[This is based on the Introduction to A Planetary Tragedy]
A planetary tragedy is unfolding. After billions of years, the evolution of life on Earth has reached a stage in which a single species, Homo sapiens, is destroying the foundations that have allowed life to flourish. As humans developed the capacity to manipulate nature to serve their own ends, their impact on the environment has reached a level and scale that threatens not only their survival but also that of numerous other species. What makes this a tragedy is not only that one of the most beautiful and miraculous products of cosmic evolution, a web of life that is extremely rare if not unique in the universe, is about to be destroyed, but that the responsibility for this lies with a species that is often regarded as standing at the pinnacle of this evolutionary process. Commonly considered to be the most intelligent of all life forms on Earth, it is also the most, perhaps even the only, destructive species to have evolved. Humans have become the greatest threat to life on Earth, including themselves. Arguably, this is the greatest paradox and mystery, or one might argue, an evolutionary ‘mistake’. Why is it that evolution has produced such a self-destructive species?
Exploring the answers to this intriguing question is a philosophical and speculative undertaking that I shall not pursue in this book. Nonetheless, the book examines two primary questions that are hardly less challenging: Why are humans engaging in this? And can they cease doing this?
Efforts to find answers to these questions may also provoke philosophical and highly speculative trains of thought, for instance, regarding human nature and its fundamental and innate flaws that render this process of (self-) destruction unavoidable, and thus a genuine tragedy in the commonly understood sense: a drama in which the innate flaws and compulsions of the main character(s) inevitably lead to disaster. In this drama, humans and evolution could be viewed as the two principal ill-fated actors in this planetary tragedy.
Although it is not my intention to speculate on or dwell on the inherent flaws of human nature, for this book it is relevant to point out what could be considered two main limitations or shortcomings of Homo sapiens that affect its interactions with the environment. The first of these, which may be termed their ecological flaw, is that humans lack a built-in (genetic) code, as all other species do, to guide their interactions with the biophysical environment. Guided by their brains (intelligence), humans manipulate and utilise the environment for their own purposes and are the only species that extracts more from it than necessary to meet their basic needs, often causing (knowingly or unintentionally) environmental harm. A second (social) flaw is that, although humans are a social species, they lack an inner code that instructs them on how to interact with one another. They are socially unspecialised in that their behaviour and actions may be influenced but not dictated by their genetic code. Human thinking, actions, and behaviour are also (some might say mostly) shaped by societies, conditions, feelings, thoughts, and choices. Consequently, they must learn how to coexist in groups and societies. Yet, despite an extensive period of socialisation, people make just as many mistakes in their interactions with one another as they do in their interactions with the biophysical environment, causing harm to one another (knowingly or unintentionally) and sometimes fracturing the groups and societies on which they depend.
While the depiction of these two flaws of human nature is speculative and contestable, it is pertinent to the two questions raised above. It suggests that individuals need to learn how to interact with their environment to avoid causing unnecessary harm to themselves. It also indicates that whether and how this learning occurs depends on a social context that presents its own challenges. Most people may agree that these two statements, although derived from claims about human nature, are hardly controversial and may be deemed facts rather than speculations. To use an analogy related to another shortcoming of human nature: individuals are not born with the ability to swim, but a society that wishes to help prevent drowning can establish a swimming education programme. The fact that people cannot swim by nature does not imply that drowning is inevitable; societies can address this flaw in human nature. This example suggests that societies are not necessarily doomed because of the ecological and social deficiencies of the human species. However, finding solutions to address these flaws may not be straightforward.
However, there is another way to approach these questions, one that I will adopt in this book. This approach involves not so much dwelling on human nature but examining how humans and societies have interacted with their environment, seeking to explain these interactions and their outcomes based on the social and environmental contexts and developments that influence or even shape them. Here, the notion of social context is interpreted broadly, encompassing everything that societies have constructed to guide and regulate human actions and interactions. It includes, among others, social studies, sociology, political studies, and economics. I define the environmental context as the biophysical reality, which encompasses the environment as modified by human activities. Both contexts are interrelated and influence one another, ultimately constituting a single, undivided reality. Nature and the human-modified environment are shaped by the social reality created by humans (societies), while the biophysical environment, events, and developments in turn influence social contexts.
This approach to the main questions raised above shifts the focus from human nature to what humans collectively do (or don’t do). Rather than attributing the destruction of nature to human nature, it seeks answers in how humans, through groups and societies, collectively shape and determine their interactions with the environment. People do not destroy nature because it is in their nature to do so, but because they collectively fail to adequately consider the (potential) impacts of their decisions and actions on the environment. This approach reframes the ‘inevitable’ planetary tragedy as the environmental challenge. Humans may collectively stop the unfolding planetary tragedy, notwithstanding the flaws inherent in their nature. Recognising the biophysical reality, societies may develop and adopt measures to control these flaws, thereby reducing and minimising their impacts on the environment.
However, although this may sound optimistic, there is hardly any basis for optimism. Reflecting on historical records of societies confronting environmental challenge, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that, overall, they have failed—abysmally so. This is not due to a lack of warning for humanity. Concerns regarding environmental degradation and issues such as pollution, deforestation, soil erosion, and declining wildlife have been pressing for people and governments throughout history, particularly since the second half of the 19th century. In 1962, Rachel Carson published Silent Spring, a book often regarded as the catalyst for the modern environmental era. Carson sounded the alarm regarding the harmful effects of pesticides on both the environment and human health. Her analysis highlighted the unforeseen impacts of technology on the environment as an intricate and interdependent whole. In the conclusion of her book, she commented on the arrogance inherent in the notion of controlling nature, a perspective that remains highly relevant today. The book sold millions of copies and was translated into 30 languages. It ignited considerable public concern and contributed to the rapid growth of the environmental movement, culminating in the organisation of the first Earth Day on 22 April 1970 in the United States. The rising publicity and concern generated discourse around an environmental crisis, even labelled as ‘Eco suicide’, among scientists and environmental thinkers. Other early warnings were encapsulated in the 1972 report “Limits to Growth,” which provided a science-based projection of the serious issues the world could expect if environmental limits were breached under various scenarios. While the report faced criticism for its (allegedly simplistic) modelling and pessimistic messaging, in 2008, a study comparing the report’s projections with actual developments concluded that “analysis shows that 30 years of historical data compare favorably with key features of a business- as- usual scenario called the “standard run” scenario, which results in collapse of the global system midway through the 21st century.” In 2012, Jorgen Randers, one of the contributors to the original report, asserted that the collective response to the challenge of adapting humanity to the planet’s limitations was too slow, and that it was “difficult to maintain a happy outlook when you know deep in your heart that the world is on a path to disaster.”
There is no need to elaborate further on the ongoing stream of reports about the rapidly deteriorating environment worldwide. Notwithstanding the views of a small number of academics who deny or downplay the seriousness of environmental problems, strong evidence exists regarding significant environmental decline and rapid global warming. Furthermore, it is now recognised that the rate of environmental deterioration has increased significantly since WWII, coinciding with a rapid rise in socio-economic indicators and sharp increases in ‘Earth System indicators’ beyond the levels characteristic of the Holocene, the geological period that began around 11,700 years ago after the last ice age and created the conditions for the human species to proliferate and develop. It has been suggested that this ‘Great Acceleration’ can be seen as an appropriate starting point for the Anthropocene, the label for a proposed new geological era characterised by changes in the structure and functioning of the Earth System as a whole that can be attributed to human activities. Although it remains unclear and debatable whether these changes signify a permanent departure from the Holocene or whether a significant reduction of socio-economic pressures may allow a return to the conditions that were so favourable for the flourishing of the human species, certainly, continuation of these pressures at current (or even higher) levels creates a high-risk ‘brave new world’ that humanity may not survive.[1]
Yet, despite the ever-louder calls for more effective action, it seems that governments, societies, and humanity as a whole are unable (or perhaps unwilling) to address the environmental challenge effectively. The planetary tragedy continues to unfold, and attributing this failure to societies rather than human nature does not provide much, if any, ground for optimism. Arguably, the source of the problem lies not only in human nature but also in society. Collectively, humans do not, and perhaps cannot, learn how to interact sustainably with the environment and adapt our social interactions accordingly.
The main argument of this book is that the sources of this inexorable process of environmental destruction lie in three clusters of factors that constitute fundamental and interconnected obstacles to addressing the environmental challenge more effectively. The first cluster pertains to the diversity of views and interpretations of the environment, environmental problems, and their sources or causes. The second encompasses obstacles within the prevailing political, economic, and socio-cultural systems that shape most societies’ practices and institutions, which are overwhelmingly incompatible with long-term environmental protection. The third cluster concerns two main factors: power and agency. These factors exert a strong influence on the other clusters but are also shaped by them. It is the interconnectedness of these three clusters of factors that makes it so difficult for environmental advocates to effect significant change and to achieve a meaningful and enduring reduction in environmental pressures. The key to accomplishing this, I argue, lies in the redistribution of power and, specifically and strategically, in the creation of national-level Sovereign People’s Authorities (SPAs).
By far, most analyses of the ‘environmental crisis’ are followed by calls for governments and ‘us’ to take more effective or radical action. It is often proclaimed that ‘we’ can resolve this crisis if ‘we’ adopt the necessary behaviour changes, practices, technologies, and measures. All members of society (and all people in the world) must do so, and/or governments must have the political will to introduce such measures and encourage, motivate, or even compel their citizens to accept them. Yet, as I will argue in this book, using the term ‘we’ in this context is misplaced. While it is easy and understandable to use the terms ‘we’ and ‘us’ when discussing matters of collective interest, such as the environmental challenge (I do it myself), it must be recognised that the responsibility for actions and practices that harm the environment, and for societal action and inaction, is not equally shared. ‘We’ (humans) are facing an existential catastrophe, but our fate, in the world as it is, lies in the hands of a relatively small group of people who make decisions on which, by far, most of us have no influence.
The distribution and exercise of power lie at the heart of the environmental challenge. Societies are being led to environmental collapse. Halting, let alone reversing, this process requires systemic changes that are unlikely to be enacted by the dominant elites or classes. The ‘flaws and inner compulsions’ that lead humanity and the planet to disaster may have roots in human nature, but are mediated, mitigated, or fuelled by societies. How ‘we’ deal with the environmental challenge depends foremost on the choices and decisions made by the most powerful, who also create, shape, or amend the systems through which those choices and decisions are made and legitimised. Fundamentally, humanity’s failure to adequately meet the environmental challenge stems from the deliberately created incapacity of prevailing systems to recognise the existential importance of protecting environmental processes, systems, and boundaries. Only the creation of systems that assign primacy to ‘our’ collective interest may stave off the presently inexorable process of destruction. Therefore, a significant shift in power from the dominant elites to the people offers the only remaining chance to move societies away from the highly unsustainable path they are on.
This radical idea implies rethinking all existing political systems, whether democratic or authoritarian. It boils down to the question of who has (or should have) the right to exercise the assumedly sovereign power of a country’s citizens. With the rise of liberal democracies, this right has been granted (one could argue usurped) by Parliaments on behalf of the people. In authoritarian systems, this right is appropriated by those who effectively hold the strings of power and claim to represent and advocate for the people. However, in all political systems, the notion of popular sovereignty has been, and continues to be, used to legitimise highly unrepresentative governments that primarily serve the interests of the dominant political and economic classes or elites in a society (or even beyond). If the principle of popular sovereignty is to mean anything, it is that the people, meaning all the citizens of a country, collectively are the legitimate source and holders of supreme power. Logically, at least, the people cannot be given what they already possess: the supreme (highest) power. If that power is de facto exercised by certain individuals or institutions, it does not imply that the people have ceased to be sovereign. If the current holders of formal political (institutional) power fail to exercise it to protect or advance the collective interests of the people as a whole, citizens have the right to reclaim that power and exercise it differently. It is perhaps a poverty of imagination, cultivated by the dominant interests and rulers, that leads people to believe there is no alternative way to exercise their sovereignty. The idea of creating Sovereign People’s Authorities represents an alternative means for the citizens of a country to exercise the sovereign power that, in principle, they already possess. The creation of such bodies constitutes, in my view, a superior method of giving practical effect to that principle and providing more meaningful substance to the concept of democracy than existing liberal-democratic systems, let alone authoritarian regimes.
A key question arising from this proposal is whether creating SPAs would make a difference in how the environmental crisis is tackled. On that point, I will be frank and admit that there is no guarantee that such bodies will effectively address the environmental challenge and prevent a catastrophic breakdown of societies and the world as a whole. I elaborate on these questions in the last two chapters of this book. Here, I will make four points: First, the chances that the systemic obstacles to meaningful environmental protection and restoration will be overcome or eliminated by SPAs are infinitely higher than they are in all existing political systems. Frankly, I believe the likelihood that countries and the world as a whole will undertake the fundamental transformations needed to move towards more sustainable (or, at first, less unsustainable) societies is currently close to zero. Second, I do not see any other way, besides creating SPAs, to compel societies to adopt truly transformational change, at least before it is too late. Third, if these fundamental changes are not made, humanity may indeed be doomed. Nature will continue in one way or another and will likely rebound over time, but the destruction of the life-support systems on which humans depend will make the survival of the human species very difficult. Thus, the idea of creating SPAs is to allow societies the chance to offer ‘us’ our best and perhaps last shot at survival – it is ‘our’ last line of defence. Fourth, if SPAs fail to implement the necessary changes, it can at least be said that societies will receive the future they deserve, not the one created for them by unrepresentative leaders.
In the remainder of this introduction, I shall outline the development of my main argument throughout the chapters of the book.
Chapter 1 elaborates on the first cluster of issues mentioned above, specifically how environmental problems have been predominantly interpreted and addressed. Although there are many different perspectives on environmental problems and how they can or should be addressed, the prevailing interpretation adopted by most governments has been very pragmatic, with approaches to these problems being ad hoc, reactive, and fragmented. I will argue that the environmental challenge necessitates a comprehensive, integrated approach grounded in the environment’s holistic nature. This is not a new idea; early environmental thinkers have long recognised it, but it has rarely been taken (very) seriously by governments and, for that matter, by many people in modern societies. The chapter presents and discusses the notion of environmental integration (EI), which can provide a basis for analysing the way(s) environmental concerns have been considered in cognitive frameworks, policies, and institutions, and for the development of a comprehensive and integrated approach to the environmental challenge by governments.
Chapter 2 utilises the framework presented in Chapter 1 to evaluate the environmental performance of the governments of four countries that, at various stages over the last five decades, were considered environmental leaders. The comparative analysis reveals that none of these countries adopted and consistently pursued an approach that aligns with the framework. However, at different stages, they developed greater strengths in some areas of environmental integration than others.
In Chapter 3, I discuss potential explanations for governments’ failure to adopt a comprehensive, integrated approach to environmental integration. The chapter begins by taking stock of the efforts undertaken by the comparative environmental policy and politics literature. While this field is helpful because it identifies a range of potentially relevant and important factors that can help explain governments’ environmental performance, I take issue with the allegedly scientific approach aimed at developing a general theory that applies to all countries. To understand countries’ approaches to the environmental challenge, we need to examine the specific, often unique histories, positions, contexts, and developments of each country. Nonetheless, the ‘independent variables’ that have been identified in the comparative (environmental) policy and politics literature can provide a valuable basis for exploring the role of relevant factors. Drawing from the literature, I briefly describe what I believe are the most important factors: socio-cultural factors, political-institutional factors, political-economic factors, and power and agency.
Chapter 4 elaborates on the role and importance of socio-cultural factors, as well as the extent to which these have facilitated or hindered environmental integration. In particular, the chapter examines a range of worldviews (religious and secular) and whether and how they consider the environment. It also explores the social support bases of these worldviews and whether there is evidence of growing support for the emergence of a new dominant environmental paradigm in countries. It also discusses the role of power and agency in the battle for people’s hearts and minds, indicating that socio-cultural change is not just a matter of evolution or changing conditions but also of deliberate efforts to shape the dominant worldview in societies and, increasingly, the world at large.
Chapter 5 focuses on the role and importance of political institutions in environmental integration. After providing my take on this topic, I focus in particular on the role of states as the most important and dominant political institutions in the modern world. It postulates that since the emergence of modern states in 17th-century Europe, states have fulfilled, or have tried to fulfil, four main core functions: security, economic, demand and conflict management, and social integration. How these functions are interpreted or defined is the subject of a continuous battle within states and societies. Arguably, environmental protection is, or should be, a fifth core function of the state. Pushed by environmental advocates and demands, states have introduced and/or adapted (environmental) institutions (‘ecostates’) to fulfil this function. However, these reforms have had little impact on how the traditional core functions of the state are interpreted, which can heavily constrain or even negate the effectiveness of environmental institutions. The chapter also discusses, in the context of the demand and conflict management function of states, arguments about the relative (de-) merits of democratic and authoritarian political systems in advancing environmental integration.
Chapter 6 examines the interaction between political systems and economic systems in greater detail. It opens with a general discussion of economics and economic systems, exploring how the realm of economics has increasingly become disembedded from societies with the rise of capitalism, treating nature and humans as mere means to economic ends. However, it also highlights the crucial role of states in shaping and facilitating economic systems, as well as the influence of economic power in shaping and constraining political systems. Although this interaction can lead to many different or even unique political-economic systems, I identify six main types based on a characterisation of political systems as more or less democratic or authoritarian, and of economic systems (capitalist, socialist, and mixed), five of which have had actual counterparts. This classification provides a basis for discussing, in the following three chapters, the extent to which these different systems may be conducive to or pose inherent obstacles to environmental integration, given the conflicting claims about their past performance and their potential for greening. Moreover, the chapter elaborates on a common underlying feature of all five political-economic systems that have thus far existed: their dependence on industrialisation and industrial production systems. Such systems, it can be argued, possess inherent features that make them fundamentally incompatible with environmental imperatives, including their expansionary logic and their roots in the idea of infinite progress. This has led to the emergence of industrial societies in which progress is defined foremost in material and scientific-technological terms, thus creating a socio-cultural basis for the ongoing process of dis-embedding development from societies, as well as of societies and humans from nature. These developments may lead to the creation of a completely artificial world (superseding nature) ruled by a totalitarian technocracy. However, whether this comes to pass depends primarily on developments within extant political-economic systems.
Chapter 7 examines capitalism and its inherent features or imperatives, such as the profit motive, competition, the necessity for capital accumulation, commodification, and the tendency towards overproduction and crisis. These characteristics also suggest the need for continuous economic growth and relentless consumerism, profit-driven technological development, and the neglect or minimisation of social and environmental damage resulting from development, all of which render capitalism fundamentally incompatible with meaningful and long-term environmental protection. Although individual entrepreneurs may be genuinely committed to making their businesses more environmentally friendly, they are limited in how far they can go by the systemic features mentioned previously. The same holds for governments that may, under pressure from environmental demands, express their commitment to greening the (capitalist) economy, particularly in economies that have been opened up to international competition.
Chapter 8 examines the question of whether socialism offers an alternative to capitalism, and to what extent, as a foundation for meaningful environmental integration. This issue is explored on two levels: theoretical or ideological, and based on the environmental records of socialist countries. At the ideological level, I discuss what I consider to be some of the key tenets of socialism, emphasising that in principle, these are not incompatible with prioritising environmental concerns; quite the opposite. However, analysing the poor environmental performance of some countries with socialist economic systems, particularly the Soviet Union and China (under Mao), leads to the conclusion that this potential has not materialised in practice. The chapter investigates the primary reasons for this failure, highlighting the significance of the commitment to rapid (industry-based) economic development, the political and historical context, and the absence of democratic institutions. While Cuba has a relatively more positive environmental record, it too suffers from the same issues. As all countries with socialist economic systems have also been characterised by authoritarian political regimes, the chapter further explores whether democratic socialism could establish a sustainable political-economic system.
Chapter 9 examines political-economic systems with what I refer to as hybrid economic systems, which combine elements of capitalism and socialism. To the extent that such systems have successfully reformed or tamed capitalism, making it no longer inherently unsustainable, they perhaps offer realistic alternatives for advancing sustainability. Two subtypes of hybrid systems can be distinguished: one paired with a more or less (liberal) democratic political system, and one combined with a more or less authoritarian system. The chapter discusses the experiences of social democracies as examples of the former, and China in the post-Mao era as an illustration of the latter. It concludes that while social democracies appear to hold considerable promise for fostering environmental integration, these systems have not addressed, let alone eliminated, the obstacles inherent to capitalism, particularly the growth imperative. Although the Chinese hybrid may exert greater control over capitalism, it too has failed to adequately address the fundamental sources of unsustainability, especially those linked to industrialism and the type of society it has engendered. Furthermore, contrary to what some assert, the Chinese political system is even less equipped to effectively confront the environmental challenge than social democracies were. Rather, it has put the country on the track towards becoming a dystopian totalitarian technocracy.
Chapter 10 takes the discussion to the international and global levels. Given the seemingly insurmountable obstacles to environmental integration at the national level, it examines whether this goal can be more effectively pursued at the international level. Furthermore, as the environmental challenge is as much, if not more, global as local, regional, and national, it can be argued that this is the level on which environmental advocates should or must concentrate their effort The chapter assesses the environmental integration initiatives undertaken thus far, drawing on the environmental integration matrix presented in Chapter 1, and discusses developments across cognitive, policy, and institutional domains. It concludes that environmental integration efforts have been most successful in the cognitive realm (based on the notion of sustainable development), less so in the policy domain, and least effectively in the institutional sphere. Overall, the effectiveness of these efforts is, euphemistically stated, rather low, and what may appear as progress often amounts to little more than a form of reverse environmental integration, whereby environmental issues are redefined and subjected to economic logic and interests.
Chapter 11 discusses four schools of thought in the field of International Relations and Globalisation that contribute various insights into why environmental integration efforts at the international and global levels have made limited progress. Two of these, Realism and Institutionalism, continue to recognise states as the foundational elements of the international (dis-)order, albeit with differing degrees of optimism or pessimism regarding international cooperation and global governance, particularly concerning environmental issues. A third school, International Political Economy, delves into the political-economic factors and developments that have propelled globalisation, providing insights into the structural features of international and global capitalism and how these limit states’ actions. This perspective also offers little cause for optimism regarding the prospects for global environmental integration, and indeed, the future of humanity and the natural world. The fourth school, Cosmopolitanism, presents a more positive (or idealistic) view of the world, positing arguably strong moral grounds for global environmental cooperation. Yet, it requires an infusion of realism from the other schools of thought. None of these perspectives provides a strong foundation for the notion that the environmental challenge can be (most) effectively addressed at the international or global level.
Chapter 12 discusses the systemic changes necessary to redirect countries from their current unsustainable paths. While the specific nature of these changes will vary from country to country, influenced by their historical, political, economic, social, and environmental contexts, they must be determined by the citizens of each nation. Nonetheless, it is possible to broadly outline the necessary adjustments to facilitate the approach to environmental integration described in Chapter 1. Furthermore, it is necessary to examine the systemic changes that would enable societies to cultivate the sustainable societies that they consider desirable. The proposed changes fall into four main areas: political-institutional (also known as greening the state), economic transformation, socio-cultural system transformation, and transformation of international and global relations. Contrary to prevailing views, the suggestions here do not prioritise global transformational change, which is considered unattainable in the foreseeable future, but rather advocate a bottom-up approach based on existing states. Countries that have adopted transformation may inspire others to follow their lead and could establish cooperative networks and coalitions that promote sustainability at a practical level, rather than relying on empty rhetoric at the global scale.
However, as discussed in earlier chapters, the obstacles to fundamental, systemic change are formidable in all existing political-economic systems, and it seems unlikely that the changes proposed in Chapter 12 will be accepted and pursued by any state. Therefore, Chapter 13 revisits the question of whether it is even plausible to consider that societies can steer themselves collectively, purposefully, and democratically in a direction of their choosing. As briefly discussed in Chapter 3, this raises the issue of collective action (agency) and power. Historically, there is little evidence that societies have achieved this. Any societal steering that has occurred has been enacted by the most powerful within societies, often resulting in unforeseen and disastrous outcomes. The chapter reexamines the significance of states, not only for addressing the essential needs of individuals and societies but also (strategically) for shifting the balance of power towards societies rather than elites. Given their political-institutional power, rooted in the sovereignty of the people, states hold the key to reshaping the allocation and distribution of power in societies. While this has long been recognised, as reflected in political revolutions, it has not resulted in the establishment of political systems that delegate the power to democratically steer societies to the societies themselves.
To that end, Chapter 14 proposes the establishment of Sovereign People’s Authorities (SPAs). A SPA would serve as the supreme political institution of a country, grounded in the principle of popular sovereignty. It would consist of a representative group of citizens, selected by sortition, with rotating membership for a fixed term. Its primary responsibility would be to adopt a social contract that reflects what members consider the most significant long-term collective interests of society, encompassing socio-economic and environmental factors. It would possess constitutive power, enabling it to reconstruct the country’s constitution and create an overarching policy framework that outlines the main principles, rules, and goals to be respected and implemented by the current government. The rationale for creating SPAs is twofold: first, bestowing the highest authority on a supreme body of citizens who can represent society is justified by the principles of popular sovereignty and democracy. Secondly, establishing such bodies is likely the only means to effectuate the transformative change necessary to redirect societies from their highly unsustainable path and to guide them collectively and democratically towards a direction deemed desirable by society. The chapter addresses key objections likely to be raised against this idea and proposes strategies to advance the creation of such Authorities.
[1] Wikipedia (2021), Guy McPherson, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guy_McPherson (Accessed: 27 October 2021); Rees, Martin J. (2003), Our Final Hour: A Scientist’s Warning: How Terror, Error, and Environmental Disaster Threaten Humankind’s Future in This Century- on Earth and Beyond. New York: Basic Books. For a discussion of such views, see Wallace-Wells, David (2019, ebook ed.), The Uninhabitable Earth: Life after Warming. London: Penguin Books.