-285; Knight, John (2013), “Inequality in China: An Overview”.
[48] Smith, Richard A. (2015), “China’s Communist-Capitalist Ecological Apocalypse”, 49, 57-59.
[49] Tuinstra, Fons (1995), “China Wil Blijven Ademhalen”, Milieudefensie, Vol.24, No.4, 6-9; Ryan, Megan and Christopher Flavin (1995), “Facing China’s Limits”.
[50] Economy, Elizabeth (2004), The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China’s Future, Loc 452; Shapiro, Judith (2012), China’s Environmental Challenges, Loc 1218.
[51] Shapiro notes that, in 2010, around 440,000 were registered and another 3 million or so unregistered, but admits that such data are unreliable. Shapiro, Judith (2012), China’s Environmental Challenges, Loc 2003.
[52] Phillips, Tom (2016), “China Imposes NGO Controls”, The Guardian Weekly, Vol.194, No.22, 8; Economy, Elizabeth (2004), The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China’s Future; Duggan, Jennifer (2015), Green China: Why Beijing Fears a Nascent Environmental Protest Movement, http://www.takepart.com/feature/2015/10/09/china-environmental-protest/ (Accessed: 3 December 2019).
[53] Peck, Jamie and Jun Zhang (2013), “A Variety of Capitalism … with Chinese Characteristics?”, 384; Economy, Elizabeth (2004), The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China’s Future; Shapiro, Judith (2012), China’s Environmental Challenges; Watts, Jonathan (2012), When a Billion Chinese Jump: How China Will Save Mankind–or Destroy It, Loc 2826-2827.
[54] Hilton, Isabel (2013), “The Return of Chinese Civil Society”, in S. Geall (ed.) China and the Environment: The Green Revolution. London and New York: Zed Books, 1-14; Zhang, Joy Y. and Michael Barr (2013), Green Politics in China – Environmental Governance and State-Society Relations. Pluto Press.
[55] Tisdall, Simon (2018), “The Chinese Export We Really Should Be Worried About: Repression”, The Guardian, 23 November 2018; Zhao, Suisheng (2016), “Xi Jinping’s Maoist Revival”, Journal of Democracy, Vol.27, No.3, 83-97; Economy, Elizabeth (2018), “China’s New Revolution: The Reign of Xi Jinping”, Foreign Affairs, Vol.97, No.3, 60-74.
[56] Munro, Kelsey (2018), “China’s Social Credit System ‘Could Interfere in Other Nations’ Sovereignty'”, The Guardian, 27 June; Verdelli, Andrea (2018), World Report. China – Events of 2018, Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/china-and-tibet (Accessed: 3 December 2019); Sudworth, John (2018), “China’s Hidden Camps. What Happened to the Vanished Uighurs of Xinjiang?”, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-sh/China_hidden_camps (Accessed: 3 December 2019); Liang, Fan, et al. (2018), “Constructing a Data-Driven Society: China’s Social Credit System as a State Surveillance Infrastructure”, Policy & Internet, Vol.10, No.4, pp.415-453.
[57] Shapiro, Judith (2012), China’s Environmental Challenges, Loc 1981.
[58] Ibid., Loc 457, 1450.
[59] Ibid., Loc 1092.
[60] Nathan, Andrew J. (2019), “The New Tiananmen Papers. Inside the Secret Meeting That Changed China”, Foreign Affairs, Vol.98, No.4, 80-91.
[61] Hua, Yu (Translated by Allan H. Barr) (2018), “Human Impulses Run Riot’: China’s Shocking Pace of Change”, The Guardian, 6 September.
Humanity on Trial 