As discussed on the Environmental integration page, environmental policy integration also has internal and external dimensions. The internal dimension refers to the development of an overarching policy based on a cognitive framework that recognises environmental limits, boundaries and ecological processes that are essential to humans and other life. Such a policy includes environmental goals and targets that governments aim to achieve within a particular timeframe.
The environment has ecological, social and resource dimensions. Even if lexical priority is given to ecological limits or boundaries in recognition of their fundamental importance for sustaining life on Earth, this does not imply that human or societal needs or goals are less important. Rather, it means that the ways by which these needs or goals are met must be (made) compatible with specified ecological and resource limits. Resource limits are ultimately determined by ecological limits and should lie at the heart of economic thinking, theory, and decision-making, as recognised by the field of ecological economics. The external dimension refers to the translation of these overarching goals or targets into goals and targets for what are commonly regarded as non-environmental sectors or policy areas like economics, energy, transport, and agriculture, but that have significant impacts on the environment. This conversion must ensure that the policies pursued in these sectors are at least compatible but preferably mutually supportive to achieve the goals specified in the overarching policy. This admittedly hierarchical (top-down) approach is needed to prevent that the policies adopted in these sectors are in conflict with each other or even negate the overarching (sustainability) goals. Ecological and resource protection are not incompatible with the pursuit of social well-being, on the contrary, genuine, and long-term human and social well-being can and will be advanced only if ecosystems are protected and the long-term availability of resources is ensured.
At the international and global level, some significant moves have been made towards the adoption of an overarching policy framework to guide the integration of environmental concerns into non-environmental sector policies. The most notable example was the adoption, at the UNCED conference in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, of Agenda 21, an action plan aimed at promoting sustainable development around the world. Given its broad coverage of environmental, social and resource (economic) issues, as well as its recommendations for policy development and institutional reform, Agenda 21 can be regarded as a first step towards the adoption of a global green plan aimed at advancing sustainable development in the world at large. For each of its 40 chapters, Agenda 21 specified objectives and actions within and across a broad range of issues that need to be addressed to globally advance and implement sustainable development.[1] Combined with the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which proclaimed 27 Principles, the Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and a statement on the management, conservation and sustainable development of all types of forests, the Rio conference may well be regarded as a global milestone in the promotion of sustainable development. The conference called upon all member states to embrace sustainable development as a cornerstone of policy development, including by adopting national sustainable development strategies.
However, Agenda 21 was non-binding, and much doubt has been raised about its effectiveness. In terms of implementation and positive outcomes, the direct results are generally perceived to have been limited, disappointing, or even insignificant.[2] Analysts have commented on the apparent lack of commitment on the part of most governments towards translating sustainable development into specific policies, actions, and outputs. Only a small fraction of the $600 billion per year that was considered to be needed to assist governments to move towards sustainable development was generated.[3] Also, Agenda 21, following the example of the Brundtland Commission, did not acknowledge the existence of hard ecological and resource boundaries or limits to economic growth. It has been argued that decision-making at the Rio conference was strongly influenced by multinational corporations that were set on warding off any threats to their interests, and on promoting free trade, as reflected in Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration and Chapter 2 of Agenda 21.[4]
In 2000, following the Millennium Summit of world leaders in New York, the UN General Assembly adopted the Millennium Declaration from which eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were derived for 2015. These goals included the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, achieving universal primary education, reducing child mortality and various other social goals aimed at improving human well-being, especially in poor countries. The Declaration alsoreaffirmed support for the principles of sustainable development “including those set out in Agenda 21.”[5] These were converted into three goals: to “ensure sustainability”, with “targets” for the integration of “the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programs”; to “reverse loss of environmental resources”; and to reduce biodiversity loss.[6] But it would be fair to say that the MDGs were foremost about lifting the standard of living, living conditions, health and well-being of the poorest in the world, with environmental concerns taking a back seat. Moreover, despite a reference to integration in Goal 7, there was no discussion about the need for greening policies that have a significant environmental impact, for instance, in the areas of agriculture, energy, transport and urban development. Rather, the MDGs relied foremost on “partnerships” and networks involving the “private” sector[7] to develop a pathway based on “an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system” that would promote trade and investment and thus lift people out of poverty.[8]
To what extent the adoption of the MDGs has led to significant improvements in the life of the poorest in the world is debatable. On the one hand, in quantitative terms, progress on the goals has been significant, even if most targets have not been achieved and there have been large variations in results between regions and countries. For instance, the target of reducing extreme poverty (defined as income lower than US$1.25 a day) by half between 1990 and 2015, was achieved for the world as a whole. But much of this can be attributed to a large drop in China (from 61% to 4%), while in sub-Saharan Africa more than 40% of the population still lived in extreme poverty in 2015.[9] The goal of halving hunger (the proportion of undernourished people) by 2015 was nearly achieved in most developing regions, but not in sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean, Southern Asia and Oceania.[10] China alone accounted for almost two-thirds of the total reduction of undernourished people while the absolute number of undernourished people in Africa increased by 44 million since 1990. Substantial progress was achieved on the goal of “universal primary education”, the reduction of child mortality, and the improvement of maternal health, combatting HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases. However, it is debatable whether or to what extent these improvements can be attributed to the adoption of the MDGs, not just in the light of China’s dominance in the figures, but also because, in itself, the adoption of goals does not mean much if anything. Given the many political, economic, and socio-cultural factors that impinge on implementation and outcomes in all such policy areas, from the local to the national and global level, explaining the (relative) success or failure of the MDGs is a complex matter that the formal UN assessment hardly enters into. Nonetheless, their adoption and implementation were based on certain assumptions or parameters, as I will discuss below.
The same can be said about the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development which was adopted in 2015 and builds on the two preceding global policy efforts. The difference between the MDGs and the Social Development Goals (SDGs) formulated in the 2030 Agenda lies not just in the larger number of goals put forth in the latter (17), but also in their broader coverage, both in terms of the three dimensions of sustainability (ecological, social, and resource/economic), and in their explicitly stated applicability to all countries. In this sense, the 2030 Agenda is more akin to Agenda 21, although the latter was far more comprehensive but less specific in target setting. The adoption of the SDGs has been heralded as a new and even historic shift towards global governance through goal setting, and as “the most ambitious effort yet to place goal setting at the center of global governance and policy”[11] even though the goals are solely aspirational and have not been followed up by any formal commitments or obligations. This rather upbeat characterisation of the Agenda seems odd and misplaced. It is odd because all policy initiatives, including Agenda 21, the MDGs and the many multi-lateral environmental agreements (MEAs) that have been adopted from the 1970s, are inherently intentional and based on principles and goals. This is nothing new. It is also misplaced as an emphasis on goals, objectives or even targets does not, by itself, produce meaningful change or results, the more so because the SDGs relate to symptoms rather than to the causes or drivers of problems.
It gets worse. The 2030 Agenda, even more explicitly so than the preceding two global policy initiatives, also contains goals and objectives that are fundamentally at odds with environmental protection and prescribes so-called sustainable economic growth and the expansion of free international trade and investment. The prescriptions are inherent to the neoliberal rule-based framework within which the SDGs should be advanced. The Agenda refers to the main role of the free market and the private (business) sector in advancing the goals (be it in partnership with governments and NGOs) as reflected in an emphasis on the privatisation of resources (like water, communal land, forests) and the participation of the business sector in the provision of health services, finance, and infrastructure.[12] This approach can be seen as an example of what I have referred to as reverse environmental integration, the redefinition of environmental problems based on an economic framework and its associated goals and interests. The dominant economic paradigm functions de facto as the overarching framework within which environmental goals are interpreted to serve economic goals and interests.
Thus, the three global policy initiatives discussed above provide little if any guidance to the greening of policy areas or sectors from which most environmental pressures arise, including economic policy, energy, industry, transport, and agricultural policy. Agenda 21 contained no chapters on these areas or sectors, and the MDGs also have nothing to say about them. The 2030 Agenda refers to the promotion of “sustainable agriculture” (under Goal 2), “sustainable energy for all” (under Goal 6), and to “sustainable consumption and production patterns” (under Goal 12), but, as noted above, these are discussed in the context of the need for “sustainable economic growth” (in Goal 8). The need for economic growth is not questioned and its compatibility with environmental protection is simply assumed.
Apart from this lack of guidance by the overarching global policy initiatives discussed above for the greening of non-environmental sectors or policy areas, there are also no global multilateral agreements (MEAs) on sustainable agriculture, energy, transport, or other non-environmental sectoral policies. Although some research has been undertaken on the environmental issues and challenges in these sectors in a global context, we still seem a long way off from the adoption of international (let alone legally binding) agreements aimed at the transformation of these sectors based on globally agreed environmental boundaries, imperatives, principles or goals.[13] Rather, politics and policies in these sectors remain firmly dominated by economic, sectoral and security interests embedded in national (state) and international institutions.[14]
Arguably, some of the most important developments towards international environmental policy integration have occurred at a regional rather than global level. The European Union, in particular, has been a promoter of environmental policy integration in internal and external forms. In terms of internal integration, the EU has adopted a series of Environmental Action Plans based on a comprehensive view of environmental problems at the European level, supported by regular state of the environment reports produced by the European Environment Agency. The Action Plans contain (aspirational) environmental goals and objectives covering a broad range of issues. External environmental policy integration (the greening of non-environmental policy sectors) has been an explicit policy goal in the EU since the Third Environmental Action Plan Programme (EAP 1982-1986). It was made a legal requirement in (Article 6 of) the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 and reaffirmed in the Sixth Environmental Action Plan.[15]
However, progress on this front, both at the national and sectoral levels, has been “extremely slow”,[16] revealing a considerable gap between rhetoric and practice.[17] In 2015, the European Environment Agency stated that “Although some progress has been made on integration (e.g. climate and energy), policy measures still tend to be compartmentalised […].”[18] Analysts have blamed a variety of reasons for this, including weak political commitment, institutional structures, regulatory styles, and political culture.[19] The European Environment Agency also commented on the weak political commitment to environmental integration, even on the part of the European Commission, and noted the lack of a strong institutional framework and authority that is needed to advance it.[20] At a more fundamental level, it has been argued that, although outwardly the EU projects itself as a strong advocate for environmental interests and integration (for instance, in negotiations on climate change), environmental concerns “remain marginal to the central project of deepening the integration process.”[21] One of the main reasons why the European Union has promoted environmental integration is to eliminate trade barriers arising from differences in environmental regulation and to create and maintain a level playing field for member countries. The EU’s concern has been foremost about the harmonisation of environmental regulation. But the harmonisation of environmental regulation across the EU, although it may have lifted standards in some countries, does not necessarily imply that the policies and practices within sectors have become more environmentally sustainable. Arguably, this has become even more difficult as it has brought about a convergence of policies, practices, and economic interests that makes it difficult for individual member countries to adopt more ambitious environmental integration efforts aimed at greening their own sectors.
Thus, international commitments towards environmental policy integration, regionally and globally, have been half-hearted at best and not backed up by the provision of adequate means to significantly advance it in practice. At the regional level, arguably, the most comprehensive (internal integration) effort has been undertaken by the European Union, accompanied by a strong official commitment to sector (external policy) integration, but the results have been meagre. At the global level, there have been three successive major initiatives involving the adoption of comprehensive global sets of goals aimed at balancing social, economic, and environmental interests, but again their effectiveness has been questionable in large part because of the failure to collectively allocate and create adequate means for their realisation, including the institutional frameworks (and power) necessary for the implementation of these policies.
Moreover, by far, most international environmental policy efforts have been and remain focused on particular problems (symptoms) like climate change, ozone depletion, biodiversity decline, and hazardous waste. Efforts have been highly fragmented, as reflected in the large number (around 500) of MEAs that have been adopted, the effectiveness of which has also been questioned given the “huge gap between agreed goals and implementation”.[22] Thus, most global environmental policy efforts mirror the reactive, ad hoc, and fragmented approach that has been characteristic also of environmental policy development within countries. At both levels, environmental policy efforts have been focused on symptoms rather than on the sources, causes or drivers of problems contained in non-environmental sectors.
References
[1] United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (1992), Agenda 21 – Programme of Action for Sustainable Development New York: United Nations Department of Public Information.
[2] Buck, M., et al. (2000), International Environmental Policymaking and Transatlantic Co-Operation. Berlin: Centre for International and European Environmental Research; Gutman, Pablo (2003), “What Did WSSD Accomplish?”, Environment, Vol.45, No.2, 21-28; Najam, Adil, et al. (2002), “From Rio to Johannesburg. Progress and Prospects”, Environment, Vol.44, No.7, 26-28; Stakeholder Forum for a Sustainable Future (2012), Review of Implementation of Agenda 21 and the Rio Principles. Synthesis. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for Sustainable Development; Stakeholder Forum for a Sustainable Future (2012), Review of Implementation of Agenda 21 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for Sustainable Development.
[3] French, Hilary (2002), “Reshaping Global Governance”, in L. Starke (ed.) State of the World 2002. New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 174-198, 183-184.
[4] Chatterjee, Pratap and Matthias Finger (1994), The Earth Brokers: Power, Politics, and World Development. London: Routledge. Principle 12 stated that: “States should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to economic growth and sustainable development in all countries, to better address the problems of environmental degradation. Trade policy measures for environmental purposes should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade. Unilateral actions to deal with environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction of the importing country should be avoided. Environmental measures addressing transboundary or global environmental problems should, as far as possible, be based on an international consensus.” United Nations General Assembly (1992), Rio Declaration on Environment and Development New York: United Nations General Assembly.
[5] United Nations General Assembly (2000), Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly. 55/2. United Nations Millennium Declaration. United Nations General Assembly, Fifty-fifth session Section IV/2.
[6] ITU (2020), Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Goal, Targets and Indicators, https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/intlcoop/mdg/goals.aspx (Accessed: 13 February 2020).
[7] Ruggie, John Gerard (2003), “The United Nations and Globalization: Patterns and Limits of Institutional Adaptation”, Global Governance, Vol.9, No.3, 301-320.
[8] United Nations (2015), The Millennium Development Goals Report 2015 New York: United Nations, 64.
[9] Ibid., 4-5.
[10] Ibid., 21.
[11] Kanie, Norichika, et al. (2017), “Introduction: Global Governance through Goal Setting”, in N. Kanie and F. Biermann (eds.), Governing through Goals. Sustainable Development Goals as Governance Innovation, 1-27, 1; French, Hilary (2002), “Reshaping Global Governance”, in L. Starke (ed.) State of the World 2002. New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 174-198, 183-184.
[12] Weber, Heloise (2017), “Politics of ‘Leaving No One Behind’: Contesting the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals Agenda”, Globalizations, Vol.14, No.3, 399-414.
[13] For instance, for a report on the global environmental issues and challenges linked to agriculture, see McIntyre, Beverly D. et al. (ed.) (2009), Agriculture at a Crossroads. International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development: Synthesis Report. Washington: Island Press. For a report on such issues related to transport, see Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2010), Globalisation, Transport and the Environment. Paris: OECD. Global energy policy has only recently emerged as a topic of research. Goldthau, A. (2016, e-book ed.), The Handbook of Global Energy Policy. Wiley.
[14] For instance, the little-known International Energy Charter is a binding international convention signed by some 50 countries that has WTO-like features and is aimed at the promotion and protection of foreign investment in the energy sector. It frames environmental and sustainability goals within a market-based paradigm and thus provides another example of reverse environmental integration. Energy Charter Secretariat (2015), International Energy Charter. Agreed Text for Adoption in the Hague at the Ministerial Conference on the International Energy Charter on 20 May 2015 Brussels: Energy Charter Secretariat. The International Energy Agency (IEA), although a useful source of information on global energy developments (including in renewables), is an arm of (30) OECD countries aimed foremost at enhancing energy security (for which it was set up in 1974). Although it has increased its engagement with non-OECD countries (including China and India), it is not a global organisation set up for developing global energy policy. International Energy Agency (IEA) (2021), About, https://www.iea.org/about (Accessed: 20 January 2022).
[15] European Environment Agency (2003), Europe’s Environment: The Third Assessment Environmental assessment report no.10. Copenhagen: EEA; European Commission (2020), Environmental Integration, European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/environment/integration/integration.htm (Accessed: 26 March 2020).
[16] Liefferink, Duncan and Mikael Skou Andersen (1997), “The Innovation of EU Environmental Policy. Introduction”, in D. Liefferink and M. S. Andersen (eds.), The Innovation of EU Environmental Policy. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 9-37.
[17] Lenschow, Andrea (2002), Environmental Policy Integration: Greening Sectoral Policies in Europe. London and Sterling, VA: Earthscan Publications; Lenschow, Andrea (2002), “Conclusion: What Are the Bottlenecks and Where Are the Opportunities for Greening the EU?”, in A. Lenschow (ed.) Environmental Policy Integration: Greening Sectoral Policies in Europe, 219-233.
[18] European Environment Agency (2015), The European Environment — State and Outlook 2015: Synthesis Report Copenhagen: EEA, 145.
[19] Lenschow, Andrea (2002), “Greening the European Union: An Introduction”, in A. Lenschow (ed.) Environmental Policy Integration: Greening Sectoral Policies in Europe, 1-21.
[20] European Environment Agency (2005), Environmental Policy Integration in Europe. State of Play and an Evaluation Framework. Copenhagen: EEA.
[21] Baker, Susan (2000), “The European Union: Integration, Competition, Growth – and Sustainability”, in W. M. Lafferty and J. Meadowcroft (eds.), Implementing Sustainable Development: Strategies and Initiatives in High Consumption Societies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 303-336, 335.
[22] Stakeholder Forum for a Sustainable Future (2012), Review of Implementation of Agenda 21. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for Sustainable Development, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/1126SD21%20Agenda21_new.pdf; Bryner, Gary C. (2004), “Global Interdependence”, in R. F. Durant, et al. (eds.), Environmental Governance Reconsidered: Challenges, Choices, and Opportunities. Cambridge, Mass and London: The MIT Press, 69-104; Wapner, Paul (2003), “World Summit on Sustainable Development: Toward a Post-Jo’burg Environmentalism”, Global Environmental Politics, Vol.3, No.1, 1-10; French, Hilary, “Reshaping Global Governance”.
Humanity on Trial 