You can’t stop science, can you?
It is often suggested that the development of science and technology is an autonomous process, unstoppable and beyond control. At the same time, however, in apparent contradiction to this view, it has been argued that the growing dependence of complex industrial societies on science and technology has led (and continues to lead) to a shift of power to experts and the emergence of technocracy. The first claim, I argue, is patently false. The second claim is partially wrong as it conflates different forms of power.
Sometimes, the view that you can’t stop science is ascribed to the inherent and irrepressible curiosity of scientists and/or the drive of inventors who put humanity on the path of continuous discovery and innovation. Such individuals are often depicted as the heroes of science and innovation who can and should be credited for the progress achieved throughout the ages, especially during the last five centuries. While there is some validity in this account, especially at the time when science was undertaken by a small group of individuals who often had to fight to have their discoveries recognised [1], this is a romantic picture of how science developed that no longer holds. With industrialisation, the number of scientists and inventors involved in innovations and their applications has grown rapidly, now numbering in the millions worldwide.[2] It can be plausibly argued that not all these scientists are directed or controlled from a single centre, or even that they collectively and purposefully steer their research towards the same goal(s) or even in the same direction. Yet, this does not mean that all science and technology develop without any control, steering or purpose.
Historical fears about science being out of control
Concerns about the uncontrollability of science and technology are nothing new. The theme of people using their limited knowledge to do or create things that they cannot control and being punished for that is central to Goethe’s ballad The Sorcerer’s Apprentice (1797), Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818), the Greek myth of Prometheus, and even to the biblical story on Adam and Eve (with Eve eating fruit from the forbidden tree of knowledge). These stories remain highly relevant to those who manipulate nature (for instance, through genetic engineering) and believe or claim they understand the consequences. However, the idea has also been applied to how science and technology have developed generally, out of control or beyond the control of societies and governments. In the 20th century, many social theorists picked up on this theme, including Max Weber, Lewis Mumford, Jacques Ellul, Herbert Marcuse, and Ivan Illich. It is worth taking a moment to consider some of their ideas, as they remain relevant and valid in certain respects.
Although Weber’s work does not focus specifically on science and technology, he ascribed the development of modern societies to the inexorable rise and spread of “instrumental rationality”, of which the expansion of bureaucracy, led by and largely composed of experts, was a principal manifestation. In his view, the bureaucratic mentality gradually but steadily took over all areas of society, including politics and economics, leaving less and less room for individuality and creativity. Societies were increasingly guided by instrumental values, notably efficiency, and were losing sight of fundamental values and ends. From this perspective, the development of science and technology has become a means of increasing efficiency. As science leaves no room for a sense of wonder or magic about nature (enchantment) or for spirituality, its push for progress lacks direction and comes at the price of eroding societal values.[3]
In the 1960s, Jacques Ellul and Lewis Mumford both looked at the growing influence of science and technology on societies as an autonomous process driven by its own rationale. Ellul spoke of “technique” rather than technology, interpreting it as “any complex of standardised means for attaining a predetermined result”, including socio-political tools like planning. He foresaw the “ever-expanding and irreversible rule of technique […] extended to all domains of life”, including politics and economics.[4] This implied increased control by the state, planning, and, ultimately, the rise of dictatorship, which would be regarded as the most efficient form of government. Ellul did not think that there was an effective alternative to planning or that the public could put any constraints on these developments. This development would lead to the complete dominance of technique (instrumental rationality) and the progressive dehumanisation of society by creating needs and distractions (including popular culture and the media). It must be emphasised that Ellul, like Weber, did not see this as a process initiated or steered by a group or plan (even though it would lead to that) but as inherent to the development of technique.
Similarly, Mumford[5] looked at the development of technology in a broader socio-cultural context that provides the basis for innovation (he ascribed a key role to language and art in the early development of tools). The invention of the hierarchical organisation (based on the claim to divine authority, as in Egypt) marked the beginning of the subjugation of people and nature to a growing ensemble of techniques that Mumford called the “Megamachine”. In his view, this development had intensified in the last three centuries and led to “delusions of omniscience and omnipotence” on the part of those who are in control of the Megamachine (whom he also identifies as the “military scientific elite”).[6] Although, in contrast to Ellul, Mumford does not regard this development as autonomous, putting responsibility at the feet of an elite, he became increasingly pessimistic about the possibility of turning things into what he saw as a more desirable direction aimed at the development of a “life-centred technology” that serves “every part of the human personality, not merely those functions which serve the machine.” [7]
Herbert Marcuse, too, offered a fundamental critique of how technological development shaped modern industrial societies, substituting false needs for real human needs and cultivating a “one-dimensional man” preoccupied with efforts to meet the former. This applied to capitalist as well as (then) existing socialist societies. While Marcuse advocated an alternative order based on central planning and control over production, he was also not optimistic about the prospects for change, arguing that “Nothing indicates that it will be a good end.” [8] Ivan Illich also held a negative view about the kind of technology developed, arguing that, with industrialisation, technology (broadly conceived) produced “tools of enslavement” controlled foremost by experts.[9] He noted the growing power of professionals who created monopolies over particular areas (including health and education), defining and controlling society’s needs and determining how these were to be met (or, rather, not met). Interestingly, Illich proposed that terms like health and education should not be used as nouns, as these are not things that can be produced, bought, or sold but require actions that individuals can undertake themselves.[10] He advocated the development of “convivial” tools that people could control but admitted that this would require a “political inversion.” Although he foresaw a “breakdown of society and that growth will grind to a halt”, there was no guarantee that such an alternative would be adopted, as such an event “could easily lead to one-man rule, expert government, and ideological orthodoxy”.[11]
Thus, in the 1960s and 1970s, many critics of industrial society and its reliance on the continuous development of technique, rationality, and science and technology regarded these developments as (virtually) unstoppable and uncontrollable, even though they also assigned growing power to experts (professionals) and the state (bureaucracy) over their application. This unease or fear about states using the increasingly sophisticated power of science and technology should be seen in the context of the time. After World War II, in many Western countries, governments played a significant role in guiding economies and societies to ensure stability and promote social welfare. Planning was still not a dirty word and was seen as desirable or even necessary to avoid a repeat of the pre-war economic crisis and its disastrous socio-economic and political consequences. In that context, it was not unreasonable to think or expect that the power of science and technology would be increasingly concentrated in and wielded by the state.[12]
The power of science and technology, and the power over science and technology
However, the idea that the growing dependence of societies on science and technology has led, or will lead to, the emergence of technocratic rule by scientists and/or experts is contestable. The main reason for this is that it confuses or conflates different forms of power. More specifically, it assumes that cognitive power (including that of scientists) is, or has become, an independent form of power and, more strongly, that it has been accumulated or even monopolised by experts and used to acquire other forms of power, in particular political-institutional power, notably that of the state. This interpretation is neither supported by a coherent and plausible theory of the role of power in societies nor by the facts.
Support for the idea of the existence of technocracy (rule by experts) is commonly based on two assumptions: first, that power is inherent to (or implicit) in technology; second, that the creators or producers of scientific knowledge and/or technology are in control over their creations or products. While the first assumption is quite plausible and can be backed up by evidence, the second assumption is much less convincing and is unsupported by actual developments.
That technology is never neutral but serves and advances particular (political) interests is an insight recognised by many thinkers and analysts. The validity of this argument is most evident and plausible when a technology can be used only for one particular purpose, and/or if it requires a specific type of expertise to operate. An often-mentioned example is nuclear energy. Nuclear power stations can only produce electricity (as a useful product, not considering atomic waste, radiation, and contaminated water used for cooling). Moreover, given the resources, knowledge, costs, and risks involved, this is not a form of energy that people can produce in their backyards; it comes with technical, economic, and safety requirements that can only be met by larger entities (states or business organisations). This is irrespective of what the generated electricity is used for. Nuclear energy thus concentrates power in the hands of a few and creates dependence for many.[13] By contrast, other technologies have been advocated because they can be used for a broader range of purposes and/or be operated and controlled by a larger number of people, distributing their benefits.[14] However, how “low-tech” technology shapes the environment can also embed particular interests. Winner provides the example of how some of the bridges over the parkways on Long Island, New York, were built extraordinarily low, thereby preventing access by buses used mainly by racial minorities and low-income groups and the ability of these groups to access a predominantly white area.[15] Therefore, the question of what purpose(s) a technology serves and/or how and why it is applied is relevant to all technologies, whatever their level of sophistication.
However, while technologies are never neutral in that they have particular goals or interests embedded in them, their creation, development, and application are all influenced, or even determined, by powerful non-scientific actors, particularly those who control the development of science and technology. Although some or many scientists may support or be dependent on (funded by) those actors and interests or even be members of such groups, they seldom have control over the funding and application of science and, hence, over the direction of scientific research and the purposes and interests it serves. While scientists may have considerable cognitive power, most do not have so much political-institutional and economic power to enable them to make or shape decisions about research funding and its purposes. Science and technology have primarily served the economically powerful and military interests. Science and technology have become increasingly intertwined (to become “technoscience”), with most science now being undertaken to develop (technological) applications that serve particular (notably economic and military) interests rather than being conducted for its own sake, the public good, or for its curiosity value.[16]
Evidence-based policy and politics
Although science and technology play an increasingly important role in the day-to-day practices and lives of people and societies, this does not mean that scientists or experts hold or control the strings over this form of cognitive power, as some analysts suggest.[17] It implies even less that governments are ruled predominantly by scientists or experts (technocracies).[18] This is not to deny that policy and decision-making are often depoliticised by arguing that they must be evidence-based. Such claims are commonly made in many, if not most, policy areas, including health care, environmental policy, and economic policy. For illustration, faced with the COVID-19 pandemic, many governments argued emphatically that their responses were science-based or expert-based. Nonetheless, even in this (crisis) situation, economic and political interests played a significant role in shaping government responses, as reflected by the differences in responses to the same or similar situations. Inevitably, governments were forced to weigh up the relative importance of protecting the health of vulnerable groups in society, the economic fall-out of lockdowns and other measures aimed at containing the virus, and the social-psychological effects of such measures on populations, and a whole host of different factors, not in the least the opposition to these decisions and measures from those who perceived these as an attack on the fundamental rights of citizens and democracy, a perception which has been commonly dismissed by governments as being based on misinformation.
But while governments may claim that their policies and decisions are evidence or science-based, this is more an attempt to depoliticise issues (especially those that are quite controversial) and to legitimise their decisions based on the high regard and trust that is accorded to science in many countries, rather than an indication of technocratic rule. Most of the time, such depoliticisation efforts are difficult to sustain for long as adversely affected interests are usually quick to ensure that politics reassert itself. Technocratic economic policy based on “neutral” neoliberal prescriptions has long been debunked as ideologically based policies that hurt many people. Health policies cannot avoid making choices about who gains or loses in the healthcare stakes. Education policies can either allow or even facilitate inequality in educational opportunities (including through public and private education). Transport policies may favour private transport interests above public transport, on which lower-income groups disproportionately rely. By definition, all policies are political in that they create winners and losers, whether or not they are (claimed to be) based on science or evidence.
Conclusion
The main conclusion from this brief discussion of technocracy is that science and technology do not develop autonomously and are not controlled by scientists and experts. No natural or physical law steers science and technology in a particular direction, whether towards progress or to some kind of dystopian future. The direction of science and technology development depends on the decisions of those with the most power and control over science, which is linked to political-institutional (particularly state) power and economic power, enabling the funding of research and the development of technology. The high costs involved in the development of technoscience (from medicines and medical equipment, new renewable energy technologies, the development of quantum computers, information and communication technologies (ICT; AI), new ventures in space exploration, or the development of the latest generation of smart weapons) makes that this is well beyond the capability of scientists and engineers to fund or control, even though they may be well paid for the services that they provide to those who do have the means to fund such projects.
This does not mean that the development of science and technology cannot or will not lead to totalitarian technocratic control. Arguably, this process is already well on its way in those countries where the intertwining or even fusion between concentrated economic power and political-institutional power, with a near-monopolistic control over the funding (and therefore steering) of science and technology, is leading to the subjection of societies to almost universal, comprehensive, and continuous surveillance and manipulation for commercial and political purposes determined by a political-economic elite. In such countries, with China being a leader and the United States arguably not far behind,[19] science and technology function foremost as tools of suppression, manipulation, and control, albeit through highly sophisticated means and insidious ways that its citizens often do not even notice. Huxley’s Brave New World may not be too far from being turned into a reality.
References
[1] For a fascinating account of Kepler’s work and efforts (and that of a handful of other astronomers) to convince people that the Earth rotated around the Sun instead of vice versa, see Koestler, Arthur, The Sleepwalkers: A History of Man’s Changing Vision of the Universe. London: Penguin Classics. Many similar accounts have been written on the contributions of scientists in different areas of science.
[2] According to a UNESCO report, there were 7.8 million full-time equivalent researchers globally in 2013. UNESCO (2021), Unesco Science Report, https://en.unesco.org/unesco_science_report/figures (Accessed: 25 November 2021).
[3] Gerth, J. H. and C. Wright Mills (1946), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. New York: Oxford University Press, 51-54, 196-244.
[4] Ellul, Jacques. The Technological Society. New York: Vintage Books, vi.
[5] Mumford, Lewis (1965), “Technics and the Nature of Man”, Nature, Vol . 208, No.5014, 923-928.
[6] Ibid., 927.
[7] Ibid., 928.
[8] Marcuse, Herbert. One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society. Boston: Beacon Press; Sphere Books, 201.
[9] Illich, Ivan (1973), Tools for Conviviality. London: Calder and Boyars.
[10] Ibid., 16.
[11] Ibid., 21.
[12] This idea can also be found in fictional literature, such as Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World. But while Orwell’s 1984 was inspired by the horrors of dictatorship in the Soviet Union, Huxley’s dystopia was based on recognising the potential use of technology to manipulate people to keep them “happy”.
[13] See Winner for a discussion on this point. Winner, Langdon, The Whale and the Reactor. A Search for Limits in an Age of High Technology. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
[14] Schumacher’s concept of “appropriate technology” and Lovins’s notion of “soft energy” are often put forward as examples of alternatives that promote democratic control. Schumacher, E. F., Small Is Beautiful: A Study of Economics as If People Mattered. London: Blond and Briggs; Lovins, Amory B. (1977), Soft Energy Paths: Toward a Durable Peace. San Francisco: Friends of the Earth International.
[15] Winner, Langdon, The Whale and the Reactor. A Search for Limits in an Age of High Technology, 23.
[16] Bucchi, Massimino (2009), Beyond Technology. Science, Politics and Citizens. Dordrecht: Springer. Buchi (p.27) notes that, worldwide, more than 70% of the costs of research and development are funded by multinational corporations.
[17] For instance, Neil Postman argues that the United States was the first country to become a “technopoly”, which he defines as a “totalitarian technocracy” in which “human life [in that country] must find its meaning in machinery and technique.” In other words, life is totally, in all facets, dominated by technology or “technique” (in the sense also used by Weber, Ellul, and Mumford discussed above, including “soft” means or tools by which people are guided or controlled). However, even if one agrees with this, it does not imply that scientists or experts control these technologies or techniques, let alone govern the country. Postman, Neil (1992), Technopoly. The Surrender of Culture to Technopoly. New York: Vintage Books, 48-52. See also Swyngedouw, Erik (2011), “Interrogating Post-Democratization: Reclaiming Egalitarian Political Spaces”; Swyngedouw, Erik (2011), “Depoliticised Environments: The End of Nature, Climate Change and the Post-Political Condition”, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements, Vol. 69, 253-274.
[18] Arguably, China is an exception. Several authors have noted that many people in leadership positions in China are scientists and engineers or have an “engineer’s mentality”. Shapiro, Judith (2012), China’s Environmental Challenges. Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press, Loc 1087; Watts, Jonathan, When a Billion Chinese Jump: How China Will Save Mankind–or Destroy It, Chapters 13 and 14; Economy, Elizabeth (2010, e-book ed.), The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China’s Future. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, Loc 4205.
[19] Zuboff, Shoshana. The Age of Surveillance Capitalism. London: Profile Books Ltd; Liang, Fan, et al. (2018), “Constructing a Data-Driven Society: China’s Social Credit System as a State Surveillance Infrastructure”, Policy & Internet, Vol . 10, No.4, pp.415-453.