The central tenets of Realism
The Realist perspective is the oldest school of thought in international relations [1] and remains a strong influence in academic and political circles. The four core elements of this perspective are: the world consists of a system of sovereign states (recognising no higher authority); states are driven by self-interest; the most important interest pursued by states is security (defined in the first instance as the protection of their territorial integrity); linked to the previous point, another primary concern of states is their relative power in the international arena. A state’s relative power depends on its military might and economic power (command over resources), providing a crucial basis for military power. Therefore, security and economic strength are the state’s top priorities. However, although economic power is essential, the state’s decisions and actions are not dominated or captured by particular economic interests; security interests take precedence and will supersede them if deemed necessary.
The state is viewed as a rational, unitary actor whose decisions are based on the interests mentioned, rather than on moral or ethical considerations, even though some classical Realists, such as Hans Morgenthau and E. H. Carr, believed that morality should also have a place in Realism. However, universal principles, values, or interests are commonly denied, and those who argue in favour of these are often dismissed as idealists.[2]
In the realist worldview, the international order is often described as anarchy, understood as the absence of a supranational authority. Yet, this does not necessarily imply international chaos and a continuous war of all against all (as a Hobbesian view would contend). Although states are driven by self-interest, they can and do cooperate with other states, but only when it serves their interests. Hence, they can and do form alliances, pursue a “balance of power”, or sign multilateral agreements if they are perceived as in their best interests. Also, as states are highly unequal in power, the most powerful state or states (hegemons) are likely to consider maintaining the status quo as desirable and to be averse to engaging in international action that destabilises the existing order. The existence of a global hegemon is thus often seen as conducive or even a necessary condition for a stable global order and for state cooperation, albeit on the terms of the hegemon.[3]
Hence, in the Realist view, to paraphrase Orwell, all states are sovereign, but some states are more sovereign than others. Cooperation among the most powerful states is always contingent on their perceptions of their primary interests (security and general economic interests), even if this comes at the expense of other states (and their sovereignty). Given the enormous differences in (relative) power between states, developing a general theory of states is meaningless, as many Neo-Realists aim to do.[4] Such efforts only serve to disguise these enormous inequalities and distract from the colonialist, imperialist, exploitative and repressive policies and practices that have been characteristic of most, if not all, significant powers and empires. This is, of course, widely recognised in the case of the colonialist past of many European powers, but it also applies to the United States and other major powers, including Russia (and the former Soviet Union) and China.
The United States and Realism
The United States has long adhered to the Realist state model, as evidenced by its numerous foreign interventions.[5] Just in the recent past, successive US administrations refused to sign up to the biodiversity and climate change conventions, to recognise the authority of the International Criminal Court, invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, engaged in the extra-judicial killing of suspected terrorists, withdrew from international nuclear arms agreements and from international trade agreements, among many other instances of unilateral action. References to the United States as an empire concerned foremost with protecting access to and control over natural resources and maintaining its military, economic, and technological supremacy also align well with the Realist view of the world.[6] By contrast, many other nations lack the power to unilaterally pursue, let alone impose, their interests on other countries. They are thus impelled to seek cooperation and compromise in their foreign policies and are followers rather than leaders. Therefore, the Realist perspective is more applicable to the United States than to many other countries and arguably serves it well, providing a legitimate theoretical basis for its foreign policies.
However, it should be kept in mind that the Realist perspective leaves room for interpretation by the leaders of a state of what the state’s (essential) security interests are. These definitions may change due to shifts in leadership and the evolving international context. For instance, there have been significant shifts in the U.S. foreign policy emphasis on multilateralism versus unilateralism (e.g., from Obama to Trump and back to multilateralism under Biden). US foreign policy, like the foreign policies of all countries, is dynamic rather than static and changes depending on who is in power, developments, circumstances, and interpretations. This does not mean that the Realist perspective is wrong or that the United States is not foremost concerned with advancing and protecting its national interests, as defined by its leaders. In some areas or respects, there is likely to be continuity in foreign policy. Arguably, the most critical ongoing and ever-growing concern in U.S. foreign policy over the last 20 years or so has been China’s rise and the threat it poses to U.S. hegemony.[7] In other instances, policy changes flow from reconsidering (the effectiveness of) means rather than ends or what a country’s vital (national) interests are. This is illustrated, for instance, by the rise of the notion of environmental security.
Realism and the environment
Environmental concerns and interests did not figure prominently in Realist accounts until they began to be linked with the concept of environmental security. Initially, this notion was advanced in environmental circles to broaden the traditional concept of security and increase the political weight assigned to environmental interests.[8] But, as some environmental analysts feared, it has been hijacked by those with a vested interest in maintaining the traditional notion of national security. Realists, including staff of the United States Department of Defence,[9] adopted a view of environmental security that emphasises the risk of conflict over, and the need to secure access to, natural resources, and the protection of the nation against waves of environmental refugees. From this perspective, climate change is a foremost concern due to its geopolitical and security implications for the United States and its allies.[10]
Thus, from a Realist perspective, environmental concerns are considered only or mainly to the extent that they threaten or serve first-order interests. Environmental issues are redefined to fit in with these concerns, constituting at most a reverse or subordinate form of environmental integration. As several analysts have pointed out, this form of integration is unlikely to be conducive to addressing the underlying causes of environmental problems, which lie foremost within countries and are thus internal rather than external. Integrating environmental concerns into traditional security thinking may exacerbate the situation, as it “weaponises” the environment and utilises environmental problems as a pretext to strengthen and employ military force to address environmental issues at high environmental and human costs.[11]
However, this does not mean that the Realist perspective should be ignored by advocates of environmental integration. To the extent that this perspective influences, drives, or even dominates the actions of states and governments, it poses significant obstacles to international cooperation efforts aimed at resolving or addressing environmental problems. Not surprisingly, this worldview is attractive to the major powers, notably the United States, as it provides a rationale and justification for pursuing and imposing their (perceived) interests and views on other countries and governments.[12] Although the United States is perhaps no longer the all-dominant and hegemonic global superpower or empire that it was widely considered to be since WWII, and in particular after the demise of the Soviet Union, it is still the most powerful nation on Earth, economically, militarily, and in the media/communications (cognitive power) domain. Nonetheless, China is rapidly becoming a rival superpower, as the United States perceives it. India, Russia, and the EU are increasingly asserting their significant power amid this rivalry. From a Realist perspective, this will likely lead to growing international tension and conflict. This view can become a self-fulfilling prophecy if it continues to hold or strengthen its grip on governments in countries.
If this proves to be the case, it does not bode well for the prospects of global environmental integration and, by extension, for national-level integration. As many environmental problems can only be tackled effectively through international cooperation, growing conflict, distrust, and rivalry, accompanied by a resurgence of nationalism, are likely to increase rather than reduce environmental exploitation in the pursuit of perceived national security and economic interests. As Renner has pointed out, the “war on terror”, waged in the name of enhancing security, has had the effect of diverting attention and resources away from environmental imperatives and has made the world even less secure in all respects.[13] The more the Realist perspective dominates, the gloomier the prospects of effective environmental integration at the national and international levels.
But the Realist view of the world is not unchallenged. Other schools of thought, including Institutionalism and Cosmopolitanism, offer a more optimistic perspective on states’ willingness and ability to cooperate.
References
[1] Gilpin, Robert (2002), “A Realist Perspective on International Governance”, in D. Held and A. McGrew (eds.), Governing Globalisation: Power, Authority and Global Governance. Cambridge: Polity Press, 237-248, 237.
[2] Korab-Karpowicz, W. Julian, Political Realism in International Relations. In: Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition)(Accessed: 2 September 2021). Sterling-Folker, Jennifer (2005), “Realist Global Governance. Revisiting Cave! Hic Dragones and Beyond”, in M. J. Hoffmann and A. D. Ba (eds.) (2005), Contending Perspectives on Global Governance. Coherence, Contestation and World Order. London and New York: Routledge, 17-38.
[3] Haas, Peter M. (1994), “Regime Patterns for Environmental Management”, in P. Haas and H. Hveem (eds.) (1994), Complex Cooperation. Institutions and Processes in International Resource Management. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 35-63.
[4] Korab-Karpowicz, W. Julian, Political Realism in International Relations.
[5] Krippendorf notes that the United States intervened 160 times in 170 years, primarily due to economic interests. Krippendorf, Ekkehart (1970), Die Amerikanische Strategie. Entscheidungsprozess Und Instrumentarium Der Amerikanische Aussenpolitik. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 26. See also: Chomsky, Noam (1992), Deterring Democracy. London, New York: Verso; Petras, James F. and Henry Veltmeyer (2001), Globalization Unmasked: Imperialism in the 21st Century. New York: Zed Books; Johnson, Chalmers (2006), Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic. New York: Metropolitan Books.
[6] Dalby, Simon (2004), “Ecological Politics, Violence, and the Theme of Empire”, Global Environmental Politics, Vol . 4, No.2, 1-11; Parenti, Michael (1995), Against Empire. San Francisco: City Lights Books; Laffey, M. (2003), “Discerning the Patterns of World Order: Noam Chomsky and International Theory after the Cold War”, Review of International Studies, Vol . 29, No.4, 587-604.
[7] Golub, Philip S. (2019), “Curbing China’s Rise”, Le Monde Diplomatique (English edition), October, 2-4; MacFarlane, Laurie (2020), “The Tensions over Huawei Are Not About Trade, but over Supremacy”, The Guardian, 16 July; Layne, Christopher (2017), “The US Foreign Policy Establishment and Grand Strategy: How American Elites Obstruct Strategic Adjustment”, International Politics, Vol.54, No.3, 260-275; Tisdall, Simon (2016), “US on Back Foot as China Rises”, The Guardian Weekly, Vol.195, 17, 1,12; Clark, Ian (2011), “China and the United States: A Succession of Hegemonies?”, International Affairs, Vol.87, No.1, 13-28; Khong, Yuen Foong (2014), “Primacy or World Order? The United States and China’s Rise – a Review Essay”, International Security, Vol.38, No.3, 153-175.
[8] Barnett, Jon (2001), The Meaning of Environmental Security: Ecological Politics and Policy in the New Security Era. New York: Zed Books; Renner, Michael (2005), “Security Redefined”, in Renner, M., H. French and E. Assadourian (eds.), State of the World 2005. Redefining Global Security. New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, pp.3-19.
[9] Schwartz, Peter and Doug Randall (2003), An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for United States National Security. California: Defense Technical Information Center; Townsend, Mark (2004), “Giant Space Shield Plan to Save Planet”, The Guardian, 11 January.
[10] Deudney, Daniel (1990), “The Case against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security”, Journal of International Studies, Vol.19, No.3, pp.461-476; Dalby, Simon (1997), “Environmental Security: Geopolitics, Ecology and the New World Order”, in J. Braden, et al. (eds.), Environmental Policy with Political and Economic Integration. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 453-475.
[11] Deudney, Daniel (1990), “The Case against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security”; Dalby, Simon, “Environmental Security: Geopolitics, Ecology and the New World Order”.
[12] It has been argued that this remains the prevailing view of the United States, despite China’s rise. Zajec, Olivier (Translated by Charles Goulden) (2020), “Biden Dreams of Rebuilding the International Order”, Le Monde Diplomatique (English edition), December, 6-7.
[13] Renner, Michael, “Security Redefined”, 13-16.