Focus on institution-building
Institutionalism, also referred to as Neo-Institutionalism, Liberal Institutionalism, and Pluralist-Institutionalism, is a diverse school of thought that focuses on international institution-building as a means by which states express or develop their common and overlapping interests and resolve issues among them. As at the national and subnational levels, institutions are defined here as formal and informal rules and organisations. Institutions are essential mechanisms for guiding or channelling the behaviour and actions of governments, non-governmental organisations, and citizens. Institutionalists seek to create or strengthen international law (both hard and soft), regimes (normative arrangements surrounding specific issues), and international organisations (regional and global) as means of addressing or resolving transnational issues.
Grounds for cooperation between states
Like Realists, Institutionalists accept the existence of the state system and see states as the leading international actors. However, unlike Realists, they are more optimistic about states’ willingness to cooperate, given interactions among citizens across countries, functional interdependence, and shared interests. States are not seen as the impenetrable, autonomous billiard balls that Realists perceive them to be, but rather as more or less open systems that function within an interdependent world. Nevertheless, Institutionalists are not blind to differences among states, the pursuit of state interests, or the existence of conflict. Arguably, the main difference between Realists and Institutionalists is that the latter argue that much of the conflict that occurs is unnecessary.[1] This implies that the extent to which conflict or cooperation occurs predominantly depends on how state actors interpret or define their state interests. While Realists define the state’s (security and economic) interests exclusively in a national context, institutionalists see a greater scope for interpreting these interests in an international context. For instance, they may look to international agreements and institutions to facilitate communication, transportation, and navigation, as these serve shared interests rather than purely national ones. Such agreements and institutions create mutual advantages that a single state cannot obtain (unless it is powerful enough to impose its conception of what is needed or desirable on other states). Similar benefits can be derived from trade agreements, even if these create interdependence. Arguably, the notion of security can no longer be defined solely based on a state’s territorial integrity, as the fall-out of a major war (let alone a nuclear war) could significantly compromise its security even if that state is not directly involved in that conflict. Hence, international agreements and institutions aimed at preventing war are in the common as well as the national interest. One source of Institutionalism, classical liberal internationalism, posits that growing interdependence, particularly in trade, would render war between states irrational and less likely.[2]
However, institutionalists regard international institution-building as the creation of systems of international governance rather than as the creation of international or world government. The latter is seen by most as unrealistic, undesirable, and unnecessary.[3] Yet, the institutional perspective offers more hope for international and global cooperation on environmental protection than the Realist school of thought. Although Institutionalists do not assume that states and governments are driven by common interests or goals, they see considerable scope for cooperation to mutual advantage, inspired by the liberal view of free trade and the free market. The creation and expansion of the European Union are perhaps the most prominent examples of how the perceived benefits of economic cooperation have led to high levels of collaboration and integration across a wide range of policy areas, including the environment.
Difficulties of cooperation
Yet international institution-building is no easy matter, and its success is heavily contingent on whether differences in states’ political-economic and security interests, as defined by governments, can be accommodated. Politics and political rationality (or irrationality, depending on one’s view) may lead to an emphasis on short-term, particular interests rather than on longer-term, collective and shared interests. Cooperation, according to the Functionalist perspective, is often easier to achieve in policy areas perceived as less politically charged or controversial and more technical or functional. For instance, international cooperation has long been established in areas such as communication (postal services are often cited as a classic example) and the control of contagious diseases. David Mitrany, who has been described as the “chief exponent of Functionalism”, linked these functions to human needs and the promotion of human welfare. In his view, international conflict was best tamed by the expansion of global cooperation, notably among experts, in non-political areas. Successful cooperation in such matters would lead people to gradually transfer their loyalty beyond the nation-state to international organisations, thus strengthening the legitimacy of international governance.[4] As scientists and experts often play a significant role in interpreting such issues and developing policy options, agreement and cooperation on these matters are usually more achievable than on politically controversial issues. It can be argued that cooperation in those areas, and the increased mutual advantages, interdependence, and trust it generates, can provide a basis for further policy and institutional integration between states, including in areas where such integration would initially have been very difficult or politically impossible.
However, functionalist optimism, although attractive to those advocating global cooperation on environmental integration, must be tempered by the recognition that it is not possible to draw a sharp line between technical issues, values, and politics. Additionally, one must acknowledge the limitations and risks of technocratic policy-making and rule, as well as the crucial role of power and interests (politics) in decision-making and policy development. These factors make progression towards ever-higher levels of cooperation and integration between states far from self-evident, let alone automatic.[5] The European Union exemplifies both tendencies: on the one hand, economic integration, notably the creation of a single market and of the European Central Bank that presumedly makes decisions on monetary policy based on technical expertise, has made it desirable or even necessary to harmonise national social and environmental policies, delegated largely to technocrats in Brussels. On the other hand, member states have resisted full economic policy integration, including in taxation matters, the creation of an integrated defence force, and the assignment of sovereign powers to the European Parliament. The adverse, and even disastrous, socio-economic effects of these “technical” policies, and the perceived lack of legitimacy of European institutions and decisions (their democratic deficit), have not only stalled the European integration process but also led to growing Euroscepticism and political pressure toward disintegration, as exemplified by Brexit. The flailing responses of the EU to the Euro-crisis, the refugee crisis, and the COVID-19 pandemic have exposed the serious shortcomings and limitations of EU institutions, raising questions about the merits and prospects of the European project.
However, these developments do not discredit the Institutionalist perspective. As noted above, Institutionalists are generally more optimistic about the prospects for state cooperation than Realists. Still, they also hold that states are, and are likely to remain, the key political units of the international system. The importance of international institutions lies not in their potential to supplant states and become a global state but in their ability to assist states in fulfilling their primary functions. Thus, they complement or enhance states’ capacity to address issues they may find difficult or impossible to resolve on their own. International and global institutions, therefore, serve to strengthen and bolster rather than erode the legitimacy and sovereignty of states. Institutionalists are interested in determining the conditions and mechanisms that promote international cooperation and the effectiveness of international institutions, rather than in exploring how states might be supplanted by a world government.
Institutionalism and environmental issues
This also applies to much of the research and debate on the role and effectiveness of international and global environmental institutions. Within the Institutionalist school of thought, studying and theorising about regimes has been a central focus. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Institutionalist perspective, and notably the study of regimes, strongly appeals to those interested in the development of international environmental policy. In return, it can be argued that the Institutionalist school has benefited considerably from research on the environmental challenge in an international context. Many studies on international environmental issues and policy have contributed insights into the role and importance of science, scientists, and knowledge more generally (epistemic communities),[6] NGOs,[7] on the (in-)effectiveness of regimes,[8] and the diffusion or transfer of ideas and practices,[9] among others.
Research has also highlighted the weaknesses and limitations of global environmental institutions like the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), as well as the deficits in the policies, practices, and legitimacy of international organisations like the World Bank, IMF and the WTO with regard environmental protection and integration. This has sparked much debate about the kind of institutional reforms that are desirable or necessary to enhance the effectiveness of global environmental institutions. However, as yet, there is little agreement on this front perhaps apart from the conclusion that the viability of reform proposals depends foremost on the political will of states and governments and that there is little chance that the presently dominant powers, in particular the United States, will agree to significant institutional reforms that would restrain their power or erode their sovereignty. Their willingness to cooperate appears to be limited by the extent to which self-defined interests are being served, and some common ground can be found. To the extent that international agreements require significant constraints on their power and/or sacrifices, even of short-term interests, as will be needed to mitigate and reduce environmental pressures, this proves very difficult to achieve.
Limitations of institutionalism
Although the Institutionalist perspective has generated many ideas, views and insights on issues associated with the development of environmental governance at the international level, it has relatively little to say about the structural causes and driving forces that underlie environmental problems. As noted by Paterson, Institutionalism interprets environmental issues primarily as instances of the “tragedy of the commons” and the related collective action problem, the disjunction between the international or global nature of many of such problems and the given state system, and a range of “discrete trends” such as population growth, economic growth, the demand for resources, and technological change.[10] Institutionalist analyses generally view these trends as separate developments rather than as interconnected at the systemic level, and they often overlook or take for granted the power structures that produce and sustain them. As a result, the ideas and solutions advanced by Institutionalists primarily address the effects and symptoms of environmental problems, at best, mitigating them, but they offer little to eliminate or green the structures that produce these problems. To understand these structural impediments, we must turn to another school of thought: International Political Economy (IPE).
References
[1] Jervis, Robert (1999), “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate”, International Security, Vol . 24, No.1, 42-63.
[2] McGrew, Anthony G. (2002), “Liberal Internationalism: Between Realism and Cosmopolitanism”, in D. Held and A. G. McGrew (eds.), Governing Globalisation: Power, Authority and Global Governance, 267-289.
[3] Young, Oran R. (1989), International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Haggard, Stephen and Beth A. Simmons (1987), “Theories of International Regimes”, International Organisation, Vol . 41, No.3, 491-517.
[4] Haas, Ernst B. (1964), Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization. Stanford: Stanford University Press, Chapter 1.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Haas, Peter M. (1992), “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination”, International Organization, Vol.46, No.1, 1-35; Haas, Peter M. (2005), “Science and International Environmental Governance”, in P. Dauvergne (ed.) Handbook of Global Environmental Politics. Northamptom, MA: E. Elgar, 383-401; Haas, Peter M. (1990), “Obtaining International Environmental Protection through Epistemic Consensus”, Millennium, Vol.19, No.3, 347-363; Adler, Emanuel and Peter M. Haas (1992), “Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Programme”, International Organization, Vol.46, No.1, 367-390.
[7] Auer, M.R. (2000), “Who Participates in Global Environmental Governance? Partial Answers from International Relations Theory”, Policy Sciences, Vol.33, 155-180; Humphreys, David (2004), “Redefining the Issues: NGO Influence on International Forest Negotiations”, Global Environmental Politics, Vol.4, No.2, 51-74; Betsill, Michele Merrill, et al. (eds.) (2008), NGO Diplomacy: The Influence of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Environmental Negotiations. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
[8] Miles, Edward L. et al. (2002), Environmental Regime Effectiveness: Confronting Theory with Evidence. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press; Mitchell, Ronald B. (2006), “Problem Structure, Institutional Design, and the Relative Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements”, Global Environmental Politics, Vol.6, No.3, 72-89; Wettestad, Jorgen (2006), “The Effectiveness of Environmental Policies”, in M. M. Betsill, et al. (eds.), Palgrave Advances in International Environmental Politics. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 299-328; Andresen, Steinar (2013), “International Regime Effectiveness”, in The Handbook of Global Climate and Environment Policy. John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 304-319; Jackson, Wendy and Ton Bührs (2015), “International Environmental Regimes: Understanding Institutional and Ecological Effectiveness”, Journal of International Wildlife Law & Policy, Vol . 18, No.1, 63-83.
[9] Jänicke, Martin, Ecological Modernization: Innovation and Diffusion of Policy and Technology. Berlin: Forschungsstelle für Umweltpolitik (FFU) Freie Universität Berlin; Tews, Kerstin (2005), “The Diffusion of Environmental Policy Innovations: Cornerstones of an Analytical Framework”, European Environment, Vol. 15, No.2, 63-79; Jörgens, Helge, “Governance by Diffusion – Implementing Global Norms through Cross-National Imitation and Learning”, in W. M. Lafferty (ed.) Governance for Sustainable Development: The Challenge of Adapting Form to Function. Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 246-283.
[10] Paterson, Matthew (2000), Understanding Global Environmental Politics: Domination, Accumulation, Resistance. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 23-29. See also Chossudovsky, Michel (1997), The Globalisation of Poverty. Impacts of IMF and World Bank Reforms. Penang, Malasya: Third World Network TWN.