It may seem ironic, but humans don’t know what being human means. One would think that being human implies that we share a common view of ourselves, but that does not seem to be the case. Instead, although we are all members of the species Homo sapiens, people hold quite different views on what makes us human. Although some are convinced that they know us well and have no difficulty specifying our main characteristic(s), others are not so sure and see us as a mixed bag of propensities, urges, tendencies, potentials, and other features. Many, though, have high regard for human beings, placing us in a (much) higher category than other species, whereas others see us as highly flawed and/or quite nasty animals. Some even think that there is no such thing as human nature and that it is futile to try to define it. Linked to that view is the idea that humans are highly malleable, so they are what we make them to be.
Here, I will identify and briefly elaborate on various common claims about human nature. Although these are common, they are also conflicting and contestable, indicating a lack of agreement. This raises the question of whether these claims are true, what underlies these views of human nature, and whether greater agreement is possible. However, as I will argue further below, views of human nature are inherently interwoven with socio-political realities. Which view of human nature prevails at any time and place is not so much a matter of objective validity as of the distribution of power in societies.
Ten claims about human nature
First, I will briefly elaborate on ten commonly made claims about human nature that have received widespread support in different places and times. These are:
- Humans are fundamentally selfish and aggressive.
- Humans are social and empathetic animals.
- People are (naturally, genetically) all different from birth, making some superior to others.
- Humans have the same basic (human) needs, making them equal.
- Men and women are, by nature, different and therefore occupy different positions and roles in society.
- What it means to be a man or a woman, or gender identity more broadly, is a matter of social construction.
- The ability to reason is the defining characteristic of humans.
- Humans are driven foremost by feelings, urges, drives or passions.
- Human nature is a mixed bag of conflicting propensities and flaws influenced by society.
- There is no such thing as human nature; we make ourselves and are completely malleable.
Just reading through this list, it will be apparent that this topic is a can of worms. The views and debates between (or even within) the various schools of thought often provoke strong feelings and reactions. This is not surprising given the (potential) implications that adopting these views has or can have for how individuals and groups are treated in societies.
Another point to note is that, while many of these claims appear contradictory and/or may be construed as dichotomies, they are often held in combination, with varying degrees of emphasis. Humans may be seen as both selfish and aggressive, as well as social and empathetic, and the predominant propensity may depend on the circumstances. This “mixed bag” view of human nature is, in my view, the most plausible, as I will discuss further below.
Selfish and aggressive humans
Arguably, the prevailing view of human nature in modern societies is that humans are inherently selfish and aggressive. This view is commonly associated with Darwin’s theory of natural selection, which has been interpreted and abused to portray life as a process of competition for survival. While Darwin emphasised that the survival of a species depended on its successful adaptation to its environment (making it fit for survival), this idea has been distorted into the view that individuals fight with one another for survival. Nature is often portrayed as a bloody battlefield (“Nature, red in tooth and claw”) on which only the strongest survive. This idea, which aligns well with highly unequal societies, had already been promoted by social conservatives before Darwin presented his theory, including Herbert Spencer. It has been argued that Darwin modelled his theory of the survival of the fittest on Spencer’s views on human societies. Anyway, Darwin’s theory has been eagerly used and abused by elites to legitimise the existence of social, economic and political inequality in societies as natural, a view that came to be known as Social Darwinism. Accepting this is also seen as a necessary condition for maintaining societal order, in which everyone knows their place and social conflict is minimised. However, one need not be a Social Darwinist to believe that humans are naturally aggressive (particularly men) and selfish. This view has garnered widespread support among philosophers, scientists, and many members of the public. More recently, the view has been supported by social and evolutionary biologists and psychologists, based on genetic research, although this research has been fiercely contested. Prominent names on the pro-genetic front include Edward O. Wilson (Wilson, 1978), Richard Dawkins (Dawkins, 1976; 1989), and Steven Pinker (Pinker, 2002), while Richard Lewontin (Lewontin, 1991) and many social scientists strongly argue against what they regard as genetic determinism.
Empathy and cooperation
Many other thinkers have presented a more optimistic view of human nature. For instance, Kropotkin (1955) deliberately countered Social Darwinist claims that social progress was a matter of the survival of the fittest, arguing that cooperation, rather than competition, has been the key feature in the development and flourishing of societies. This view has also garnered significant support in the social sciences, where the notion that humans are a social species, in the sense that they depend on the care and cooperation of others for their survival and well-being, tends to be emphasised (Clark, 2002; Narvaez, 2018; Narvaez & Witherington, 2018). The long human maturation period makes them heavily dependent on caregivers and broader society to acquire the essential knowledge, capabilities, and skills necessary for functioning in society. Even mature humans cannot survive very long if wholly isolated from others (notwithstanding the exceptional accounts of wolf children) and require other humans to meet their basic material, psychological, and social needs. Moreover, human dependence on others has fostered empathy, the capacity to share feelings with others (Rifkin, 2009). Humans and societies survive not because of competition among individuals but through cooperation. This does not necessarily imply that individuals lack egoistic propensities or are always altruistic. However, given the crucial need for cooperation in individual maturation and in the functioning and survival of the groups to which they belong, their selfishness must be kept in check.
Naturally different
The view of human nature, arguably the most widely held throughout history and one that persists today, emphasises human differences. In particular, it has long been claimed that, from birth, some people are superior and destined to lead as members of a selected group, elite, or class. The rest are naturally less endowed and, therefore, destined to serve. In this view, inequality is a natural or God-given phenomenon that justifies differences in status, power, wealth, and people’s roles in society. This view underlies the Indian caste system and has also justified the positions of monarchs, royal families, and the nobility, even after the establishment of modern states. Although challenged since the Age of Enlightenment and by the ideal of democracy, it remains a deeply entrenched belief worldwide, even among the “common” people. Again, the pro-genetic camp in the biological sciences supports the view that there are inequalities in natural endowment among individuals, including differences in intelligence. However, most of these scientists are careful not to draw the conclusion that such findings warrant unequal treatment or inequality in society at large. Nonetheless, claims about natural inequalities between individuals and groups, including between men and women, races, and classes, have often been used to justify discrimination and inequalities in status, rights, wealth and power.
Basic human needs
The view that all humans share the same basic needs and propensities, and are therefore equal, is perhaps the least controversial. Fundamentally, it can be argued that all humans, regardless of race, nationality, gender, position, role, or social standing, share a common humanity that is more important than their differences. This view, which lies at the heart of the cosmopolitan worldview, has also been supported by (social) psychologists and social theorists. For instance, it has been argued that meeting children’s basic needs is crucial for their maturation into socially and psychologically healthy adults. Failing to meet these needs has long-term adverse consequences for their development and life chances in society. In other words, fundamental psychological differences and cognitive abilities between adults may have been created by their upbringing and the extent to which their environment provided an “Evolved Developmental Niche” that met their basic human needs (Narvaez, 2018; Narvaez and Witherington, 2018). It has also been argued that failing to meet basic human needs can trigger aggression (Davies, 1970). Yet basic human needs can be interpreted and expressed in different forms across cultures and societies. Therefore, what is considered a basic need can differ across individuals and societies, providing a basis for discrimination between more or less “civilised” people and cultures. Nonetheless, the commonality of basic human needs can also constitute a basis for recognising fundamental human rights.
Men, women and gender
Whether and to what extent the biological differences between men and women (as opposed to socio-cultural factors) are significant, and in what respects, became a contentious issue in the 19th century. Before then, around the world, the biological differences between males and females were commonly regarded as a natural basis for assigning different positions and roles to men and women. Throughout much of history, and especially with the emergence of agriculture, patriarchal societies that gave women a lower status in the social and political hierarchy prevailed. Although differences between men and women have become a source of activism and demands for equal rights and treatment, and have increasingly been addressed at the formal level, much gender inequality persists in the political, economic, and social realms in most countries. This can be ascribed to continuing differences in power (structures) and social conservatism. However, the extent to which differences between men and women can be attributed to “nature or nurture,” and the importance attached to biological and psychological differences, continue to be debated. While some (“social determinists”) argue that the importance attached to the latter is totally socially constructed, others think that, although men and women are mostly alike, the biological differences between men and women are (also) significant in themselves, creating some differences in propensities, feelings, and preferences. Again, scientists contribute to this debate (Hooven, 2021; Pinker, 2002: Chapter 18).
Views and debates on this matter have become even more complicated and controversial with the shift in focus from biological sex to sexual identity pushed by the LGBTQ+ community. This has led to much confusion, as gender and sexuality are claimed not to have a binary biological basis but are foremost a matter of self-identification across a broad spectrum of possible identities. This claim raises complex scientific questions about the links between physiology, the endocrine (hormonal) system, and the brain that affect people’s sexual orientation. The lack of scientific clarity and consensus on this front leaves room for different views of what is “natural”. For instance, gender dysphoria (feeling a discrepancy between biological sex and gender identity) has been medically diagnosed as a condition, a deviation from the normal process that leads to the development of sexual identity. This condition may have become more prevalent for various reasons, including the effects of hormone-disrupting chemicals (Hood, 2005). But this does not necessarily mean that “gender fluidity” is normal or “natural” and that all men and women are ambivalent about their sexual identity and gender. Not surprisingly, this topic creates confusion and division, also within the feminist camp. For instance, some consider erasing the biological definition of male and female to be misguided and even dangerous to women’s cause (Rustin, 2022). As with all claims about natural differences between people, the central issue is not whether they hold true, but rather the social and political significance assigned to those differences. This is subject to differences in social and political-ideological views, societal positions, and power. The issue can also be exploited by dominant interests to fuel conflict and division within societies, diverting attention from the political and economic problems that shape their fate.
Rationality
The view that the most important feature distinguishing humans from non-humans is the capacity to think and reason dates back to classical philosophy (Anagnostopoulos and Miller, 2013). The human faculty for reasoning (rationality) was seen as the key to discovering the laws of nature and, henceforth, those that guide, or at least should guide, human thinking, morality, and behaviour. Reasoning, in particular collective reasoning, was regarded as a gateway to uncovering the ultimate meaning of the universe and human existence. This profound truth served as a bridge between humans and the divine. With the rise of modern science and the Enlightenment, the link between reason and religion steadily eroded, even though it was still seen as a means for identifying moral (categorical) imperatives (Kant, 1956; 2016). However, the human faculty for reasoning increasingly took on an instrumental character, aimed not at discovering a set of natural or moral laws by which humans should live, but at altering, manipulating, or conquering nature to serve human ends associated with progress and the idea of creating better societies. Thus, rational thinking came to be seen as the most important and desirable of the human faculties, even if it was recognised that, in practice, humans do not always think and act rationally. But even so, this is often seen as remediable, as humans and societies can be perfected by learning how to (better) control their irrational instincts and emotions.
Feelings and passions
Not surprisingly, given the realities of human behaviour and social interactions, the view that rationality is, or should be, the primary characteristic of human nature has encountered considerable scepticism. As many philosophers, social scientists, and novelists have noted, humans are primarily driven by feelings and passions. Arguably, rationality serves human needs and urges, even if the latter are irrational. A famous quote in this context is David Hume’s statement that “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them” (Hume, 1739; 2002: Book II, Part III, Section III). Emotions, fears and desires, which may be linked to human needs, drive much of what humans think and do. The sexual urge, which evolutionary biologists and psychologists link to the survival (reproduction) instinct, selfish genes, competition, and aggression, is often regarded as the most critical driver of human feelings, thinking, and behaviour, especially in men. However, the extent to which such feelings dominate actions and behaviour is subject to interpretation and debate. Arguably, in a social context, human passions are channelled, regulated, and/or to some extent controlled by social norms and expectations and a sense of morality. Individuals may moderate, adapt, or control their propensities rationally to keep or make their behaviour socially acceptable.
However, what is considered to be socially acceptable or desirable is shaped by factors that are also not, in themselves, rational but rooted in collective needs, values, feelings and/or urges, such as the need for security, bonding, and meaning, and possibly by an evolving sense of morality (Alderson, 2017; de Waal, 2006). Nonetheless, one cannot ignore the fact that, under certain conditions, humans have shown to be capable of being very cruel to others (humans and other animals). Additionally, individuals vary in their desire for power and control over others. This has led some to argue that humans are a hierarchical species, like other primates (de Waal, 2019), although this view is contested. Clearly, views on the importance of the emotional or instinctive side of human nature overlap with some of the other perspectives on human nature already mentioned.
A mixed bag
This leads to the view that human nature is a mixed bag of urges, propensities, and potentials, encompassing most of those depicted by the aforementioned perspectives. This view, I find, is the most plausible and realistic. As selfishness, competition, aggression, empathy, cooperation, love, reason and rationality, inequality and hierarchy, self-assertiveness, anti-authoritarianism, and basic human needs are all recognisable features of human behaviour, it can be argued that human nature is indeed a mixed bag of propensities that express themselves to different degrees in different circumstances. Some propensities may dominate in particular situations, contexts, societies, and times. Which characteristics prevail is also influenced by which features are cultivated or suppressed by a person’s milieu and society. In other words, which aspects of human nature become prevalent in a particular group or society is not a matter of human nature per se but of which view(s) of human nature are held up and presented as natural by those who have the power to influence or shape public views and perceptions. However, such power is never total and repressed features and propensities of human nature are bound to reassert themselves.
What human nature?
This leads to the final view of human nature identified here: it does not exist as such; rather, it is entirely malleable. From this perspective, no biological or genetic factors determine or even influence human behaviour. Humans are what they are because of their societies and experiences, and do not possess a set of shared biological characteristics that can be considered natural (Hull 1986). An extreme individualistic view holds that individuals construct themselves through their experiences and choices. This belief goes back to ancient Chinese philosophers and lies at the heart of Buddhism. But as this view implies that there is no inherent set of characteristics or values that constitute our humanity, it opens the door for manipulating and shaping humans in any way that is deemed desirable, for instance, through genetic manipulation, brain-enhancing implants and/or personality-altering treatments. This is often presented as a means of improving or perfecting humans and societies. Examples can be found in the ideas of B. F. Skinner (Skinner, 1971) and in Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World. More recently, this view is referred to as the Transhumanist perspective, which argues that humans can and should transform themselves into beings no longer constrained by biology or nature (McKie, 2018; O’Gieblyn, 2017). This can involve altering their physiology in line with what is considered desirable (already underway), genetic manipulation to enhance intelligence and immunity to disease, and extending their lifespan by halting the ageing process, making death optional. Advocates of this view commonly argue that this is what people have always wanted and that the development of science (almost inevitably) brings such ends within reach. Others, however, are alarmed by such ideas and developments, raising fundamental philosophical, ethical, and socio-political questions (Fukuyama, 1999, 2003).
Science and human nature
The claims about human nature made above raise the question of which view(s) on human nature are correct or the most plausible. I do not pretend to have the answer to this question, even though I am inclined to see some validity in almost all of them. As noted above, my view is that, to some extent, most of these claims are recognisable because humans have (often) exhibited such propensities and behaviours across times and places. Yet, it is different to argue that some of these features are the most important or dominant in all people. Yet, this is precisely what many scientists have set out to do.
Increasingly, scientists have invoked biological and genetic evidence to support the view that humans are naturally selfish and aggressive. In the early 20th century, the study of genetics, of which Julian Huxley was a prominent advocate, provided a basis for claims that selfishness and aggression were hard-wired into the human constitution. This view received a further boost from biologists, notably Edward O. Wilson (Wilson, 1978), the “father” of sociobiology, who argued that human behaviour has a material (biological, genetic) basis that predisposes humans to particular types of behaviour. In his view, these biological predispositions limit the extent to which culture can shape human behaviour. For instance, while humans have a capacity for altruism, this is exercised most strongly among close relatives and becomes weaker and more conditional in larger groups. Hence, moral and ethical views are held on a genetic/biological leash by which “human genetic material has been and will be kept intact. Morality has no other demonstrable ultimate function” (Wilson, 1978: 167). Similarly, Wilson believed that aggression was an innate human capacity, expressed in different forms and degrees depending on context (notably population pressure) and grounded primarily in the distinction between in-groups and out-groups. Thus, while Wilson acknowledged the role of societies and culture in influencing human behaviour, the idea was to explain the incidence and degree of aggression and violence based on a biological propensity shared by all humans.
Another biologist, Richard Dawkins, also emphasised the importance of biology in understanding human nature. However, Dawkins’s main argument was that the struggle for survival occurred not at the level of groups or even individuals but at the level of genes. Genes, not individuals, are immortal in that they (although not all) are passed on from generation to generation, albeit continuously mixed (in chromosomes) in embryonic development. While Dawkins admits that competing genes do not make conscious decisions and that, therefore, the adjective selfish may be misleading, they instruct the brain by setting rules for what to do based on what is best for the propagation of the genes (Dawkins, 1976; 1989: 3, 55). He sees individual bodies as nothing more than (complex) “machines” that have evolved to enhance the chances of genetic reproduction. “I shall argue that a predominant quality to be expected in a successful gene is ruthless selfishness. This gene selfishness will usually give rise to selfishness in individual behaviour” (Dawkins, 1976; 1989: 2, 106). In line with this, he regards aggression as a natural phenomenon in the sense that “the individual as a selfish machine [is] programmed to do whatever is best for its genes as a whole” (Dawkins, 1976; 1989: 66).
This view has also come to dominate the field of evolutionary psychology. For instance, Steven Pinker argues that human traits evolved as a product of natural selection and that the selected ones have been predominantly selfish (Pinker, 2002: 52). Although Pinker does not claim that human behaviour is determined by the genetic make-up of individuals, genes do at least explain 50% of human traits, with the remaining 50% remaining subject to uncertainty and speculation, including from the social sciences. Personality traits, including some “unpleasant temperaments”, are “partly inheritable” and can be linked to “a willingness to commit antisocial acts, including lying, stealing, starting fights, and destroying property.” Also, it has become clear from archaeological records that virtually all cultures have been murderous and known “…conflict, rape, revenge, jealousy, dominance, and male coalitional violence” that can therefore be regarded as “human universals” (Pinker, 2002: 57-58).
Challenging science on human nature
However, these science-based attempts to explain human and social behaviour in terms of genes have rightly provoked considerable criticism, including from other scientists. In part, critiques are based on the premises, choices, and assumptions that frame such research, as well as on the methodologies by which conclusions are reached. A key point that has been made in this context is that such frames and methods have been influenced, construed, and selected in line with the values and worldviews of the researchers, even though they will often fiercely deny that this has been the case. But, as Richard Lewontin, Richard Levins and others have argued (Lewontin, 1991; Lewontin, et al., 1984; Prindle, 2009), much of the research that has been undertaken on genetic sources of human behaviour aligns well with the dominant views about the inevitability of inequality in societies, as this is attributed to a large extent to the distribution of genetic endowment among individuals. Moreover, government policy efforts to address such inequalities are deemed misguided as they ignore human nature. For instance, in The Selfish Gene, Dawkins stated that “the welfare state is a very unnatural thing” (Dawkins, 1976; 1989: 117), while Pinker seems to think that social classes and the distribution of income in societies are based on inborn talent (Pinker, 2002: 149). But, as noted above, if one wants to show that biological differences between people are responsible for social classes and inequality, where does that leave the argument that all humans share common characteristics (such as selfishness and aggression) that explain their behaviour? Can we still speak meaningfully of aggressiveness or intelligence features of human nature in a general sense, or are these more characteristic of some (groups, classes) of humans? Often, sociobiologists and genetically based psychological research seem more inclined to emphasise the differences between people rather than their common features or nature.
Non-Marxist scientists have also noted that contextual factors inevitably influence scientific research. While the scientific method is often regarded as a warrant for the objectivity of science, research is always based on assumptions and choices that are influenced by factors beyond the method (and science) itself (Longino 1983). This applies to all the steps in the research, including the definition of the problem (research question) and/or the formulation of a hypothesis and selection of dependent and independent variables, decisions about what part of reality (or population) to focus on and which parts (most of reality) to leave out, by which methods (and tools) to undertake the research, how to process and classify data, and what findings or conclusions to draw from the data (which may be open to interpretation). Not surprisingly, scientists disagree on many topics, especially concerning humans and human behaviour. Given these subjective (extra-scientific) influences that frame scientific research, science alone cannot provide an objective answer to the question of human nature, nor can it function as a moral guide for how humans should behave or be treated. Scientists hold diverse views on human nature, which are inevitably influenced by their societal positions, worldviews, or ideologies, and sometimes by the political-economic interests that fund their research. By the same token, their research findings are likely to support, or can be used to support, the views and interests of some groups in society. It is astounding how many scientists still do not recognise the political implications of their research and naively believe it is value-free and that they should not get involved in politics. This, at least, could not be said of Stephen Jay Gould, who spent much of his career making apparent the political dimensions of thinking and theorising in evolutionary biology (Prindle, 2009).
There is another reason why attempts to explain human behaviour on the basis of human genetic (or biophysical) characteristics (as in sociobiology and evolutionary psychology) are flawed. This flaw lies in the failure to recognise the crucial role, or even existence, of human societies in shaping and steering human behaviour. Many researchers in these fields seem to assume that collective behaviour is simply the sum of individuals’ choices and behaviours. Societies do not exist; they are nothing more than collections of individuals artificially or arbitrarily thrown together. In this respect, it is easy to see how, for instance, the publication of Richard Dawkins’s The Selfish Gene (in 1976) played well into the hands of advocates of neoliberal ideology, such as Margaret Thatcher, who argued that there was no such thing as society, only individuals and families. It seems incredible that such a view has been able to get a grip on so many people, including intellectuals and academics, given the enormous nonsense that it is. Not only does it seem to ignore the fact that, especially in modern societies, people are heavily dependent on larger groups for their survival beyond their families, but also that, by far, most of an individual’s behaviour is steered or even shaped by their social environment, not by their genes. In specific terms, hardly any human behaviour can be explained by biology, not even that linked to sexual desire, which is commonly considered the primary driver of behaviour, given its importance for reproduction and survival (of the genes).
The precedence of societies
Arguably, the most important feature distinguishing humans from other animals is their capacity to think about what they are doing and/or should be doing. Their behaviour is not pre-programmed but results from many years of socialisation in groups. They need to learn how to function within the social context in which they live. Much of that social environment consists of institutions (rules, including organisations) as real as the biophysical or natural reality. Almost everything people do has been learned and/or guided, steered, imposed or enforced in that social (including cultural and political-economic) context. At work, workplace institutions and authorities determine what they do, and must, should, and should not do. The consequences of ignoring these rules and directions can be as real as running into a brick wall, as this may mean losing your job and income and, hence, your means of living. For billionaires, institutions are just as important. The ownership rights they claim on their investments and money are foundational to their reality, something they would quickly discover if a society were to abolish such rights. People need not even believe in such institutions to find out that they are real, as they will be confronted with the consequences of ignoring them. This is most evident when individuals commit acts that are considered serious crimes in the societies in which they live. But most people accept the reality of social (including political and economic) institutions and take that into account when deciding what to do or how to behave, in large part because they recognise the importance of institutions, both for themselves and for the groups to which they belong, including society as a whole.
Those who are blinkered by the individualist worldview and the idea that societies are mere figments of the imagination often accuse social realists of regarding society as an autonomous superorganism that develops independently. Again, this illustrates the (deliberate?) naivety of society deniers in their political approach. They do not (wish to) see that the rules, laws, and decisions that prevail in a society are made foremost by the most powerful people (not autonomously). This applies especially to the most critical political-economic institutions that rule society, and many other (social) rules that are considered crucial to society. While some institutions may possess enduring qualities, they do not act or make decisions autonomously. Real people do so, especially those with the agency and power to make or change the rules by which groups and societies must abide. The idea that society is a kind of superorganism may have been propagated by some 19th-century philosophers. Still, again, this was mainly on conservative ideological grounds, portraying (unequal) society as a natural order that should not be messed with.
However, the fact that societies are real and shape, influence, and steer much of human behaviour, individually and collectively, does not imply that human nature is entirely malleable. Again, genetic believers often accuse social realists of holding that human biology is entirely unimportant and that humans are blank slates on which societies can write whatever they want (Pinker, 2002). However, one need not be a social determinist to reject the claim that genes are more important than human capacity to shape individual and collective behaviour. This does not imply a denial that human propensities (including the sexual urge) do not exist, along with fundamental basic human needs and capacities. When basic human needs go unmet, and conditions such as crowding and resource pressures mount, certain propensities (e.g., aggression) come to the fore (Clark, 2002; Davies, 1970). Increasingly, scientists are recognising the crucial importance of the external (including social) environment in the development of the human embryo and young children, including their brains, psychological makeup, and even moral development. External influences affect epigenesis, the expression of genes, and the absence of the “Evolved Developmental Niche”, which can result in various pathologies (Narvaez and Witherington, 2018). Many of the (problematic) personality traits that sociobiologists consider to be responsible for the behaviour of individuals are likely to derive from this interplay between human biology and their environment, particularly their social environment, rather than genes only. That some people turn out to be nasty individuals cannot simply be attributed to their genes or their endowment at birth. It is more likely to result from nasty experiences and conditions that influenced the development of their brains before and after birth.
These observations make it clear that explaining actual human behaviour on the basis of generic claims about human nature is virtually meaningless. By definition, all human behaviour is natural unless some people are considered to be non-human. Human behaviour, both individually and collectively, can only be explained meaningfully by looking at the (many) factors and conditions that influence the differences in behaviour at different times and contexts. This does not mean that humans lack shared propensities and basic needs. However, whether and how these are developed and met depend primarily on the environment in which they are conceived, grow up, and live. On balance, therefore, (social) environmental factors are more important than the biological differences between individuals. Furthermore, given the neglect or denial of social reality in sociobiological and evolutionary psychological accounts, their explanations of collective behaviour and societal issues are highly simplistic. De facto (if not intentionally), they serve conservative political-ideological causes rather than providing a scientific (empirically based) understanding of social reality.
The latter point highlights the critical role of politics and ideology in the debate and research on human nature. As discussed above, science alone cannot provide the correct answer to the question of what human nature is. The various and often conflicting views on human nature, including those presented by scientists, serve a wide range of purposes and interests. Evidence and support can be found for each of the views mentioned above. However, which view is dominant has significant consequences for societies, especially for particular groups. Moreover, much of the research and debate on human nature attributes many, if not most or all, of the problems experienced by individuals and societies to individuals and/or to the natural order of things that cannot be changed, thereby individualising and depoliticising social, political, and economic issues. Therefore, what the rights and wrongs of human nature are is not so much a scientific question as one that requires examining the politics of human nature.
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