For much of human history, humans accepted the world, including their own society, as a given beyond their power to control. At most, they might have tried to find favour with the Gods by sacrificial offerings and rituals, for instance, hoping to be granted a bountiful harvest. With the rise of ancient civilisations, philosophers and historians began to raise questions and develop ideas about history and societies, sowing the seeds of the view that more than divine providence was involved. Ideas about the cyclical course of history, similar to that in nature, tended to prevail. However, teleological and eschatological views (that read a purpose in the development of the world and/or that expected it to end) became more common with the rise of the major world religions. However, common to all these belief systems was the assumption that humans cannot influence, let alone control, the course of history and their destiny.
The idea of progress
With the rise of the Enlightenment and modernity, the belief that people and societies do not have to accept the existing situation and social order, but can improve their lot and change societies for the better, became a fundamental tenet that inspired inventors, scientists, philosophers, and political and social movements. The idea is captured in the notion of progress, which, according to Nisbet, “holds that mankind has advanced in the past—from some aboriginal condition of primitiveness, barbarism, or even nullity—is now advancing, and will continue to advance through the foreseeable future.”[1] Bury argues simply that the idea means “that civilisation has moved, and will move in a desirable direction.”[2] Although these authors disagree on whether the concept has been around since the ancient Greeks or emerged in more recent times (around the mid-18th century), they agree that the notion of human progress combines two elements: a belief in the inexorable advance of knowledge, and the belief in the perfectibility of humans and societies. The accumulation of knowledge of the biophysical world (as demonstrated in astronomy, physics, and biology) was insufficient to guarantee human progress. It needed to be complemented by an understanding of human societies, including their politics, economics, and social patterns and developments, which were believed to be subject to general laws, much like the biophysical world. An understanding of these social laws would allow the perfection of societies.
This idea of progress dominated much of the philosophical and political thinking from the mid-18th century until the late 19th century. Although thinkers had widely different ideas about what these laws were, from economic laws governing the liberal free market advanced by Adam Smith and other classical economists, those linked to historical materialism developed by Marx, to those put forward by the early practitioners of the new science of society, including Condorcet, de Saint Simon, and Comte (who was the first to coin the term sociology) and many others, they shared a belief in human and societal progress based on the advancement of science. Even if, during this time, there were also sceptics of the idea of progress,[3] they were in the minority. But from the early 20th century, sceptics in philosophical and intellectual circles increased sharply. By the end of the century, arguably, the belief that societies were on an inexorable path of progress started to lose its grip on the general public, at least in Western countries. Future historians may well refer to the 20th century as the Age of Disillusion, effectively supplanting the Age of Enlightenment.
The end of progress?
Various reasons can be identified for the erosion, if not complete disappearance, of the belief in human and societal progress and perfectibility. Probably the most commonly provided explanation is that, despite the developments in science, humans do not seem to have made any progress in tackling their ability or tendency to inflict harm on each other, as reflected in two world wars, the holocaust, and many other atrocities that were committed throughout the century. Science and technology may have progressed to unprecedented levels, but this has also enabled violence to be applied on a larger scale and/or with greater effectiveness and precision. Second, although economic development may have led to an increase in living standards (or consumption), more people started to question its psychological and social effects, raising concerns about a raft of interconnected phenomena including individualisation and the breaking up of communities and families, alienation and anomie, the erosion of core social values and social capital, materialism and the decline or loss of culture, phenomena often referred to collectively as cultural pessimism or the decline of (western) civilisation. Such themes had already been raised in the 19th century by critics of the idea of progress, but they became more common in the early 20th century. Interestingly, pessimistic views were also shared by the political right and the left.[4] More recently, the trend towards what Nisbet refers to as “disowning the past”[5] seems to have become more intense with anti-colonialist and anti-racist movements tearing down statues of colonial figureheads and demanding the dismantling of cultural colonialism that is still perceived to be prevalent in Western societies.[6] Third, growing concerns about environmental degradation have contributed to this pessimism, resulting in a rising tide of apocalyptic publications in environmental circles.[7] Fourth, the persistence, and even worsening, of inequality and poverty even in high-income countries (as in most other countries around the world), the re-emergence of homelessness, food poverty and dependence on charity, and the continuing discrimination and inequality of life chances and social justice in general, can all be used as evidence of the failure of the Enlightenment project to perfect societies.
Yet, it should be noted that not everyone agrees with such an assessment. Those who take a more positive view note a range of improvements and achievements, such as increased human life expectancy, and higher material living standards for most if not all households, as reflected in the near-universal (at least in high-income countries) ownership of durable consumer goods, advances in health care, higher access levels to education, and the widespread availability of sophisticated technologies (like computers, mobile phones, the internet), and other indicators. Even concerning environmental matters, the situation is sometimes portrayed as much less gloomy than depicted by “doomsayers”.[8] Based on these indicators, progress has been made on various fronts in many countries, albeit at varying rates. Some argue that it is largely because of a lack of knowledge that many people express pessimistic views about the situation in their country and/or the future.[9] Overwhelmingly, governments and businesses remain committed to pursuing economic growth, holding it up as the means to improve the lives of everyone. And many, if not all, people in industrialised societies around the world continue to literally buy into a modern lifestyle dominated by materialism and a belief in infinite technological progress. This faith also extends to environmental issues and encompasses the belief that science and technology can and will address environmental challenges.
Here, I will not revisit this debate as I think that the environmental trend, backed up by many scientific assessments, is sufficiently clear to warrant the conclusion that, thus far, societies and the world as a whole have been unable, or/and perhaps unwilling, to prevent and stop this environmental decline, and that this poses a severe risk to the foundations on which human well-being and possibly life are based. Instead, I want to address whether people and societies can somehow control the socio-cultural, political-institutional, and political-economic factors identified as responsible for this trend.
Can societies be steered?
In the social sciences, one can find little agreement on whether societies can be guided or steered, and if so, how and in what direction. Rather, there is a large diversity of views and interpretations associated with different sub-branches, ideological dispositions, theoretical perspectives, and methodologies.[10] Some of these views (notably pluralist theory) question the ability of societies to steer towards a collectively agreed-upon desirable future, while others allow for individuals and groups (notably elites) to exercise agency and power in the pursuit of what they consider desirable or needed. Indeed, one of the key issues standing in the way of the development of a theory of societal guidance is the diversity and plurality in modern societies, linked to differences in socio-economic positions, social class, interests, ideologies, values and norms, and many other respects, which makes it highly unlikely if not impossible to reach societal agreement on what constitutes a desirable society.
In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, many social theorists even seem to have given up on the idea that it is desirable to think about how a collective vision of a future society could be developed, let alone that governments should play a role in steering societies, thereby de facto accepting the prevailing capitalist liberal-democratic order. One analyst of the ideas of four prominent social theorists of the 1990s (Anthony Giddens, Ulrich Beck, Jürgen Habermas, and André Gorz) [11] argues that all four appear to accept that capitalism has become the only realistic system. Of these, only Gorz hangs on to some socialist principles but also gives up on abolishing capitalism as “there is no alternative”. When it comes to protecting the environment and social welfare, these social theorists seem to believe that there is no alternative but to adopt a defensive approach and/or push for increased public participation and/or stronger government regulation to mitigate the adverse effects of development. Accepting the prevailing order, Goldblatt concludes, these theorists do not provide “sufficient intellectual or moral resources” on how to steer societies into a different and more desirable direction.[12]
Following the lead of the non- or anti-ideological pragmatists, other social scientists take a technocentric and technocratic approach to systems change, for instance, many of those who contribute ideas under the theme of transition management (TM).[13] To its credit, this stream commonly identifies sustainability as a leading, long-term goal and often takes a relatively upbeat view of the feasibility of achieving that goal, mainly because of a belief in science and technology and in the steering capability of governments and societies. Similarly, the school of ecological modernisation (EM), arguably one of the most well-known and popular among social scientists, is relatively optimistic about the possibility of moving societies towards a (more) sustainable future, again primarily based on a belief in science and technology. However, although there is a diversity of sub-streams within both schools (TM and EM), with some emphasising also the need for significant political and economic changes, it would be fair to say that their adherents generally advocate gradual and reformist change in social, economic and political systems, alongside exploiting the scope for “radical” technological transformation in the energy, transport, agriculture, industrial and other systems.[14] The main challenge, as they see it, is to bring all the stakeholders together in cooperative governance structures that advance shared goals.
However, this approach can be criticised for an overly optimistic view of the feasibility of fundamental change within the context of liberal-democratic capitalist political-economic systems. Moreover, as argued before, such a depoliticised approach raises serious questions about the lack of democratic control over the development of science and technology and the likelihood that this will have unforeseeable, undesirable, and potentially highly damaging or disastrous social and environmental effects. Its adoption puts societies on the path towards creating (totalitarian) technocracies, a concern with a considerable pedigree in social, political, and philosophical thought.[15]
While Marxist ideas about societal change, based on the assumption of the intensification of class conflict and the likelihood that this will lead to revolutionary political change and the abolition of capitalism, offer the prospect of fundamental change, it is doubtful that this can still be expected. In many countries where social democracy had been a considerable political force, it has lost much of its support base, partly because social-democratic parties actively participated in the neoliberal turn. However, this betrayal did not lead to a significant strengthening of other (more) left-wing parties; instead, it is the far-right that has benefited most from the disillusionment with the left, mainly by scapegoating immigrants. However, socialism is far from dead as an ideology that holds the promise of a more equitable society, recognises the importance of democracy, and takes on board the environmental cause (eco-socialism). In recent years, in some countries (notably the United States, where Bernie Sanders, a self-proclaimed socialist candidate for the 2020 presidential election, mobilised massive support, especially among young people), socialism appears to be enjoying a comeback. Yet, it seems unlikely that, in any liberal-democratic capitalist country, radical socialism (openly advocating the abolition of capitalism and the establishment of a planned economy) will be able to win the seats of government. Also working against this is the anti-socialist bias in the media, which keeps on depicting socialism as a flawed and failed experiment.
The idea that societies can collectively and democratically steer themselves into a self-chosen direction seems to be trapped between elitism and pluralism, or voluntarism and uncontrollable autonomous development (determinism). On the one hand, much evidence supports the view that, in most societies, elites and/or a powerful and dominant social class can (and do) steer societies into a particular direction of their choosing (based on their interests or the perception thereof). On the other hand, the plurality, diversity, fragmentation, and even atomization of modern societies make it difficult to believe that a society can steer itself in a collectively and democratically chosen direction. While, from the first point of view, societies are steered into a direction that serves foremost the interests of the elite(s), which are bound up with the prevailing political-economic system, from the second point of view it seems highly unlikely if not impossible that society as a whole can or will be able to agree on what the collective interests of society are that can and should guide collective policies and decisions. As much evidence can be gathered to support both views, there appears to be little scope and hope for the idea that societies can steer developments democratically in a direction deemed collectively desirable.
One of the social theorists who has tried to find a way out of this trap is Amitai Etzioni, who developed a theory of “societal guidance” based on what he considers the essential conditions for societies to collectively gain control over their future. He identifies “a self-conscious and knowing actor, one or more goals he is committed to realize, and access to levers (or power) that allow the resetting of the social code” as the three main components of an “active orientation” and projects these at the macro-level of society.[16] While recognising the existence of elites and plurality, he puts forward the idea that societies can develop “societal consciousness” by facilitating the development of knowledge by different actors and allowing for the expression of fundamental critique, the reduction of inequalities of power (of various kinds), which involves a redistribution of what he refers to as assets (the sources of power), the promotion of social mobilisation (in which organisations play a significant role, overcoming atomisation), a process of consensus formation undertaken by societal groups and organisations, but in which the state plays a vital role as a relatively autonomous actor and power, and the introduction of fundamental changes based on these efforts and processes, and which are likely to further strengthen the conditions for societal guidance. An essential element underlying this theory is the recognition of the existence of basic human needs, the meeting of which is crucial to minimising alienation and “inauthenticity” in society, phenomena that erode the conditions for an active (participatory; responsive) orientation of citizens. It is worth noting that, although Etzioni’s ideas were directed in the first instance at (nation-) states, he also speculated about their applicability at the international level, noting the possibility of the emergence of a global political community, growing consciousness and support for universal values and norms, and expanding international law.[17]
Although it is easy to dismiss Etzioni’s theory as unscientific and idealistic, given its largely abstract (not empirically based) and normative nature, it offers inspiration for thinking about how to escape the trap between the elitist and pluralist theories referred to above. First, it highlights the need to address the power inequalities associated with the unequal distribution of resources as a key condition. This concurs well with my views on the importance of the resource-based theory of power and the tendency of power to accumulate across different sources. Second, it recognises the importance of the state’s role in improving the conditions for social mobilisation, among others, by creating a more egalitarian society and ensuring that the basic human needs of all citizens are met. Third, it does not exclude the possibility that societies can develop a shared view of their collective interests that provides a basis for steering themselves into what is deemed to be a desirable (or necessary) direction.
Arguably, the greatest weakness in Etzioni’s theory is the lack of more specific ideas on how an “active society” can be advanced strategically and by whom. He seems to assume that there already is a major actor capable of creating the conditions for such a society, either in society or embodied in the state. This may have been a reasonable assumption in the 1960s, when the “baby boomers” in many countries were full of enthusiasm and energy, aiming to create more democratic and better societies. But much of that idealism has faded or even disappeared, not in the least because of the shift towards an individualistic and selfish culture spread by some 40 years of neoliberal propaganda. Although there are indications that younger generations are again adopting an “active orientation” based on a perception of collective interests (not in the least related to environmental issues, notably global heating), they seem to lack a clear strategy about how to address these issues strategically in the context of the need for the fundamental systemic changes that are required, linked also to a collective vision on the direction into which policies and decisions should be steered to create what are deemed to be more desirable societies and a better world.
In the following three sections, I discuss these gaps further. First, I revisit the idea that the distribution of power lies at the heart of the problem. Second, I will return to the crucial importance of states and their functions in meeting the basic needs of people and societies. Third, I will elaborate on the need for a strategic approach to collective action.
Power is the key
Fundamentally, the extent to which individuals or societies can give direction to their future is a matter of power. Although all people, unless they are in a vegetative state, have agency – the ability to make choices – their capacity to give consequence to these choices depends on the power resources available to them and their ability to use those resources (more or less effectively). The more resources available to a person, and the greater his/her ability to use them effectively, the more that person has a chance to give direction to his/ her life, even if this does not mean being able to control his/ her future. By contrast, people with little power have far fewer chances in life. Similarly, groups and societies differ in the resources that are available to them, but their ability to use these resources collectively and effectively depends not just on the skills of individuals (although these can make a difference, notably of those who are in positions of leadership), but also, and arguably even more so, on the institutions (organisations and rules) through which the resources and abilities are mobilised, developed, and used. Thus, as well as resources, institutions play a crucial role in a society’s ability to collectively influence its future direction.
Power comes in different forms linked to the kind of resources it is based on. At least six forms (or categories) of power resources can be identified: physical, cognitive, personal, social, economic, and institutional. Rather than defining power foremost in relational terms and/or outcomes (the extent to which objectives are achieved), the most prevalent interpretations in political studies, I prefer a resource-based definition of power that is better able to account for the structural and distributional aspects of power while recognising that resources need to be utilised to give consequence to choices and for power to be exerted, often in interaction with other people. It is also worth noting that different power resources are often used in combination and concurrently, thereby enhancing their effectiveness. They tend to accumulate and concentrate, especially around economic power, which enables other forms of power to be bought in various ways. For that reason, economic power is arguably the most important source of power. It is accumulated and exercised by individuals, groups, and organisations (including businesses) outside the formal realm of politics, notably by hiring or employing people to give consequence to “private” choices and decisions that can affect many people’s lives.
In all societies, there is, and always has been, a tendency for economic power to be accumulated and concentrated in elites, even though these elites may not be unified but compete more or less fiercely with each other for dominance or hegemony (which means acceptance as the legitimate dominant power). They do this by acquiring (paying for) different sources of power, for instance, from or of the media to influence other people’s views and preferences (cognitive power), and in the political-institutional realm, for example, by funding policy papers produced by think tanks, hiring experts and lobbyists, funding political campaigns for themselves or others, or by donations and corruption. While history is not just about great men and wars, there can be little doubt that powerful leaders and elites have often been able to attach significant consequences to their choices, affecting the lives of many people. While leaders and elites may not be able to control or even shape the future of their societies in line with their aspirations, we can plausibly argue that, on many occasions, they have given direction to the course of history, albeit not always, or often, in ways that many people deem or deemed desirable.
The big question is whether and how societies can exercise power to steer themselves into a less unsustainable and more desirable direction. Past efforts have failed and/or produced disappointing, undesirable, and disastrous results. With the rise of neoliberalism, in many countries, governments have abandoned the idea and are no longer even trying to steer societies. Allowing “the market” to steer developments, many governments are floundering as they have no clear ideas for tackling the unfolding crises. Much of what they are doing is like sticking plasters on festering wounds, hardly softening the brutal pains caused by the “free market”, let alone addressing the sources or causes of the problems that are steering and pushing societies, and the world, towards self-destruction.
Our best hope, it seems to me, lies in fundamentally altering the existing distribution and concentration of power. This configuration underlies and props up the political-economic, political-institutional, and socio-cultural systems, which are fundamentally at odds with environmental protection and sustainability, and therefore with maintaining and creating the conditions for human life on earth.
Given the enormous and unprecedented concentration of economic power in many countries and the world, it may seem logical to target this configuration as a priority for change. The concentration of economic power holds societies in an economic stranglehold, corrupts governments (political-institutional power) and forces them into collaboration with the “1%”. Economic power also controls the media (cognitive power), many of which are conservative and persuade people that this “is the way it is” and that there is no alternative. As a result, many individuals either do not think fundamental change is possible or actively support the dominant elites as they identify their interests with maintaining the status quo. For these reasons, it is almost impossible to challenge the political-economic power elite head-on. Doing so gets little support, invokes ridicule, antagonism, and personal attacks, and—if a challenge is perceived to gain support and to pose a real threat—is likely to provoke suppression. Already, anti-terrorism laws adopted in many liberal democracies (and non-democratic regimes) can be broadly interpreted to punish protestors and deter opposition.[18] For these reasons, we need to consider a more effective approach than simply calling for the abolition of capitalism and/or the expropriation of billionaires and the growing class of multimillionaires, who will fiercely defend their wealth. At the same time, we should have no illusions that introducing a progressive income tax and/or a wealth tax will bring about a significant redistribution of economic power, let alone systemic change (such as in property rights, let alone capitalism).
But if challenging concentrated economic power is unlikely to have much effect, what are the alternatives? Thus far, demands for fundamental change have often focused on political change, notably the overthrow of political leaders, governments or regimes and their replacement with leaders who are (likely to be) more sympathetic to the causes advanced by those who have mobilised the people. Revolutions, from the French, American, Russian, and Chinese to the Cuban revolution, have always been led by relatively small groups of intellectuals, activists, and charismatic and/or ruthless leaders who imposed their views on how societies must be organised and run. One may disagree about their achievements, but such revolutions have often come at significant costs to many individuals, families, and societies. Not surprisingly, the idea of political revolution has fallen out of fashion, which serves the dominant political and economic elites well. More recently, the idea that a revolution (or revolutions) may be needed to provide the breakthrough to fundamental change is again gaining support. The mass mobilisations in a string of Arab countries during the early 2010s, commonly referred to as the “Arab Spring”, can be seen as a revival of the revolutionary spirit.[19]
However, whether these latest attempts have been successful in bringing about fundamental change is debatable; they may have rekindled the idea that governments should heed the views and interests of the people, but it appears that in most countries where the Arab Spring occurred, it has failed to produce fundamental and enduring political-economic change. A similar conclusion can be drawn from popular uprisings and protest movements in the United States (the “Occupy movement”), Spain (the “Indignados”), France (the “Yellow Vests”), the UK (the “Extinction Rebellion”) and in many other countries, including Belarus, Burma, and Hong-Kong. These rebellions may have led some governments (for instance, in France) to grant minor policy concessions. Still, most of these movements have either fizzled out or been brutally suppressed, as in Egypt, Belarus, Burma, and Hong Kong, demonstrating that control over physical power (the army and police) still plays a key role in blocking political change. These experiences also illustrate that trying to effect fundamental change by mass mobilisation is, in itself, not sufficient. More is needed.
As some analysts have pointed out, this “more” may be a persuasive and coherent programme or set of demands that is supported by a broad coalition of movements and/or a convincing story (view of the world) that shows that the presently dominant story is no longer believable and acceptable.[20] These suggestions hark back to Gramscian thinking that emphasises the importance of ideas and of forging a counter-hegemonic movement (an alternative “historic bloc” comprising a broad range of societal actors, including intellectuals and organisations) in advancing an alternative view of society as the basis for political praxis.[21] Thus, this approach leans foremost on building cognitive power (empirical as well as moral) and social power to offset and overcome the dominant economic and political-institutional (state) power of elites who also use cognitive power to maintain their legitimacy and hegemony, even though hegemony is never complete and is continuously subject to contestation.
Although I concur with the view that presenting a shared programme for change, supported by a broad coalition of social movements, is essential for achieving political change, this approach has several issues. The first and most obvious problem is how to forge such a program given the diversity of social movements with different causes, views, interests, and priorities. Obviously, the broader the coalition or social base one wants to build to maximise social power, the greater this challenge. Second, a relatively small group of individuals is likely to play a leading role in forging such a programme, which, even if it is formally endorsed by the members of a broad coalition of groups, may open up the exercise to accusations of elitism, bias, or neglect of minority views and interests. Third, even if a programme receives broad and strong support and is backed up by powerful (mass) social mobilisation, it still needs to go through the regular political-institutional processes (involving the executive, legislative and possibly judicial institutions) to be transformed into official policies and/or institutional changes. This means it is likely to encounter the same structural obstacles and barriers that have prevented the adoption of more meaningful (environmental and other) policies. This is not to downplay the importance of groups in society developing and proposing changes. But at the same time, we must acknowledge that other (conservative) groups do the same thing and may well outcompete the social movements in their bid to get the ear of governments because of their entrenched power and the larger pool of resources (including the cognitive power of the mainstream media) that they can draw upon. In brief, trying to effect fundamental change on a highly uneven playing field is an uphill battle, acknowledged by veteran environmental advocates.[22]
Wresting economic power from the economic elites is an almost impossible task as long as the existing distribution of, and/or command over, power (resources) across the different forms, including cognitive, political-institutional, and physical power, remains intact. We must somehow find a more indirect and strategic way to confront economic power. Arguably, there is only one way to do this: focusing efforts on the power of the state. If power is the key to fundamental change and steering societies in a different direction, then states hold that key.
States hold the key
If power is the key to collectively choosing the direction of society, states are the most crucial battleground in the fight over that key. States remain the most important political institutions in the world as it is, for three main reasons: first, despite the claim that states have lost much of their power or even relevance in the present world order, there is little evidence that states are becoming less important or redundant political institutions and collective actors; second, the functions performed by states (even if in ways that may be deemed inadequate) remain crucial to meeting the basic needs of people and societies; third, states are the only political institutions through which people can address the accumulation and concentration of economic and cognitive power.
With globalisation, it is often argued, states have lost much of their power and have become redundant or even obstacles to progress, which is deemed to lie in further eliminating barriers to trade, investment, and the movement of people.[23] Although many critics of globalisation deplore its adverse social and environmental effects, it has become commonplace to argue that globalisation’s benefits must be more equally shared and/or that globalisation needs to be better regulated by strengthening global institutions, as advocated by institutionalists and many cosmopolitans.[24] In my view, these arguments are fundamentally flawed. States remain the most important political institutions, offering the best chances of steering societies in a more sustainable and desirable direction, both socially and environmentally, as well as economically and politically.
To begin with, there is little evidence to support the contention that nation-states have lost much of their power and/or have become redundant and are on their way out. Even during the heydays of globalisation, from the mid-1980s until the end of the 1990s, states played a key role in supporting and advancing their national (foremost capitalist) economic interests, earning them the appropriate label of “competition states”.[25] Of course, given the enormous differences in power, some states, particularly the United States, are in a much stronger position to do so than others. In this context, it is also worth pointing out that the formation of the EU has not meant the demise of states within that body. The EU was primarily established to advance the capitalist economic interests of the already more powerful countries, particularly Germany, while holding out the promise that all member states would benefit. And although the EU has indeed served the German economy well, this cannot be said for many economically weaker states.[26] The weaknesses of the EU policies have been illustrated by its obstinately holding on to a monetary policy that prolonged the Euro crisis,[27] and that produced harmful socio-economic effects for many people, notably in Greece,[28] and during the COVID-19 crisis when each member state fell back on its own capacity and borders to combat the pandemic.[29] The failures of the EU have fuelled public disillusionment, Euroscepticism, and a revival of nationalism in member states. The EU is at most a weak proto-European state lacking a genuinely federal structure. The uneven distribution of economic power and benefits across the EU has generated significant social and political tensions that cast a shadow over the future of the European project.
Similarly, in the United States, the legitimacy and political support basis for economic globalisation has weakened with the rise of public discontent about the adverse socio-economic effects (de-industrialisation; structural unemployment) on many of its people. This discontent provided fertile ground for the election of the populist Donald Trump as president, fueling nationalism (“Making America Great Again”) and bringing about a significant change in US foreign policy, which blatantly put “America First”. In part, this change has also been driven by China’s rise as a global superpower, which has led to concerns about maintaining US hegemony, a priority rooted in the American foreign policy establishment.[30] This concern, shared by Republicans and Democrats, is reflected in the continuity of US policy towards China, even though President Biden has adopted a more multilateral approach in his efforts to contain China, rather than Trump’s unilateralist policy.[31]
At the same time, nationalism is at least as strong a force in China, where it is deeply rooted in its 2000-year history as a “civilisation-state” and associated superiority complex, which, according to some analysts, will transform the world when China becomes the dominant power.[32] If anything, the Chinese state will become a more demanding and assertive international actor rather than surrender its sovereignty. Like all big and powerful states, China will likely bind itself to international agreements only if they suit it. And while smaller states tend to be more willing to do so in the hope of (somewhat) constraining the arbitrary use of power by bigger states, there is also no indication that they are inclined to relinquish formal sovereignty. If and where the independence and integrity of states are under threat or pressure, it is usually from domestic ethnic groups that wish to create their own state.
Globally, there is more evidence to be found for the waning of economic globalisation and a revival of nationalism and national rivalries than for the fading of nation-states. The 2007 financial-economic crisis and its aftermath have exposed the vulnerability of the globalised financial system. Many so-called developing countries appear to have concluded that there is little to be gained from further opening their borders to foreign capital and trade if such measures are not reciprocated sufficiently by high-income countries. Additionally, concerns about the adverse social, economic, and environmental effects of economic globalisation on societies (as highlighted by the anti-globalisation movement) have grown stronger, for instance, where ownership and control over vital resources, such as drinking water and agricultural land, have been transferred to foreign companies.[33]
These latter issues are linked to a second reason why states remain crucially important: they perform, or at least should perform, functions vital to meeting people’s and societies’ basic needs. States fulfil four main functions: security, economic, demand and conflict management, and social integration. These functions can, and have been, interpreted quite differently, depending on who controls a state’s institutions. With the emergence of the modern (European) state in the 17th century, these functions were increasingly defined to serve the capitalist class, whose wealth and power had grown at the expense of the land-owning classes and over the backs of workers and colonial peoples. However, due to its inherent contradictions and destructive social and political consequences, capitalism faced serious threats in the first half of the 20th century, compelling the capitalist class in many countries to make concessions to the working classes. This led to the creation of social-democratic welfare states, which significantly improved the living conditions of most members of these societies and strengthened the power and influence of the labour movement. This was accompanied by the emergence of a broadly supported view of the state as a benign and crucial institution through which economic growth and stability, and the social well-being of all, could be promoted. Without wanting to idealise this era (referred to by Piketty as “the thirty glorious years from 1945 to 1975”),[34] this marked a revolutionary change in the perception of the state and how its core functions should be interpreted. Throughout history (also in premodern states), states had served foremost the interests of their rulers. With the creation of the social-democratic state, the fundamental expectations of states changed as people experienced that the state could serve their individual and collective needs and interests. The experience demonstrated, albeit to a limited extent, that the functions of the state can be (re-) defined and fulfilled in ways that not only serve the basic needs of people but also create the conditions for their flourishing, for instance, by offering free higher education to all, which significantly boosted student numbers and enabled many young people to improve their lives, also benefitting the whole of society.
With the rise of neoliberalism, in many countries, the functions of the state were again redefined to better serve the interests of capital at the expense of the welfare state, even to the point where beggars returned to the streets and food banks have again become a common phenomenon in many nominally “developed” countries. This development highlights the crucial importance of the state to people’s survival. By far, most people in modern societies have lost the capacity to provide (food and other essentials) for themselves and their families. As globalised production systems have made many nations more dependent on imports, their vulnerability has starkly increased. When things go wrong, people have no option but to turn to the state as social networks have eroded or disintegrated, social conflict increases, and security has become precarious. Those who think that states are no longer important only need to look at “failed states” to see the social consequences if a state can no longer fulfil its core functions. In a range of countries, this has also been demonstrated during the COVID-19 epidemic when health systems became overwhelmed and the capacity of states to protect their citizens against the virus proved inadequate.
There are also strong grounds for arguing that, in the first instance, states must play a central role in advancing environmental integration. Although biophysically the environment is globally interconnected, and a growing number of environmental problems have taken on a global dimension, most of their sources and drivers are geographically located within countries, for instance, in the form of burning fossil fuels, local sources of pollution, and the manufacturing of materials and products that are exported and/or that become part of a global production chain. All such activities and practices also have local social and environmental effects. To adequately protect the environment, in the first instance, each country must look after its own environment and people while also having regard for global impacts, as expressed by the cliché that we need to “think globally, and act locally”. If all countries were to implement this, global measures would likely be unnecessary. While this may seem utopian, it is in the (self-) interest of every country to do so as the protection of its environment is vital to the health, well-being, and even survival of most of its citizens (but perhaps less to big exporters and not to foreign investors).
At this point, it is worth considering briefly what alternative political institutions might be better suited to meet the needs of people and societies. On this front, two main alternative options are supra-national and sub-national. Supranational alternatives involve the creation or strengthening of international institutions assigned the responsibility and power to make supreme decisions in areas that currently fall under the sovereignty of states. Sub-national alternatives involve decentralising responsibilities and power to smaller political systems (or “mini-states”). While a good case can be made that both levels must play an important part in governance (notably linked to some of the functions of the state—such as security at the international level, and day-to-day environmental management at the local level), national-level governments remain crucial for providing coordination, support, and guidance to the local level, and to function as the collective intermediate actor between the local and the international levels. While arguably local governments can and should be granted more power and resources to facilitate a transition towards sustainable societies, and (should) play a significant role in meeting the economic and social (security) needs of their residents, their capacity has been seriously eroded with the shift of economic power towards TNCs and other big companies operating at the national and global level. Given their position in the competitive capitalist system, local governments are in a significantly weaker position than national governments to regulate or exert control over economic power and decision-making by large corporations.
At the other end of the scale, it is hard to see how international or global institutions would be able to better meet the economic and social needs of people, given the (even) longer distance (geographically, socially, and psychologically) between such institutions and people, their lack of local knowledge of and/or empathy with national, regional and local socio-cultural frameworks, local/regional ecological systems and processes, and, last but not least, their lack of command over the material resources needed to meet local needs and demands. While creating a global authority for security matters is a worthy ideal, establishing one for other state functions would likely cause nightmares. There is virtually no chance that a world government will be created anytime soon. In summary, states are, and for the foreseeable future are likely to remain, the most important political institutions on which people and societies depend to ensure that their most basic needs are met.
A third main reason why the (nation-state) remains crucially important is that (barring revolution) it provides the only realistic basis for societies to control and reduce the power accumulated and concentrated by economic elites and to protect and strengthen democracy. As the rise of social democracy in the post-World War II era and the neoliberal revolution of the 1980s and 1990s have demonstrated, battles over the role and power of the state are highly significant and have major consequences for societies. The state’s power can be used either to accentuate and serve the accumulation and concentration of economic power (and not only in capitalist systems) or to constrain and/or redistribute that power in favour of workers and the large majority of people. Since states are formally sovereign, a priori, they have the right to fundamentally alter the rules by which economic power is accumulated (or not), (re-) distributed, constrained, and controlled. In principle, in a democracy, such issues should be decided collectively by its citizens; citizens should define how the power of their state is used, including the (re-)distribution and control of economic power. Economic institutions are not sovereign and do not have the right to (re-) define the functions and powers of the state and decide how these should be used. The primacy of the state over the economy is a fundamental tenet of democracy.
Notwithstanding the accumulation and concentration of economic power and the extent to which that power has been able to get a hold over states and governments, especially during the last 40-odd years, we should not abandon the idea that the state is there to serve the interests and advance the collective aspirations of societies rather than those of elites. Much of the neoliberal revolution hinged on giving the state a bad name. Depicting the state as “the problem rather than the solution” (as President Reagan famously declared) has been a key element in the neoliberal strategy aimed at subjugating the state to “the market”, in practice, to the economically most powerful. The state’s power has been curbed by institutional reforms designed to better serve the interests of capital, notably through deregulation and reregulation, by crushing the power of labour and trade unions, and, in some countries, even by constitutionally entrenching the primacy of neoliberal interests.[35] With neoliberal capitalism triumphant in the battle with what was referred to as “communism”, the view that the prime role of governments is to serve free-market capitalism (the economy) rather than to guide it became the new paradigm.
At the same time, democracy around the world has come under threat and is in retreat. Arguably, this became most apparent in the United States when Trump refused to concede losing the 2020 election, a first in American history, and appeared to provoke a coup to keep him in power. However, the threats to democracy have structural causes that go beyond the dictatorial aspirations of individuals. In the United States, concern about the influence of economic power on American democracy (which in the past was often held up as a model) has grown to the point that many consider the system to be in deep trouble, and some regard it no longer as a democracy.[36] Similarly, concern has been raised about the erosion of democracy in many other countries, partly related to the expansion of state powers for security reasons (allegedly needed to combat terrorism) but also linked to the rise of illiberalism and would-be dictators on a populist tide.[37]
Media ownership and control play a vital role in winning the hearts and minds of people. Apart from presenting information, misinformation, propaganda, and opinions aimed at keeping public attention and opinion focused on safe topics and solutions, most of the mainstream media are corporate entities that have a stake in maintaining capitalism and deliberately conflate economic freedom with democracy and the rights of citizens. Therefore, putting forward ideas or proposals for restricting economic freedom or aimed at the introduction of economic democracy, let alone the abolition of capitalism, gets filtered out and stands no chance of entering the public arena.[38] By contrast, the media are saturated with entertainment and trivia, distracting people from the developments and decisions that shape their lives and the future of societies.[39] Although the internet and social media have the potential to, and to some extent do, discuss the need for fundamentally transforming the political-economic system ((arguably within so-called “echo chambers”), they also are increasingly used by the powerful to manipulate people for commercial and political purposes, even to turn them against democracy.[40]
Thus, protecting democracy without radically curtailing economic power and loosening the grip of that power on the state and the media is an uphill battle in which those who advocate fundamental change aimed at the creation of a more sustainable, democratic, egalitarian, and socially desirable society, rely mainly on mustering social and (limited) cognitive power. This enormous power imbalance is why environmental activism has had no impact on the sources and drivers of environmental degradation. Significantly altering that imbalance will require more than efforts to beef up environmental demands and campaigns. However, efforts aimed at addressing this imbalance head-on, for instance, by proposing or strengthening strict rules that limit the direct influence of economic power on the election of political representatives (notably related to campaign funding and publicity), drastically reducing the inequalities in wealth and income, breaking up and putting limits on the size of businesses, and democratising economic decision-making, are all stymied by the economically powerful and their allies in states and governments. Therefore, to fundamentally alter the distribution of economic power, we must take a strategic approach to political and institutional change.
Strategic collective agency
As discussed above, given the fundamental and systemic obstacles to democratically steering societies and more effective environmental integration, collective action must focus on the power of the state. Capturing the state’s power holds the key to bringing about systemic change. While this is not a novel insight and has been the subject of considerable debate and theoretical reflection in academic and political circles, it has often been overlooked by many social and environmental movements, which tend to be preoccupied with fighting ad hoc battles over specific issues.
How to capture the power of the state has, of course, been a key question facing those who oppose tyranny, exploitation, and oppression. More or less organised and broadly supported rebellions and political revolutions have marked the history of many countries, including the United States, France, Russia, and China. In many cases, the effectiveness of rebellions (including those that occurred during the 2010s under the banner of the Arab Spring) in bringing about a significant and durable change in the allocation and distribution of power has been doubtful or nil. Political revolutions have tended to be much more successful in this respect, but they often simply led to a change of elite(s) or ruling class, even if in the name of the people. They tended not to bring about the reallocation and redistribution of power (notably of economic power) necessary to create an enduring democracy. However, despite these failures, rebellions and/or revolutions are bound to recur if political regimes fail to fulfil the functions of the state, especially when living conditions are desperate. Continuing environmental degradation and global heating are likely to contribute to the destabilisation of societies and further erosion of state legitimacy, creating a vicious circle that leads to an ever-diminishing collective capacity to halt the planetary tragedy.
But rather than staging revolutions to conquer the power of states, I advocate a different form of strategic collective action. The approach involves a three-step process. First, social mobilisation aimed at institutionalising popular sovereignty by establishing Sovereign People’s Authorities as the supreme political institutions. Once these are in place and the balance of political-institutional power has shifted towards the citizenry, it will become possible to initiate further political-institutional changes required for the “greening” of states. This, in turn, would make it possible to bring about a third wave of systemic changes, including of the economic system (the production system—including energy, industry, transport, and agriculture—and the economic institutions), and socio-cultural transformation (of education, the media, and science and technology systems, and other). These transformations must be undertaken concomitantly with the pursuit of global transformation, notably by cooperation in networks of like-minded states that share a commitment to popular sovereignty, democracy, sustainability, and global justice.
To conclude, whether it is, or might be, possible for a society (“we”) to steer itself collectively, consciously, deliberately, and democratically towards a future of its choosing is a question of the distribution of power. For much of history, this question did not even arise, and societies were ruled by the most powerful, who did whatever they wanted and were primarily concerned with protecting, maintaining, or expanding their wealth and power, especially against rivals. Although nominally, the legitimacy of modern states is built on the principle of popular sovereignty, this does not mean that collective decisions are made democratically. In practice, such decisions continue to be made by the most powerful in society through the institutions of the state to which sovereignty has been transferred. To democratically steer a society, the people (“we”) will have to (re-) claim their sovereignty and create political institutions that are truly representative of the people and that have the final say about all matters that are deemed to be in the vital interests of society as a whole. Creating Sovereign People’s Authorities could be a crucial step in this direction.
References
[1] Nisbet, Robert A. (1980), History of the Idea of Progress. New York: Basic Books, 4-5.
[2] Bury, John Bagnell (1921, 2010 ed.), The Idea of Progress. An Inquiry into Its Origins and Growth. The Project Gutenberg Ebook, 12.
[3] Nisbett mentions Tocqueville, Burckhardt, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. Nisbet, Robert A., History of the Idea of Progress, 318-319.
[4] Some influential 20th-century authors on this theme are Spengler, Oswald (1926; 1928), and Decline of the West. New York: Alfred A. Knopf; Marcuse, Herbert, One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society. Beacon Press; Sphere Books; Mishan, E. J., The Costs of Economic Growth. London: Staples Press; Hirsch, Fred, Social Limits to Growth. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; Bloom, Allan (1987), The Closing of the American Mind. New York: Simon and Schuster; Toynbee, Arnold (1972), A Study of History. London: Oxford University Press. For a discussion of the left and right strands in cultural pessimism, see Herman, Arthur (1997), The Idea of Decline in Western History. New York: The Free Press.
[5] Nisbet, Robert A., History of the Idea of Progress, 323-329.
[6] Mohdin, Aamna and Rhi Storer (2021), “Tributes to Slave Traders and Colonialists Removed across UK”, The Guardian, 29 January; Siddique, Haroon and Clea Skopeliti (2020), “BLM Protesters Topple Statue of Bristol Slave Trader Edward Colston”, The Guardian, 7 June; Steim, Tyler (2018), “Statue Wars: What Should We Do with Troublesome Monuments?”, The Guardian, 26 September.
[7] McNeish, Wallace (2017), “From Revelation to Revolution: Apocalypticism in Green Politics”, Environmental Politics, Vol . 26, No.6, 1035-1054.
[8] Prominent examples are Simon, Julian Lincoln and Herman Kahn, The Resourceful Earth: A Response to Global 2000. Oxford: B. Blackwell; Lomborg, Bjørn, The Skeptical Environmentalist: Measuring the Real State of the World. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. And Ridley, Matt (2020), Against Environmental Pessimism, Property and Environment Research Centre (PERC), https://www.perc.org/2020/07/06/against-environmental-pessimism/ (Accessed: 30 July 2021).
[9] Roser, Max and Mohamed Nagdy (2014), Optimism and Pessimism. Published Online at Ourworlddata.Org, https://ourworldindata.org/optimism-pessimism#citation (Accessed: 30 July 2021).
[10] Ritzer’s Encyclopedia of Social Theory discusses more than sixty “Schools and Theoretical Approaches” Ritzer, George (ed.) (2005), Encyclopedia of Social Theory (2 Volumes). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, xiv.
[11] Goldblatt, David (1996), Social Theory and the Environment. Cambridge: Polity Press.
[12] Ibid., 203.
[13] European Environment Agency (2017), Perspectives on Transitions to Sustainability Luxembourg: European Environment Agency; Kemp, René and Jan Rotmans (2009), “Transitioning Policy: Co-Production of a New Strategic Framework for Energy Innovation Policy in the Netherlands”, Policy Sciences, Vol.42, No.4, pp.303-322.
[14] Smith, Adrian, et al. (2005), “The Governance of Sustainable Socio-Technical Transitions”, Research Policy, Vol.34, No.10, 1491-1510; Szarka, Joseph (2016), “Towards an Evolutionary or a Transformational Energy Transition? Transition Concepts and Roadmaps in European Union Policy Discourse”, Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research, 1-21; Murphy, Joseph (2007), Governing Technology for Sustainability. London: Earthscan.
[15] Hendriks, Carolyn (2009), “Policy Design without Democracy? Making Democratic Sense of Transition Management”, Policy Sciences, Vol.42, No.4, pp.341-368; Scrase, Ivan and Adrian Smith (2009), “The (Non-) Politics of Managing Low Carbon Socio-Technical Transitions”, Environmental Politics, Vol.18, No.5, 707-726; Ellul, Jacques, The Technological Society. New York: Vintage Books; Postman, Neil, Technopoly. The Surrender of Culture to Technopoly. New York: Vintage Books.
[16] Etzioni, Amitai (1968), The Active Society. A Theory of Societal and Political Processes. New York: The Free Press, 4.
[17] Ibid., Chapters 19 and 20.
[18] Amnesty International, Dangerously Disproportionate – the Ever-Expanding National Security State in Europe. London: Amnesty International Ltd, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur01/5342/2017/en/ (Accessed: 5 July 2018).
[19] Wikipedia (2021), Arab Spring, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_Spring (Accessed: 6 August 2021).
[20] Naomi Klein makes this argument in Klein, Naomi, No Is Not Enough: Defeating the New Shock Politics. Great Britain: Allen Lane. See also Monbiot, George, Out of the Wreckage. A New Politics for an Age of Crisis. London and New York: Verso.
[21] Fontana, Benedetto (2010), “Political Space and Hegemonic Power in Gramsci”, Journal of Power, Vol . 3, No.3, 341-363; Gill, Stephen (ed.) (1993), Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[22] For instance, Gustav Speth, a long-time environmental advocate, has argued that “environmentalists have been winning battles, but are losing the war” Speth, James Gustave, The Bridge at the Edge of the World: Capitalism, the Environment, and Crossing from Crisis to Sustainability. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, Loc 44.
[23] A well-known proponent of this view is Friedman, Thomas L. (1999, 2000 ed.), The Lexus and the Olive Tree. London: HarperCollins Publishers; Friedman, Thomas L., The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
[24] The economist Joseph Stiglitz is a prominent voice for this view. See Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2006), Making Globalization Work. London: Allen Lane.
[25] Cerny, Philip G. (1997), “Paradoxes of the Competition State: The Dynamics of Political Globalisation”, Government and Opposition, Vol . 32, No.2, 251-274; Weiss, Linda (1998), The Myth of the Powerless State. Governing the Economy in a Global Era. Cambridge: Polity Press.
[26] For the case of Greece, see Varoufakis, Yanis, Adults in the Room. My Battle with Europe’s Deep Establishment. London: Vintage. The dominance of Germany in the EU is also reflected in the fact that the EU lacks a common industrial policy, as the German state plays a significant role in supporting its own industry. Quatrepoint, Jean-Michel, “Why the EU Has No Industrial Policy”, Le Monde Diplomatique (English edition), August, pp.12-13; See also Denord, Francois, et al., “Germany’s Iron Cage”, Le Monde Diplomatique (English edition), August.
[27] Tooze, J. Adam, Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World. United Kingdom: Penguin Random House.
[28] Varoufakis, Yanis. Adults in the Room. My Battle with Europe’s Deep Establishment.
[29] Butler, Katherine, “Coronavirus: Europeans Say EU Was ‘Irrelevant’ During Pandemic”. The Guardian, Publication date: 24 June 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/23/europeans-believe-in-more-cohesion-despite-eus-covid-19-failings (Accessed: 25 June 2020).
[30] Layne, Christopher (2017), “The US Foreign Policy Establishment and Grand Strategy: How American Elites Obstruct Strategic Adjustment”, International Politics, Vol . 54, No.3, pp.260-275.
[31] Tisdall, Simon (2021), “Biden Races to Unite Allies against China Knowing Sooner or Later an Explosion Will Occur”, The Guardian, 25 July.
[32] Jacques, Martin. When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order. New York: Allen Lane, 561-583.
[33] Grugel, Jean and Pía Riggirozzi (2012), “Post-Neoliberalism in Latin America: Rebuilding and Reclaiming the State after Crisis”, Development and Change, Vol . 43, No.1, pp.1-21; Pearce, Fred (2012), The Land Grabbers: The New Fight over Who Owns the Earth. Boston: Beacon Press.
[34] Piketty, Thomas. Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, Loc 270.
[35] MacLean, Nancy, Democracy in Chains: The Deep History of the Radical Right’s Stealth Plan for America. Scribe Publications.
[36] Gilens, Martin and Benjamin I. Page (2014), “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens “, Perspectives on Politics Vol.12, No.3, pp.564-581; McChesney, Robert W. and John Nichols, People Get Ready: The Fight against a Jobless Economy and a Citizenless Democracy. New York: Nation Books; Speth, James Gustave, The Bridge at the Edge of the World: Capitalism, the Environment, and Crossing from Crisis to Sustainability, Chapter 11.
[37] Crouch, Colin (2016), “The March Towards Post-Democracy, Ten Years On”, The Political Quarterly, Vol.87, No.1, pp.71-75; Levitsky, Steven and Daniel Ziblatt (2018), “This Is How Democracies Die”, The Guardian, 21 January; Zakaria, Fareed (2007), The Future of Freedom. Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.; Amnesty International, Dangerously Disproportionate – the Ever-Expanding National Security State in Europe.
[38] For a discussion of media filters that keep coverage to ‘safe’ issues, see Chomsky, Noam, Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies. Boston, MA: South End Press.
[39] Postman, Neil, Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business. New York: Viking; Lewis, Paul (2017), “Everyone Is Distracted. All of the Time”. Guardian Weekly, Vol . 197, No.21, pp.26-31.
[40] McChesney, Robert W., Digital Disconnect: How Capitalism Is Turning the Internet against Democracy. New York and London: New Press; Zuboff, Shoshana, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism. London: Profile Books Ltd.