The political-institutional factors behind environmental performance and failure arguably have attracted the most attention in the field of comparative environmental policy. From the beginning, research in this field focused on exploring the significance of the differences between political systems and institutions for environmental policy (performance) between countries. Over time, attention has shifted to include the role and influence of socio-cultural factors (including the environmental movement) and political-economic factors (notably businesses). Still, much research and debate remain focused on the importance of political institutions.
Political-institutional diversity
At least to some extent, the kind and degree of environmental integration sought and achieved within a political system vary between governments. The weak and limited nature of integration efforts is often blamed on a lack of political will. Governments may be reluctant to take bold steps either because of their political-ideological make-up (as they represent or are close to particular interest groups and share their ideology), or out of concern for their political (-electoral) survival. Environmental commitment and the political support basis of governments vary between governments and with stages in political cycles. Individuals, notably those in leadership positions, can make a significant difference.[1] Yet, many of the obstacles facing environmental integration are structural and require institutional change that is very difficult to achieve for governments of any persuasion. Some of these obstacles stem from the nature of the political system and dominant policy styles; others share a similar or common nature, such as the more general limitations of liberal democracies.
Efforts to explain states’ environmental integration efforts need to be placed in a country’s particular (historical, political-institutional, socio-cultural, political-economic, geographic, and other) context. The comparative (environmental) policy literature has identified many political-institutional factors that (potentially) impinge on environmental performance. Here, I will only briefly mention some of these factors.
The (pre-) existing political-institutional context refers to the structure of organisations and formal and non-formal rules that collectively constitute a political system. It comprises the formal rules (often constitutions) that specify the organisations and positions of government, such as Parliament or Congress, the President, Prime Minister, and cabinets, the judiciary, and the roles, responsibilities, and powers of these bodies, as well as the rules governing their interrelationships. It also includes the rules for sub-national government bodies (like states, provinces, and local councils) and other agencies, such as ombudsmen, royal commissions, and other ad hoc advisory bodies. It also encompasses the administrative arm of the government, the public service or bureaucracy, and the (administrative) laws and rules by which it operates. These organisations and rules form the framework through which a country’s collective decisions and policies are made, debated, challenged, and changed.
Closely intertwined with a country’s formal political-institutional arrangements is its political culture. Strictly speaking, political culture can be considered an inherent element of a country’s political-institutional framework, as it consists mainly of non-formal and unwritten rules that underlie the formal political institutions and may even be their basis or source. On the other hand, formal political institutions can affect or cultivate a political culture, so the relationship between formal political institutions and political culture is akin to the proverbial chicken and egg.[2] However, the relationship between the two is not necessarily causal, for three reasons. First, political culture is broader and vaguer than the specific (formal and informal) rules and can take form in a (wide) range of more particular organisations and rules: countries with a cooperative (or adversarial) political culture have significantly different political structures (organisations and rules). Second, formal political institutions can and do change without notable changes in political culture, but for other (political, economic, social, or even environmental) reasons. Third, political culture may evolve due to, for instance, social and/or economic changes (such as education and growing affluence, as well as influences from outside a country), and political factors (including political dissatisfaction and a growing demand for political rights). While in the past, it was often assumed that political cultures were of an enduring nature, in recent decades, many countries, even those traditionally regarded as stable, have entered a state of flux. This has manifested itself, for instance, in a decline of support for democratic values in liberal democracies and a loss of trust in political institutions.
Political institutions and environmental integration
Broadly speaking, the importance of the political-institutional context (including political culture) to environmental integration is twofold. First, it lies in the extent to which it allows or constrains the creation of well-equipped environmental institutions (rules and organisations) for the task. This relates to their formal status, mandates, roles, and responsibilities and their (relative) power vis-à-vis non-environmental rules and organisations. Second, it lies in the extent to which political institutions (including political culture) facilitate or obstruct the development, adoption, and implementation of long-term, comprehensive environmental policy (or green planning), at all levels of government, which is one of the six key challenges of environmental integration. A political system’s capacity for green planning is arguably one of the most important touchstones for its ability to effectively address the environmental challenge.[3] It has been argued that a country’s political culture or dominant policy style (often presented in dichotomous terms as adversarial or cooperative) is a significant factor in the facilitation or obstruction of the adoption of such an approach.[4] Nonetheless, retaining that capacity even in countries often regarded as having a cooperative political system has been problematic.
Looking deeper: the role of states
The large variety and often unique nature of the specific political institutions of countries make it very difficult to draw general conclusions about how they affect environmental integration efforts. Therefore, to assess the importance of political institutions as obstacles or conducive to environmental integration, it is desirable or even necessary to dig deeper and focus on factors at play in all states, despite the broad political-institutional variety between them. A good starting point for this can be found in the political science literature on the role of the state. An analysis of the state’s role and functions can provide insight into the most important political and institutional factors affecting environmental integration. While the political institutions of countries are enormously diverse, it can be argued that all states must fulfil a range of core functions to maintain their legitimacy and viability. It is only recently that environmental protection has been added to the functions of states. But in many countries, this is not (yet) regarded as a core function, partly because it can (be seen to) clash with the longstanding and well-entrenched core functions. Therefore, a discussion of these core functions can contribute to a deeper understanding of the political-institutional obstacles to environmental integration. This task is undertaken on The Role of States page.
Democracy or authoritarianism?
One other political-institutional question that deserves to be singled out as potentially (highly) important for environmental integration: the issue of democracy versus authoritarian regimes. Arguably, both types of regimes must fulfil the core functions of the state, although people disagree about their relative effectiveness in doing so. This disagreement also extends to the ability of both types of regimes to deal more or less effectively with the state’s relatively new environmental protection function. On the one hand, some claim that (some types of) democratic regimes can better deal with the environmental challenge than less democratic and authoritarian regimes.[5] Others point out the limitations and shortcomings of liberal democracies in addressing environmental issues, but believe that democracies can and should be improved to enhance their environmental performance.[6] Some argue that liberal democracies cannot cope successfully with the environmental challenge and that authoritarian regimes are better equipped and required to do so.[7] This issue is further discussed in the More or Less Democracy to Save the World? page.
Have states become redundant?
The debate about the relative merits of democratic and authoritarian regimes takes place against the backdrop of a broader discussion about the role and relevance of states in the context of globalisation. Some argue that, with globalisation and the growing interdependence between countries, the institution of the state, whether democratic or authoritarian, has become outdated and dysfunctional. In this view, states have played a crucial role in advancing modernisation and the mobilisation and integration of diverse populations in the pursuit of collective (socio-economic) goals. But as they have become more interdependent and the issues they face, including environmental destruction, are of a global nature, it is argued that states have become dysfunctional and need to be superseded by ceding power and authority to the supra- and/or sub-national levels of governance. I engage with this discussion on the pages about The Role of States, Systemic Transformations, and Can “We” Change the World? In my view, states remain crucial (collective) actors in the pursuit of environmental integration and for meeting other collective needs. While strengthening or creating new global institutions to deal (more) effectively with the environmental challenge is highly desirable or even necessary, global (geo-) political-economic reality makes this unlikely in the short or medium term. In the meantime, humanity cannot afford to wait for this to happen. Societies have a more feasible option of fundamentally transforming and greening their own states to enhance their chances of coping with the intensifying environmental crisis and the possibility or likelihood of a global political and economic meltdown. At the same time, they can and should cooperate with like-minded states to create, through a bottom-up process, more appropriate and effective international institutions aimed at advancing global sustainability.
References
[1] One can only speculate what the United States’ government’s environmental performance would have been had Al Gore rather than George W. Bush Jr. become President of the United States, or had Hillary Clinton instead of Donald Trump been elected. Still, it seems plausible that the difference would have been significant.
[2] Lijphart, Arend (2012), Patterns of Democracy. New Haven, United States: Yale University Press, 301-302.
[3] Jänicke, Martin (2002), “The Political System’s Capacity for Environmental Policy: The Framework for Comparison”, in Weidner, H. and M. Jänicke (eds.), Capacity Building in National Environmental Policy. A Comparative Study of 17 Countries. Berlin: Springer, pp.1-18.
[4] Crepaz, Markus M.L. (1995), “Explaining National Variations of Air Pollution Levels: Political Institutions and Their Impact on Environmental Policy-Making”, Environmental Politics, Vol.4, No.3, pp.391-414; Jahn, Detlef (1998), “Environmental Performance and Policy Regimes: Explaining Variations in 18 OECD-Countries”, Policy Sciences, Vol.31, No.2, pp.107-131; Jahn, Detlef (1999), “The Mobilisation of Ecological World Views in a Post-Corporatist Order”, in M. Wissenburg, et al. (eds.), European Discourses on Environmental Policy. Aldershot: Ashgate, 129-155; Scruggs, Lyle, Sustaining Abundance: Environmental Performance in Western Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Lijphart, Arend and Markus M. L. Crepaz (1991), “Corporatism and Consensus Democracy in Eighteen Countries: Conceptual and Empirical Linkages”, British Journal of Political Science, Vol . 21, pp.235-256.
[5] Jänicke, Martin (1996), “Democracy as a Condition for Environmental Policy Success: The Importance of Non-Institutional Factors”, in W. M. Lafferty and J. Meadowcroft (eds.), Democracy and the Environment – Problems and Prospects. Cheltenham and Lyme: Edward Elgar, 71-85; Li, Quan and Rafael Reuveny (2006), “Democracy and Environmental Degradation”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol . 50, No.4, 935-956.
[6] Dryzek, John S. (1992), “Ecology and Discursive Democracy: Beyond Liberal Capitalism and the Administrative State”, Capitalism, nature, socialism, Vol.3, No.20, 18-42; Eckersley, Robyn (1996), “Greening Liberal Democracy. The Rights Discourse Revisited”, in B. Doherty and M. de Geus (eds.), Democracy and Green Political Thought: Sustainability, Rights, and Citizenship. London and New York: Routledge, 212-236.
[7] Shearman, David J. C. and Joseph Wayne Smith (2007), The Climate Change Challenge and the Failure of Democracy. Westport, Conn.: Praeger; Ophuls, William (2011, e-book ed.), Plato’s Revenge: Politics in the Age of Ecology. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.