Social Fragmentation in China

Social cohesion in China is under threat from the dominant materialist culture, which is insufficient to hold society together.

An article in the Guardian of 6 September 2018 (“‘Human Impulses Run Riot’: China’s Shocking Pace of Change”) provides support for the view that, with the (re-) introduction of capitalism in the 1980s, Chinese society has been subject to a process of social fragmentation. Individualism, materialism, and corruption are rampant; the importance of family has declined, and collective political ideals no longer drive people.

The author (Yo Hua) reflects on the political, economic, and social changes since the 1960s, identifying three periods of rapid political change (each associated with three waves of suicides among political officials) and noting that, in present-day China, money is all that counts. Political ideals no longer drive people, family ties have weakened, individualism and corruption are rampant, and inequality has increased. He seems to suggest that no one is really happy. Ordinary workers suffer most from the fierce competition, which is driving wages down. The rich suffer from anxiety, afraid to lose everything they have acquired. Many people are nostalgic. But new technologies (such as mobile payments) have been adopted by most people, and few, he argues, would really want to return to the past. He also notes that present-day protests (“mass incidents”), when they occur, are motivated by self-interest (protection of material interests), not by a desire to transform society, indicating widespread depoliticisation

Although the love of money and materialism are theoretically shared values, they do not necessarily bind communities or societies together. Rather, they feed and fuel competition, jealousy, and perpetual discontent and unhappiness (relative deprivation – pressure to “keep up with the Joneses”, a treadmill of insatiable consumption). Hence, relying on continuous economic growth, even if it were possible, as a means to “keep people happy”, is a fundamentally inadequate and risky strategy for holding societies together (social integration). Large inequalities in wealth and income erode social integration, creating a new class society. Not surprisingly, China’s leadership is attempting to foster pride in China’s rich cultural heritage to maintain social cohesion. However, clamping down on corruption, although it may help somewhat to maintain the regime’s legitimacy, does little for social integration, as it does not address the sources of fragmentation associated with individualism, materialism, exploitation, and inequality.

Pastoral Egalitarianism?

Although prehistoric pastoral societies may have been more egalitarian than agricultural societies, this does not necessarily mean they were democratic.

Research reported in The Guardian provides support for the idea that prehistoric pastoral societies had egalitarian structures. Various other sources have argued before that hierarchical social structures originated with the emergence of agriculture and associated permanent settlements. This led to agricultural surpluses being accumulated and entrusted to and/or controlled by “authorities”. Although the members of agricultural communities may have consented in such arrangements, it does not seem farfetched to claim that those who exerted control over surpluses thereby also built up a position of material power with which they were able to create or strengthen their official positions in their societies, de facto creating states, the emergence of which has also been linked to the rise of agriculture. By contrast, pastoral societies that lived nomadic lives to feed their herds were probably less able to accumulate and store surpluses, providing less opportunity for relatively powerful individuals to increase their material and other forms of power. Nonetheless, we should be careful not to idealise pastoral societies as egalitarian, let alone democratic, communities. There is no a priori reason why relatively powerful individuals or groups of individuals in such societies would not have been able to, for instance, lay ownership claims on more cattle than others, thus also expanding their material power. Moreover, it is quite likely that differences in other power resources (physical, communicative, social) between individuals in pastoral (and any other) societies will have led some to obtain leadership positions (political institutions) that may also have provided a basis for privileges and material inequality to arise. But it is plausible that the potential for the accumulation of wealth (material power) in (city-) states was significantly bigger insofar as the area under production could be expanded (possibly by force), control over increased trade (of surpluses) could be enforced, and income could be generated by control over the labour power and productive efforts of those who were exempted from working in the fields (such as crafts people). In both cases, however, the key to increased inequality lay in the ability of some (relatively more powerful members of a community) to increase control (if not ownership) over material resources, by legitimate or non-legitimate means.