Both Realism and Institutionalism regard states as the building blocks of the international political system. But although they differ in their views on the extent to which there is scope for cooperation between states and conflict between them is unnecessary or even irrational, they also share a common weakness. Both schools of thought adopt a largely voluntarist view of state (and government) action, in the sense that what governments do or don’t do depends primarily on the rational choices made by those who act on behalf of the state. But while these choices are based on these actors’ interpretations of what their states’ (or their own) interests are, both Realists and Institutionalists have little to say about how these interests are structured and circumscribed by the political-economic systems within which these actors operate. However, what state officials and political leaders define as a state’s essential interests does not depend solely on their personal preferences, as is often assumed in Realist and Institutional models of rational choice. Similarly, the international interactions between state representatives and the choices they collectively make do not merely reflect the personal preferences of those involved. Although agency—the ability of individuals to choose—can make a crucial difference (demonstrated, for instance, by different presidents of the United States), the choices made by state officials, both elected and appointed, are circumscribed by the institutions within which they operate and by the political-economic power relations and structures that have shaped those institutions.
The School of International Political Economy (IPE) has much to offer in advancing our understanding of the structural factors shaping state interactions. The label “Political Economy” has been interpreted in different ways [1]. Here, I primarily draw on the Marxist or Critical school of thought, as it focuses on the connections between political and economic systems and how these influence or shape international and global institutions, processes, and interactions. Realism and Institutionalism have little time for the idea that capitalism is a significant factor in what states do (or don’t do) internationally, even though they talk in general terms about states pursuing economic interests as well as safeguarding the security (territorial integrity) of the state. IPE, by contrast, has much to say about how the interactions between capitalism and states influence and shape much of what is going on in the world.
Capitalism and imperialism
International exploitation already played a role in the early stage of capitalism, referred to by Marx as the stage of “primitive accumulation”. Marx argued that “The colonies secured a market for the budding manufactures, and, through the monopoly of the market, an increased accumulation. The treasures captured outside Europe by undisguised looting, enslavement, and murder, floated back to the mother-country and were there turned into capital.”[2] Competition between capitalists and the centralisation of capital into ever fewer hands drove the internationalisation of capitalism: “Hand in hand with this centralization, or this expropriation of many capitalists by few, develop, on an ever-extending scale […] the entanglement of all peoples in the net of the world-market, and with this, the international character of the capitalistic regime.”[3] It is worth noting that Marx located the growth imperative in the industrial system, with its growing need for resources and expanding markets, and in the competitive nature of the capitalist system, which necessitates the search for new opportunities for investment and profit (the accumulation imperative). Both imperatives are at odds with recognising limits to growth, making these systems inherently ecologically unsustainable.
The claim that capitalism has been a driving force behind imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism has been taken up and further developed by many subsequent thinkers and analysts, including Hobson, Hilferding, and Lenin. While Hobson agreed that colonisation provided an outlet for overproduction and surplus savings (capital), he argued that it was not strictly necessary, as, in theory, surpluses could be absorbed domestically if wages were raised sufficiently to create effective demand.[4] However, Marxist analysts, including Hilferding and Lenin, were quick to point out that increasing wages to such levels contradicts the logic of capitalist competition, which requires their suppression to keep production costs down. Hilferding expanded on the role of finance in furthering the concentration of capital and the rise of monopolies and cartels, which recruited state assistance to expand colonial markets and new investment opportunities, thereby turning nationalism into an ideology of imperialism.[5] Lenin, who drew on both Hobson and Hilferding in his study of imperialism, also emphasised the growing influence of financial capital and its search for new profitable outlets worldwide, leading to rivalry and division among the major capitalist states. Imperialism was just the next stage in the development of capitalism, inevitably leading to international conflict and war.[6]
Thus, from an IPE perspective, states have always played, and continue to play, a crucial role in facilitating the expansion of capitalism. Although capitalism became the dominant economic system in only a relatively small part of the world (Western European countries and North America) in the 19th century, it was closely intertwined with industrialisation, and its expansionist needs led to the rapid integration of much of the world into the capitalist system. While the leading European powers competed to establish colonies or protectorates across most of Africa and Asia, the United States claimed the Americas as its own backyard, even as it pursued a different strategy from the European powers to draw this region into its economic dominance.[7] But while the policies and methods of the imperial powers differed, the result for the rest of the world was much the same. The economies of the countries under their control were (re-) structured to serve the (resource, market, and investment) needs of their national capitals, which resulted in the “development of underdevelopment” in many of the subjugated territories.[8]
The rise of the United States
Great Britain, which gained a head start in the Industrial Revolution and the colonisation of large parts of the world, owing also to its superior naval power and the fact that France and Germany were embroiled in the 1870 war with each other, was the leading power and the financial centre of capitalism until WWII. However, the United States, which was already the most technologically advanced industrial country in the late 19th century and had benefited economically from both world wars, rose to become the dominant power following World War II, as most of Europe and Japan lay in tatters. During World War II, American policymakers had already begun to redesign the global political-economic order that would be established after the war, with the Bretton Woods system becoming a cornerstone of this new order. Also, with the emergence of the Cold War and the “threat” of socialism, the U.S. government decided that it was in America’s interest to rebuild the European and Japanese economies and to integrate them into its political-economic sphere under a free-trade umbrella.[9] The Marshall Plan and a similar aid package for Japan opened access to American capital and exports while also providing European and Japanese goods, services, and capital with access to the US market. With Germany and Japan rising from the ashes to become strong industrial powers with prosperous economies, and with Germany contained within European and Transatlantic cooperative institutions, the threat of political instability and socialism was effectively controlled, while the dominant position of American capitalism was firmly secured. This was also reflected in the US dollar becoming the world’s preferred reserve currency, with the advantages it conferred on the United States.[10]
However, the golden era of capitalist expansion, which enabled many European nations to build welfare states without compromising capitalist imperatives, ended in the 1970s. Although explanations for this turn of events differ, most IPE analysts agree that the contradictions inherent to capitalism reasserted themselves. After 25 years of unprecedented economic growth, production, and consumption, the problems of declining opportunities for accumulation and overproduction resurfaced.[11] The crisis created an opportunity for the advocates of neoliberalism to roll back the Keynesian political-economic consensus on which the post-WWII order had been based, and to push through their agenda of destroying the power of labour, dismantling the welfare state, the deregulation of capital and full-scale privatisation to create new accumulation opportunities and to restore the primacy of profit (capital) over people and societies. In 1973, Chile became the first country where, under General Pinochet, the neoliberal agenda was forcefully imposed after the elected government of Salvador Allende was brought down in a US-sponsored military coup.[12]
Although European governments, to varying degrees, also embraced neoliberalism, it was in the United States that neoliberalism was developed into a more or less coherent ideology and comprehensive government programme.[13] And given the dominant influence of the United States in the IMF and the World Bank, it did not take long for neoliberal prescriptions to be imposed on these organisations’ “clients” in the form of structural adjustment programmes that opened the door for Western capitalist interests to find new investment (capital accumulation) opportunities, at high costs to the countries involved.[14] Through the World Trade Organisation, established in 1995, the United States sought to create a global regime to further reduce and eliminate national barriers to the free movement of capital and to trade in goods and services. Following China’s economic reforms in the late 1970s, particularly its accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001, and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the world was largely integrated into a global capitalist system. Production was increasingly organised in complex production value chains (PVCs). As obstacles to international capital flows and investment were steadily reduced, countries became increasingly dependent on trade (through export-oriented growth), communication and information-sharing became instantaneous and truly global, and consumption patterns increasingly converged.
A Transnational Capitalist Class?
These developments, often discussed under the label of globalisation, have sparked much debate about whether the global capitalist system has become truly international, possibly guided by a Transnational Capitalist Class (TCC) or global elite, or whether the United States remains (pretty much) in charge as the hegemonic or (informal) imperial power, or whether the capitalist system has become fully autonomous and beyond the control of any group or state. The TCC theory is in line with a longstanding stream within Marxist theory that claims that the imperatives and dynamics of capitalism inevitably turn it into a global system in which national class divides are being overtaken by a globalised divide of (capitalist and working) classes.[15] This claim has been supported by studies and data about the existence of networks of interlocking ownership and control of companies (especially of financial institutions) by a relatively small group of people who have the power to dictate to governments what they can or must do (or not do).[16] On the other hand, there is an equally strong school that assigns dominance, if not hegemony, to the United States, depicting it as an “informal empire” that has created a global institutional (or “new constitutional”) framework reflecting its structural power and giving primacy to its interests.[17] A third (non-IPE) perspective claims that the global capitalist system functions autonomously and is beyond the control of any particular class, group or state, as power has been diffused.[18]
There is much to be said for the perspective that capitalism has become a truly global system. The picture is very recognisable when examining the financial and economic policies and decisions of governments around the world, with the views and movements of capital markets being treated as the will of the Gods, receiving priority over everything else. It is recognisable in the closely similar austerity and government financial-discipline policies and institutions (including independent Central or Reserve Banks) that have held most governments in their grip for the last four decades or so. It can also be seen at play in the draconian austerity decisions and conditions imposed on countries like Argentina, Greece, and many others when they were unable to repay their debts, despite, or rather because of, the neoliberal “medicines” that they had taken, only to become even more dependent on global financial capital.[19]
However, it is debatable to what extent capitalist enterprises and/or their management have become truly internationalised or even transnationalised. Although foreign investments, mergers, and takeovers across national borders have become the new normal under the free movement of capital promoted by the new neoliberal order, TNCs still have a home base. Intra-firm trade and transfer pricing between branches of a TNC may occur for legitimate and creative accounting purposes to minimise taxes and maximise profits [20]. However, ultimately, decisions about the (global) structure and direction of a company are still made by the company’s headquarters (CEO, Board). Therefore, predominantly American-owned TNCs, such as Apple, ExxonMobil, and Goldman Sachs, notwithstanding their extensive foreign investments, international networks, and global production chains, have remained American companies subject to American law. This national basis or bias of TNCs is also reflected in the composition of these companies’ boards, where “nationals” predominate, even when foreign capital owners are represented. Examining the home bases of TNCs still reveals much about the relative positions of countries and their capitalist systems within the global order.
On that point, the United States and Europe have tended to predominate. In 2010, twenty of the top 50 companies were based in the US, nineteen in Europe, four in Japan and three in China. Based on an analysis of interlocking directorships between the Global 500 corporations, Carroll concluded that “capitalist interests based in the USA retain a dominant position in the global network” [original emphasis].[21] In the financial sector, the figures also leaned toward the United States. In 2011, a Swiss study of the largest financial companies revealed that six of the top ten financial institutions within the network, which controlled 80% of the value of all such TNCs, were based in the United States, with two in the UK, one in France, and one in Switzerland. Among the top fifty financial-economic actors, twenty-four were based in the US, eight in the UK, five in France, four in Japan, two in Germany, two in Switzerland, two in the Netherlands, and one each in China, Canada and Italy.[22] These data suggest that the TCC is essentially a transatlantic capitalist class in which American-based companies dominate by sheer numbers. This is confirmed by data on transnational interlocking corporate directorships, which indicate the predominance of US and European directors and also support the idea of an Atlantic ruling class under American hegemony.[23]
To be able to exert power aimed at protecting and advancing its interests (to act as a “class for itself”), a class must develop class consciousness. Transnational policy organisations and fora like the Mont Pélérin Society, the Bilderberg Conferences, the Trilateral Commission, the World Economic Forum, the International Chamber of Commerce, and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, among others, have played a key role in the cultivation of transnational or transatlantic capitalist class consciousness that is an essential element for hegemonic capitalist rule.[24] Despite their differences, these policy communities share a common belief in capitalism and capitalist values as the only basis for organising economic life. They are likely to have played a significant role in the spread of neoliberalism as the dominant economic paradigm. As discussed above, US academics and think tanks sponsored by capitalists played a crucial role in the rise of neoliberalism as the dominant ideology and government policy framework in the United States. But it should be acknowledged that these US actors found willing partners across the Atlantic in making neoliberalism the dominant paradigm for governments, not only in the United Kingdom (under Margaret Thatcher), but also in Germany, where “ordoliberal” ideology offered a bridge to neoliberalism,[25] and more or less eagerly in a range of other European countries, in particular Sweden.[26]
However, even if a transatlantic capitalist class has emerged and developed a degree of class consciousness that is reflected in shared advocacy of neoliberalism, this does not imply that nation-based capitalist classes or fractions and competition no longer exist, that competition and rivalry have halted, and that such a class is able or even willing to overcome internal political, economic, and socio-cultural differences. This applies even more so to the claim that a global capitalist class has emerged or is emerging. If anything, neoliberal globalisation has intensified capitalist competition and rivalry. In TCC theory, the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO are guided by the TCC and advocate for the most globalised sectors of capital. Meanwhile, national governments take their lead from these agencies and from factions of the TCC within their countries. However, this is problematic, as states are not simply executive committees of the TCC but relatively autonomous institutions that are the subject of continuous struggle between competing classes, interests, and demands, including those from different fractions of capital. Even if there is an emergent TCC, it cannot simply instruct governments on what to do or not to do. As a rule, transnational directorships are embedded within national business communities, which leads Carroll to conclude that the Transnational Capitalist Class “exists neither as a free-standing entity […] nor as a homogeneous collectivity.”[27]
The United States: An Informal Empire
While it is widely acknowledged that the benefits of this process have been unevenly distributed and that it has eroded governments’ control over their national economies, this has intensified rather than diminished battles over the role of the state. If anything, the mounting economic and social pressures caused by neoliberal policies have raised public expectations of governments. From experience, people have learned all too well that they have nothing (good) to expect from a transnational or global capitalist class, the IMF, the WB, the WTO or, for that matter, the EU. If anything, with globalisation, the functions of and expectations towards the state to meet the individual, shared, and everyday needs of people have become more pressing and ivital The (re-) election of (ex-) US President Trump, Brexit and growing EU scepticism can be seen as signs of this growing public sentiment.
Another reason to cast doubt on the existence or emergence of a truly autonomous TCC is that capitalists (and the wealthy in general) require and seek the strongest possible protection for their wealth.[28] Foremost among the civil rights that are considered sacred in capitalist systems, and perhaps most emphatically so in the United States, are private property rights.[29] In the absence of a powerful global state, an incipient transnational class cannot rely on international institutions like the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO, often touted as the backbones of a prototype global state, to effectively protect its wealth. A capitalist class needs the backing of a powerful state to effectively protect its property and other legal rights, especially in the face of (growing) threats, both nationally and internationally. Hence, not surprisingly, many billionaires and TNCs locate (much of) their wealth and formal ownership titles in the United States given the high level of protection afforded to private property, the financial security provided by the US dollar as the global reserve currency, and the unrivalled force that US governments are able and willing to bring to bear upon any country or regime that threatens US property, apart from other advantages enjoyed by US capital. As Carroll states: “US capitalism, with its giant home market, political stability and low-tax regime, is the centre of gravity for the world’s billionaires.”[30] Moreover, since World War II, the US government has played a dominant role in advancing the interests of US capital internationally, including through the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO.[31] Not surprisingly, despite globalisation, many TNCs still have their home base in the United States and rely on its enormous power to protect and advance their interests worldwide.
That, since World War II, the United States has been the largest military and economic world power is a widely accepted view, even though the Soviet Union, due to its military and nuclear might, was commonly regarded as a countervailing superpower. However, whether the United States has been, and remains, a globally hegemonic power or an empire has been the subject of ongoing debate. As discussed above, after World War II, European powers (notably Germany) and Japan emerged from the ashes, mainly due to American support, to become major economic powerhouses in their own right, competing with American companies. Nonetheless, it was the United States that created the post-World War II capitalist economic order (Bretton Woods) and was the home of the neoliberal revolution of the 1980s, serving as the main driver behind the spread of neoliberal ideology and reforms worldwide, thereby opening many countries to American businesses.[32] It has done so mainly by creating and changing national and global institutional frameworks (including Independent Central Banks, free trade rules, fiscal responsibility and “good governance” criteria), sometimes referred to as the “new constitutionalism,”[33] using its enormous economic power (providing funding) and cognitive power (shaping the dominant policy discourse; persuasion of policymakers) without conquering or occupying countries. Hence, the United States has been referred to as an “informal empire” to distinguish it from past (Roman and other) empires based on territorial occupation or control.[34] Nonetheless, American governments have not hesitated to also use America’s unrivalled military power to invade countries when this was deemed necessary or desirable.[35]
In the realm of cognitive power, the capacity and ability to persuade, influence, manipulate or indoctrinate people based on knowledge, information, skills and technologies, the United States has also been the biggest powerhouse since the early 20th century. Triggered by commercial (capitalist) imperatives linked to mass production and competition, United States businesses were early leaders in the scientific development of knowledge and technologies that enabled effective persuasion, advertising, marketing, propaganda, communication, and public relations.[36] These capabilities have been advanced in the 21st century by “surveillance capitalists,” among whom American enterprises (notably Google/Alphabet, Facebook/Meta, and Microsoft) have become globally dominant players.[37] In addition, the global reach of the American entertainment industry and private ownership of most of the mass media give U.S. capitalists an unrivalled capacity to disseminate their capitalist values and worldview.[38] US political actors, including governments, leverage this enormous capacity through public and private agencies to pursue their aims domestically and internationally.
However, although American governments have varied over time in their relative reliance on hard and soft power, as well as on unilateral and multilateral foreign policies,[39] since World War II, they have been consistent in their commitment to maintaining American supremacy in the world, effectively acknowledging its status as an empire.[40] As Layne points out, the American foreign policy establishment shares fundamental beliefs that span party lines and have remained unchanged since World War II. These include a belief in the need for the US to provide “leadership” (implying primacy; hegemony), a belief in the imperative of national security, in defending and spreading liberal ideology, and “perhaps most importantly” in the economic Open Door, the need for open markets.[41] Rooted in lessons learned from the pre-WWII experiences, US foreign policymakers firmly reject isolationism and appeasement as these policies are perceived to have led to economic and political disasters. Instead, the US follows strategies of active engagement where and when potential threats to America’s (future) interests are perceived. As noted above, this includes (threatening with) the use of military force whenever deemed necessary.
All in all, these are convincing grounds for characterising the United States as an “informal empire”. However, this does not mean that the United States is all-powerful and able to fully control events worldwide, politically, economically, or in any other area. Nor does it mean that the dominant or hegemonic position of the United States will endure.
The rise of China
For decades, authors and observers have declared that the United States has been in (relative) decline or that it is no longer a dominant, let alone an imperial power.[42] More recently, the rise of China and the threat this poses to American dominance have taken centre stage in this debate.[43] In 2021, of the global top 50 corporations (based on revenues), 22 were based in the United States (up from 20 in 2010), 12 in China (up from 3 in 2010), 7 in Europe (down from 19 in 2010), and 4 in Japan (same as in 2010).[44] Compared with the 2010 figures, these numbers do not indicate a decline in American corporations’ position in absolute terms. Still, they do signify a significant rise of Chinese corporations, albeit mainly at the expense of European-based companies. The rise of China is also reflected in the number of billionaires based in the country, which, in 2021, stood at 698, compared with 724 in the US.[45] Among the top 100 billionaires in the world, the number of Chinese went from zero in 2010 to 22 in 2021. Over the same period, the number of US billionaires in this top group increased from 32 to 34, while the number of European billionaires (excluding Russia) declined from 23 to 16.[46] These figures indicate that a significant portion of the world’s wealth remains concentrated in the United States and Europe, and that there has been a staggering rise in the concentration of private wealth in China. The fact that Chinese capital accumulation has been nothing less than momentous is also reflected in the absolute and relative standing of Chinese banks globally. In this sector, in 2021, based on assets, four of the Forbes Top 10 Financials list were Chinese companies, three American, two European, and one Japanese.[47]
However, in the financial world, the United States still holds on to a crucial trump card: the status of the US dollar as the global reserve currency. This gives the US Federal Reserve enormous international clout (structural power), for instance, in its ability to influence global interest rates and capital flows. Moreover, it allows the US government to accumulate public debt levels that would trigger punitive reactions from capital markets and lead to the imposition of severe austerity policies in other countries. Even during international financial and economic crises, the U.S. dollar remains a safe haven, attracting overseas capital and bolstering its value. The crucial role and power of the US in the financial and economic realm were confirmed during the 2008 financial crisis, in which Federal Reserve intervention in support of capitalist interests in both the US and Europe prevented a global financial collapse. These events suggest that, if a TCC exists, it relies on the US rather than the IMF or any other proto-world government agency to provide assistance in times of crisis. By contrast, the crisis, which was much more prolonged in the EU than in the United States, highlighted the ineptitude of EU institutions.[48] This was demonstrated once more during the COVID-19 pandemic, which again placed enormous strain on the global financial system.[49] Anyone who had the idea or hope that the euro would be able to supplant the US dollar as the global reserve currency must now admit that this is very unlikely. However, as Tooze explains, China, in addition to being financially involved in the US and Europe, has been struggling with its own financial vulnerabilities.[50] Given the CCP’s desire to maintain control over the Chinese currency and capital markets, it is unlikely that the yuan will supplant the US dollar as the global reserve currency anytime soon.
It has been said that the main aim of President Trump’s (first term) foreign policy was to break or block China’s seemingly unstoppable rise to global supremacy, and that the Trump administration became convinced that it was no longer in the US’s interest that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) remains in charge of the country. This suggests that the US was/is seeking nothing less than “regime change” in the country, creating an existential threat to the Party. President Biden’s stance suggested continuity in U.S. foreign policy toward China, which is widely regarded as the principal threat to U.S. hegemony. This view places both countries on a direct collision course, with the risk of a globally devastating conflict.[51] In 2024, the re-election of Trump for a second presidential term brings such a collision even closer.
Conclusion
One main conclusion that can be drawn from these developments and political-economic analyses is that the globalisation of capitalism intensifies rather than mitigates its internal contradictions. The rebuilding of Europe and Japan, and the rise of China as major centres of industrialisation and capitalism, have intensified global competition. The increasingly free movement of capital between the United States and these centres has led neither to the emergence of an autonomous or cohesive transnational capitalist class nor to the complete dominance of American capital worldwide, which was perhaps the intention or hope behind America’s “Open Door” policy. China, in particular, has become a rival centre of state-controlled capitalism, competing strongly with both the United States and Europe. China’s immense economic success and capital accumulation, combined with excess capacity in the construction sector, have compelled it to expand foreign investment, notably through its Belt and Road programme, which also serves Chinese geopolitical interests.[52] These developments also highlight the crucial role that states continue to play in assisting the imperatives of their (nation-based) capitalist systems.
This may not end well. There is a good chance that intensified capitalist competition, backed by state-based concerns about national sovereignty, security, and (strategic) resources, will not only lead to major conflicts or a third World War but also seal environmental collapse. In the absence of an effective system of global governance, there are few impediments to the exploitation of whatever natural resources are left and to even more serious levels of pollution and ecological devastation. Arguably, this makes it highly desirable to examine whether a cosmopolitan perspective offers any hope of addressing the world’s challenges.
References
[1] See Gilpin, Robert and Jean M. Gilpin (2001), Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, Chapter 2. The authors provide a concise summary of various interpretations of Political Economy, defining it broadly as referring to “questions generated from the interactions of economic and political affairs” (p. 31). O’Brien and Williams, who use the label IPE interchangeably with Global Political Economy (GPE), identify three main perspectives: economic nationalism, liberalism, and critical, with the latter comprising the Marxist school of thought. O’Brien, Robert and Marc Williams (2010, 3rd ed.), Global Political Economy: Evolution and Dynamics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, Chapter 1.
[2] Marx, Karl (1867; 1887, First English edition ed.), Capital. Volume 1. The Process of Production of Capital. Moscow: Progress Publishers, Chapter 31.
[3] Ibid., Chapter 32.
[4] Hobson, John A. (1902), Imperialism: A Study. New York: James Pott & Company.
[5] Hilferding, Rudolf (1910), Finance Capital. A Study of the Latest Phase of Capitalist Development. London, Boston and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
[6] Lenin, W. I. (1916), “Der Imperialismus Als Höchstes Stadium Des Kapitalismus”, in W.I. Lenin – Ausgewählte Werke in Drei Bänden, Band 1. Moskau: Progress Verlag, 763-873.
[7] Panitch, Leo and Leo Gindin, The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of American Empire. London and New York: Verso Books, Chapter 1.
[8] Frank, Andre Gunder (1966), “The Development of Underdevelopment”, Monthly Review, Vol . 18, No.4, 17-31; Rodney, Walter (1982), How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. Washington, D.C.Howard University Press.
[9] Ikenberry, G. John, “Globalization as American Hegemony”, in Held, D. and A. McGrew (eds.), Globalization Theory. Approaches and Controversies. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, pp.41-58.
[10] This meant, for instance, that the US could afford to incur big balance of trade deficits, enabling American consumers to import whatever they fancied, and that the US government was able to run large budget deficits to spend large, among other, on a strong “defence” force, financed by issuing bonds that foreign investors were all too happy to buy as they were considered to be very safe investments. Panitch, Leo and Leo Gindin, The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of American Empire, 17.
[11] Analyses differ in their emphasis on problems such as overproduction, declining opportunities for capital accumulation and the rate of profit, the inflexibility of wages (responsible for stagflation), and the 1973 oil crisis. The latter was a result of geopolitics (the Israeli–Arab War and the oil embargo imposed by Arab countries) rather than capitalism. Still, the fourfold rise in oil prices helped trigger a sharp recession.
[12] Klein, Naomi. The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. New York: Picador.
[13] For accounts of how this occurred, see MacLean, Nancy (2017, e-book ed.), Democracy in Chains: The Deep History of the Radical Right’s Stealth Plan for America. Scribe Publications; Mayer, Jane (2016), Dark Money. The Hidden History of the Billionaires Behind the Rise of the Radical Right. New York: Doubleday.
[14] Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network (SAPRIN) (2013, e-book ed.), Structural Adjustment. The SAPRI Report: The Policy Roots of Economic Crisis, Poverty and Inequality. London: Zed Books.
[15] Sklair, Leslie (2001), The Transnational Capitalist Class. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell; Overbeek, Henk (2005), “Global Governance, Class, Hegemony. A Historical Materialist Perspective”, in M. J. Hoffmann and A. D. Ba (eds.), Contending Perspectives on Global Governance. Coherence, Contestation and World Order. London and New York: Routledge, 39-56; Robinson, William I. (2017), “Debate on the New Global Capitalism: Transnational Capitalist Class, Transnational State Apparatuses, and Global Crisis”, International Critical Thought, Vol.7, No.2, 171-189; Robinson, William I. and Jerry Harris (2000), “Towards and Global Ruling Class? Globalization and the Transnational Capitalist Class”, Science and Society, Vol.64, No.1, 11-54.
[16] Phillips, Peter (2018), Giants. The Global Power Elite. New York: Seven Stories Press; Vitali, S., et al. (2011), “The Network of Global Corporate Control”, PLoS ONE. Vol . 6, No.10; Carroll, William K. with Colin Carson, Meindert Fennema, Eelke Heemkerk and J. P. Sapinski (2010), The Making of a Transnational Capitalist Class: Corporate Power in the Twenty-First Century. London: Zed Books.
[17] Parenti, Michael, Against Empire. San Francisco: City Lights Books; Magdoff, Harry. The Age of Imperialism. The Economics of U.S. Foreign Policy. New York and London: Monthly Review Press; Strange, Susan (1996), The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press; Sinclair, Timothy J. (1994), “Between State and Market: Hegemony and Institutions of Collective Action under Conditions of International Capital Mobility”, Policy Sciences, Vol.27, No.4, 447-466; Gill, Stephen (1995), “The Global Panopticon? The Neoliberal State, Economic Life, and Democratic Surveillance”, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol.20, No.1, 1-49.
[18] In Hardt and Negri’s interpretation of “empire”, it becomes an amorphous phenomenon while the opposition against it is an equally amorphous “multitude”. Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri (2000), Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Beck treats globalisation as an autonomous and uncontrollable process against which resistance is futile. Beck, Ulrich (2006), The Cosmopolitan Vision. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 117-118. Friedman’s “Flat World”, depicted as a world in which individuals are the leading empowered global actors, is driven by autonomous technological (ICT) development and international competition and cooperation, but with no one in control. Friedman, Thomas L. (2005, 1st ed.), The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
[19] Varoufakis, Yanis (2017), Adults in the Room. My Battle with Europe’s Deep Establishment. London: Vintage.
[20] By some estimates, intra-firm trade accounts for 70 to 80% of all international trade. Bonturi, Marcos and Kiichiro Fukasaku (1993), Globalisation and Intra-Firm Trade, OECD Economic Studies. Paris: OECD; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2013), Press Release – 80% of Trade Takes Place in Value Chains Linked to Transnational Corporations, UNCTAD Report Says (Accessed: 29 July 2020).
[21] Carroll, William K. with Colin Carson, Meindert Fennema, Eelke Heemkerk and J. P. Sapinski, The Making of a Transnational Capitalist Class: Corporate Power in the Twenty-First Century, 96.
[22] Vitali, S., et al., “The Network of Global Corporate Control”. PLoS ONE, 10.
[23] Carroll, William K. (1986), Corporate Power and Canadian Capitalism. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 34-35.
[24] Carroll, William K. with Colin Carson, Meindert Fennema, Eelke Heemkerk and J. P. Sapinski, The Making of a Transnational Capitalist Class: Corporate Power in the Twenty-First Century, 36-45, 179-202.
[25] Streeck, W. (2016, e-book ed.), How Will Capitalism End? Essays on a Failing System. London: Verso Books, Loc 2701-2760; Quatrepoint, Jean-Michel (2017), “Why the EU Has No Industrial Policy”, Le Monde Diplomatique (English edition), August, 12-13; Denord, Francois, et al. (2015), “Germany’s Iron Cage”, Le Monde Diplomatique (English edition), August.
[26] Steinmo, Sven (2005), “The Evolution of the Swedish Model”, in Soederberg, S., G. Menz and P. Cerny (eds.), Internalizing Globalization: The Rise of Neoliberalism and the Decline of National Varieties of Capitalism. Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.149-164; Therborn, Göran (2017), “The ”People’s Home” Is Falling Down, Time to Update Your View of Sweden”, Sociologisk forskning, Vol.54, No.4, pp.275-278.
[27] Carroll, William K. with Colin Carson, Meindert Fennema, Eelke Heemkerk and J. P. Sapinski, The Making of a Transnational Capitalist Class: Corporate Power in the Twenty-First Century, 228.
[28] Winters, Jeffrey A. (2011), Oligarchy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[29] Borger, Julian (2020), “Pompeo Claims Private Property and Religious Freedom Are ‘Foremost’ Human Rights”, The Guardian, 16 July.
[30] Carroll, William K., with Colin Carson, Meindert Fennema, Eelke Heemkerk and J. P. Sapinski, The Making of a Transnational Capitalist Class: Corporate Power in the Twenty-First Century, 140.
[31] Panitch, Leo and Leo Gindin, The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of American Empire.
[32] Harvey, David (2003), The New Imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Harvey, David (2005), A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press; Panitch, Leo and Leo Gindin, The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of American Empire; Petras, James F. and Henry Veltmeyer (2001), Globalization Unmasked: Imperialism in the 21st Century. New York: Zed Books.
[33] Gill, Stephen and A. Claire Cutler (2014), “New Constitutionalism and World Order: General Introduction”, in S. Gill and A. C. Cutler (eds.), New Constitutionalism and World Order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1-21.
[34] Panitch, Leo and Leo Gindin, The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of American Empire; Petras, James F. and Henry Veltmeyer, Globalization Unmasked: Imperialism in the 21st Century.
[35] Chomsky, Noam (2016, e-book ed.), Who Rules the World? New York: Metropolitan Books; Parenti, Michael, Against Empire; Foster, John Bellamy (2006), “A Warning to Africa: The New U.S. Imperial Grand Strategy”, Monthly Review, Vol.58, No.2, 1; Duffy Toft, Monica(2017), “Why Is America Addicted to Foreign Interventions?” The National Interest, 10 December.
[36] Bernays, Edward L. (1928), Propaganda. New York: H. Liveright; Herman, Edward S. and Noam Chomsky (1988), Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media. New York: Pantheon Books; Simpson, Christopher (1994; 2015), Science of Coercion. Communication Research & Psychological Warfare, 1945 – 1960. New York: Open Road Integrated Media.
[37] Zuboff, Shoshana (2019), The Age of Surveillance Capitalism. London: Profile Books Ltd. All three are among the world’s biggest 50 companies. Forbes (2021), Global 2000. The World’s Largest Public Companies (Accessed: 24 January 2022).
[38] McChesney, Robert W., Rich Media, Poor Democracy: Communication Politics in Dubious Times. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, Chapter 2.
[39] Engler, Mark (2008), How to Rule the World. The Coming Battle over the Global Economy. New York: Nation Books.
[40] Layne, Christopher (2017), “The US Foreign Policy Establishment and Grand Strategy: How American Elites Obstruct Strategic Adjustment”. International Politics, Vol . 54, No.3, pp.260-275.
[41] Ibid., 263.
[42] Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri, Empire; Kennedy, Paul M. (1989), The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000. New York: Vintage Books; Mandel, Ernest (1970), Europe Vs America. Contradictions of Capitalism. New York: Monthly Review Press.
[43] Tisdall, Simon, “US on Back Foot as China Rises”, The Guardian Weekly, Vol . 195, 17, pp.1,12; Jacques, Martin, When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order. New York: Allen Lane; Golub, Philip S., “Curbing China’s Rise”, Le Monde Diplomatique (English edition), October, pp.2-4; Layne, Christopher (2017), “The US Foreign Policy Establishment and Grand Strategy: How American Elites Obstruct Strategic Adjustment”; Borger, Julian (2020), “US Uses Coronavirus to Challenge Chinese Communist Party’s Grip on Power”, The Guardian, 4 May.
[44] Forbes, Global 2000. The World’s Largest Public Companies. These rankings are based on four metrics: sales, profits, assets, and market value.
[45] Dolan, Kerry A., Jennifer Wang and Chase Peterson-Withorn (2022), Forbes World’s Billionaires List. The Richest in 2021 (Accessed: 18 January 2022).
[46] Ibid.
[47] Wikipedia (2021), List of Largest Financial Services Companies by Revenue (Accessed: 24 January 2022).
[48] Tooze, J. Adam (2018, e-book ed.), Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World. United Kingdom: Penguin Random House.
[49] Tooze, Adam (2020), “How Coronavirus Almost Brought Down the Global Financial System”, The Guardian, 14 April.
[50] Tooze, J. Adam, Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World, Chapter 25.
[51] China Briefing (2021), US-China Relations in the Biden-Era: A Timeline (Accessed: 19 April 2021); Cheng, Evelyn (2021), Biden’s China Policy Is Tougher on Financial Firms Than Trump’s Was, Report Says, (Accessed: 19 April 2021); Tisdall, Simon (2021), “How to Rein in China without Risking War Is the Issue Biden Must Address”, The Guardian, 14 February.
[52] Kuo, Lily and Niko Kommenda (2018), “What Is China’s Belt and Road Initiative?”, The Guardian, No date (Accessed: 5 March 2019); Watts, Jonathan (2019), “Belt and Road Summit Puts Spotlight on Chinese Coal Funding”. The Guardian, Publication date: 25 April (Accessed: 26 April 2019).