Social Integration and Fragmentation: Holding Societies Together

Some theorists attribute this human tendency to fight to human nature, postulating that humans are inherently selfish and, therefore, inclined to clash with others in the struggle for survival. Contesting theories emphasise the human capacity for empathy and a tendency for cooperation as fundamental human characteristics essential to human survival and development. Here, it is not my intention to engage in this debate about human nature other than to note that there is no need, in my view, to prove one theory or the other for two reasons. First, there is ample evidence (that can be confirmed daily) to support the view that humans are capable of both selfishness and violence on the one hand and empathy and cooperation on the other. Second, the more immediate sources of conflict and cooperation lie foremost in the conditions (socio-cultural, material, political) in which people find themselves. Conflict and collaboration do not originate from human nature but from contexts (conditions and situations) that promote one or the other. Arguably, in some contexts (conditions and situations), everybody can be pushed towards using violence or be inclined to be generous and cooperative.

The theme of social integration and fragmentation refers to the fundamental question of what ties or holds people together in groups (of various sizes) and what drives them apart, causing them to organise themselves into separate groups. Throughout history, people have lived in various groupings, ranging from extended families and clans to tribes, kingdoms, states, and empires. Although it is tempting to see a line in this development from more minor to larger groups, perhaps with the promise of humanity organising itself into a unified global society and polity, in reality, ongoing social disintegration, fragmentation, and conflict defy such linear thinking. Over time, kingdoms and empires have risen and fallen. Societies and states have expanded, shrunk, collapsed, and disappeared to make way for new groupings, which has made social (dis-)integration and fragmentation an ongoing theme in human history. So, what binds us together and what sets us apart?

What binds people together?

As noted above, humans are a social species, and social bonding and organisation are fundamental needs that humans need to meet for survival. Yet, there are many different ways by which this can be done and has been done. These ways bring and hold people together, but often divide them and cause conflict.

It can be argued that what binds people together depends on three (sets of) interrelated factors: first, a shared material (economic) basis for meeting their needs; second, power, agency, and political organisation; third, a common set of values, norms and institutions (which can be referred to as culture). Many people may be inclined to think that culture is the most important of these three. However, culture does not simply emerge spontaneously. Cultures are created by people and emerge from their interactions, which are largely shaped by material and political factors. The three sets of factors can be seen as three dimensions of social reality that are strongly interwoven. All three are necessary to bring and hold people together as a group, and the erosion of any one of these undermines the degree of social integration in the other two dimensions of social reality.

To meet their material needs (such as food, clothing, and shelter), people depend on the help and cooperation of others. This is most obvious in their younger years, but it also applies to adults. Notwithstanding the Robinson Crusoe story, few people would survive for long on their own. But there is no need for speculation on this front. In reality, all people live (and have lived) in groups on which they depend to meet their needs. The size of these groups and the kind of production and distribution systems by which the material needs of group members are met matter. To the extent that these systems adequately meet the needs of most or all members, the group will be seen as essential or even taken for granted. Individuals may have a degree of autonomy, but the interests of the group and its economic system will be regarded as more important. By contrast, if a group no longer meets the basic material needs of many or most of its members, this is likely to lead to social tensions and conflict, possibly resulting in its disintegration.

However, humans also have non-material (social-psychological) needs as important as their material needs, as reflected in the saying that people “cannot live by bread alone.” As these non-material (emotional) needs, drives, or urges are also deeply rooted in human biology [1], they can also be regarded as having a ‘material’ basis. They are intrinsic to human nature, and feelings and emotions arguably underlie everything people think and do. They influence their cognitive (rational) capacity and activities (such as learning, seeing and interpreting the world around us, processing information, choosing, and theorising), even if feelings may, to some extent, be held in check by the capacity to reason. Almost by definition, these social-psychological needs (social acceptance, recognition, identity, bonding, a sense of meaningfulness) can only be met through interaction with other people. Shared values, beliefs, norms, language, history, customs and traditions, geography, and rituals, among others, play a role in forging bonds that hold people together. Groups, therefore, are as essential to satisfying these needs as to meeting the material needs mentioned above. Not meeting these needs (from when they are born) produces all kinds of personality disorders (such as a lack of empathy, obsessions, and neuroses), behavioural and social problems (aggression, anti-social behaviour)[2] that, if scaled up and affecting a large proportion of a group, contribute to social disintegration.

Therefore, groups must meet and continue to meet their members’ material and psychosocial needs to ensure their continued existence. This applies to groups of all kinds and sizes, as groups may satisfy different needs. However, how and to what extent needs are met depends foremost on politics, the institutions and processes that involve the distribution and exercise of power, and that largely determine “who gets what, when and how.” In its various forms, power is intrinsic to all human interactions and societies, and it is never distributed equally. Moreover, the distribution of power is itself influenced by power and agency, and power tends to accumulate and concentrate. This leads to the development of political-economic systems that vary widely in the ways and degrees to which the (material and social-psychological) needs of the members of a group are met. Therefore, ultimately, what holds a group (including societies and states) together is the ability of the prevailing political-economic system to meet most of its members’ material and social-psychological needs. This may vary over time, depending on developments and events (harvests, economic crises). A temporary decline in material conditions is not necessarily fatal and may even be compensated for by strengthening social-psychological bonds (for instance, through increased solidarity in crisis situations, often referred to as social resilience). However, in the long term, a political-economic system and society that are unable to adequately meet the basic human needs of most of its members will collapse and disintegrate.

Throughout history, people have banded together in various ways. What seems clear is that kinship has always played a crucial role in determining the extent to which humans have been (and still are) willing to cooperate with and support each other (altruism). Kinship relations were (and arguably still are) the most fundamental to human existence: without them, no offspring would be produced, no children would be raised to adulthood, and it would have been challenging for individuals to survive. Hunter-gatherer societies shared a somewhat limited material basis for their survival. Members worked together to gather fruit, nuts, and other edibles and formed hunting teams to provide food for the group. Concomitantly, they developed rules and norms to guide their interactions and activities, including the sharing of food, sexual relationships, responsibilities and the members’ relative status (and privileges). Whatever was deemed essential for the group’s survival became a shared value among the members. Their culture was not just imagined out of thin air, but had a source in the conditions and practices found, through experience, to be essential for the group’s sustenance. Individuals did not choose their identity, but rather derived a sense of self from their place and role within the group to which they belonged. It has been argued that such societies tended to be relatively egalitarian, circumscribing the power of individuals. The material basis of the group thus shaped their politics, culture, social relations, and sense of (group and individual) identity and belonging. Although this does not mean that individual differences, conflict and rivalry did not exist within kinship groups, the extent to which people depended on these groups to meet their needs and survive provided a strong incentive for individuals and the group to keep internal conflicts under control.

However, as noted above, it seems likely that conflict between kinship groups was not uncommon, triggered by competition over resources and aggravated by cultural differences (including beliefs and practices). How and why the groups in which Homo sapiens started to expand into clans and tribes is largely a matter of speculation. Possibly, when a group became too big to sustain itself within a particular territory, a subgroup left the main group to establish itself as an independent group in an adjacent territory. Yet, ongoing contact, exchange, meetings, and intermarriages gradually created a basis for developing shared norms, institutions, beliefs, and values (culture). Kinship and (a belief about) common ancestry also continued to hold these larger groupings together. Nonetheless, we know (for instance, from Māori accounts in New Zealand) that conflict and war between such larger groups (tribes) were not uncommon. Political and social bonds above the kinship and tribal level were less solid and precarious, especially when subjected to resource conflict.

It is sometimes argued that societies and states rest on a social contract between citizens and rulers. In reality, the origins of states (the political institutions by which decisions are made about who gets what, when and how) lie in the accumulation and concentration of power in small groups (elites) and individuals who used such institutions to legitimise their dominance and rule. States arose with the emergence of sedentary agricultural societies that produced “appropriable” surpluses (mainly grains) that could be “taxed” by rulers,[3] which also gave rise to an increase in inequality. While hunter-gatherer and nomadic societies may have been relatively egalitarian and possibly even democratic (a claim that is contestable), it is commonly recognised that agricultural societies tended to be more unequal and ruled by authoritarian leaders.

With the emergence of agriculture, ownership and control over land became the basis of a feudal class system characterised by sharp economic, political and social inequalities, held together mainly by religious doctrine, force and oppression. Although farmers would not have liked that part of the hard-won fruits of their labour was confiscated by rulers (as an early form of taxation), they had little choice but to comply, given the threat of force (physical power) emanating from above. Additionally, their livelihood was closely tied to the soil they cultivated, making migration a challenging prospect.[4] Moreover, kinship ties, crucial for meeting social needs, providing mutual support, ensuring social security, and facilitating social (and self-) identification, would still have provided strong incentives to stay where they were. At the same time, the emergence of agriculture and urban settlements under authoritarian rulers led to the creation and evolution of new institutions (rules and organisations), beliefs, norms, values and a common language, as well as to the development of crafts and specialisations, developments that broadened the cultural outlook and increased material interdependence of societies. Ruling elites would have had every interest in encouraging and supporting the development of a common culture and belief system, as this provided a basis for legitimating their power and the polity’s existence, contributing to social cohesion and political stability. In other words, rulers and ruling elites will likely have started to play an active role in forging a common culture (beliefs, values, institutions, norms, temples, symbols, rituals, and artefacts) that enshrined and institutionalised their positions, power and interests.

But not all states have been (or are) culturally homogeneous. Very few states have probably ever been culturally homogeneous in the sense that all members share the same culture. This also applies to existing states, most of which include cultural (ethnic) minorities within their borders. Although cultural diversity may be accepted or even valued by many people and governments, virtually all states have played, and still play, a vital role in promoting a particular dominant culture. Historically, states may have done so mainly by introducing laws (which are always values-based), but from the 18^th century, (nation-) states developed a whole array of ways to forge, promote and uphold what they perceived to be the national culture. These include the adoption of a national flag and hymn, the teaching of national geography and history at schools, the introduction of national holidays and commemorative events, the building of museums and art centres to display artefacts of national-historical importance, the provision of support for ‘national’ sports in which nationals tend to excel, and a variety of other ways to promote national culture and identity. Nationalism, as the term suggests, has been a product of the formation and cultivation of nation-states.

There is hardly a need to point out the enormous costs wrought by excessive nationalism, especially when coupled with politically motivated interpretations of cultural, ethnic, or racial integrity. While political-economic factors and developments lie at the root of many, if not most, conflicts within and between states, they tend to take on a more fanatic and lethal character when overlain with an ethnic-cultural and nationalistic dimension. Swept up by feelings of both superiority and hatred for the ‘other’, nation-states and ethnic groups have been responsible for many atrocities, mass killings, and even attempts at genocide committed against the members of other groups or cultures. While such extreme forms of animosity between ethnic groups may be rare and exceptional, ethnic differences can and often are a source of prejudice, discrimination and inequality within societies that give rise to social and political tensions and demands for greater autonomy or independence (nation-states).

The long history of animosity, rivalry and violence between ethnic groups, often linked to political-economic factors (oppression, inequality, exploitation and discrimination), raises questions about the wisdom of emphasising the importance of cultural values and ethnic differences in the present world, especially when their material basis has weakened or even disappeared. As noted above, for hunter-gatherer societies, adopting and maintaining shared rules, values, and norms was crucial to their ability to cooperate and survive, individually and collectively. In modern states and highly pluralist and socially diverse societies, characterised by increasing degrees of specialisation driven by industrial capitalism, the material basis of societies has changed fundamentally. Ownership and control over capital, expanding hand-in-glove with industrial development, created a new class system that took the exploitation of people and nature to unprecedented levels, leading to a sharpening of class conflict and the erosion of socio-political stability, With the weakening of religion as the main legitimator of the rapidly changing socio-cultural and political-economic order, also under threat from new ideologies, for these societies to work and hold together, cultures, institutions, values, norms, dominant beliefs and political systems had to be adapted to the new economic system that required different skills, values, rules, disciplines and commitments.

This adaptation is reflected in a whole raft of institutions, values, norms and beliefs that most people now take for granted, including time-keeping and the regimentation of work and life based on the clock, an extended period of formal education and specialisation, the importance of hard work and work discipline, the level of income as a measure of achievement and recognition of one’s importance and contribution to society, the consumption of goods and services as a basis for defining one’s identity, status and purpose in life and, linked to many of these things, an emphasis on competitive individualism as the driver of both individual success and collective advancement (‘progress’). In other words, capitalism has produced a culture of materialism, hard work, and competition as the dominant values that are congruent with its needs. Paradoxically, modern (primarily capitalist) political-economic systems have made individuals more interdependent and less materially self-sufficient than ever before while cultivating individualism and selfishness. But this came at great cost.

Apart from the fact that capitalism produces far from optimal results for most people (as reflected in the creation of extreme inequality, the exploitation of workers, poor working conditions, and social deprivation, among others), it also erodes the socio-cultural fabric that holds societies together. While, at times, these conditions and processes have been mitigated by the introduction of more or less extensive social welfare provisions and regulations, such institutions have proven to be vulnerable to erosion and to being dismantled when required by the imperatives of the (capitalist) economy. Even though the nature of social (class) conflict has evolved with the development of capitalism, its inherent competitiveness, need for growth, innovation, and exploitation (of both people and nature), as well as recurring crises, ensure the continuation of tensions and conflicts that contribute to social disintegration. What holds this order together is the dominant belief in, and promise of, an ever-rising standard of living and continued technological ‘progress’ that will cure all ills of individuals and societies. But this promise has become increasingly hollow with recurring economic crises, growing inequality, persistent poverty, housing unaffordability, social misery, new health threats, and rising environmental problems and pressures.

The rise of neoliberalism and the breakdown of national barriers for the free movement of financial capital, goods, services, and labour aggravated and accelerated the process of disintegration. Aimed at creating a global economy dominated by transnational corporations and enabled and facilitated by national governments, globalisation increased economic insecurity, instability, inequality, and vulnerability, including in the so-called developed countries. Governments of the right and the left functioned as the handmaidens of economic globalisation. They thus seemed to ignore or deny the importance of the material foundation for social integration within (national) state boundaries.

However, economic globalisation does not (and cannot) provide a secure material basis for social integration, as it assumes that people’s economic needs can and should be met by the most efficient global corporations, wherever they are located and whoever owns them. Inherently, economic globalisation is about eliminating barriers to trade and investment. However, removing national borders and creating a competitive global market does not necessarily lead to an international community or a world of cosmopolitan citizens. Instead, it has taken competition, individualism, materialism, and self-centeredness to the global level, creating profound social disintegration and confusion worldwide. It has undermined the idea that states are important, or even legitimate, foci for social identification. Global communication technologies transform social reality into virtual reality, creating shallow or artificial digital communities and identities that may or may not meet social and psychological needs.

Some self-proclaimed progressive groups advocate for the abolition of state borders and the recognition of the free movement of people as a fundamental human right. One can hardly think of a more foolish idea. Even if all states agreed to such a measure (the chances of which seem remote, to say the least), it would guarantee global mayhem. Apart from the practical chaos that this would cause, it would take social conflict and violence to unprecedented levels, tearing down whatever remains of the fragile state of social integration in many countries, especially in (high-income) countries that would be the main targets of mass migration. The idea is based on a naïve notion of cosmopolitanism that denies the importance of social bonding, culture, and identity for individuals and societies. While creating a global labour market would benefit the big (international) corporations by reducing the costs and shortages of labour, the costs would be borne by most people worldwide, including migrants. Although a strong case exists for solidarity across borders, the priority should be creating equitable and sustainable political and economic systems within all countries.

If (nation-) states are no longer the institutions that secure a material basis for a society and are no longer foci for social identification, the rationale for their existence, and even that of societies, can be questioned. But what groups (and political-economic systems) can take their place? In the absence of a world government with the responsibility and capacity for ensuring that the material needs of all people are met adequately and equitably, there is no socio-economic (material) basis for cosmopolitanism.

Nation-states refuse to die

While nationalism has provided an important ideological basis for social integration in much of Europe and the Americas for several centuries, it has been a more recent phenomenon in most other parts of the world. In Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, most states were established during the decolonisation process, which began in earnest at the end of World War II. Many newly created states were given arbitrary borders within which a (large) variety of ethnic groups faced the need to live together under the same political institutions, while some other groups were split up between two or more states. Not surprisingly, forging nation-states based on a shared sense of identity has proven to be a significant challenge in many of these countries, especially when socio-economic inequalities, historical and religious rivalries, and ethnic differences coincide.

However, even in states with a long history, social integration remains an ongoing challenge. For instance, although China prides itself on having the world’s longest continuous civilisation, going back some three thousand years, this does not mean it is exempt from the social integration challenge. While the Han, comprising more than 90 per cent of the population, are by far the dominant ethnic group (even though it is an amalgam of different groupings in the past), more than 50 other ethnic groups with a combined population of 105 million people live within the borders of modern China. It has been noted that China’s expansion to its present borders has been “a complicated process of war, rivalry, ethnic conflict, hegemony, assimilation, conquest and settlement.”[5] Notwithstanding the official recognition of these minorities, the Chinese government has practised policies aimed at the assimilation or annihilation of these cultures, including by Han settlement. It has been argued that these policies find their roots in a belief in the supremacy of the Han culture and “race”, which are considered inextricably linked [6] and in a long-standing obsession of Chinese rulers with national unity. Despite the longevity of the Chinese civilisation, the Chinese ‘civilisation-state’ has frequently experienced periods of disintegration, which makes maintaining unity still one of the most critical functions and priorities of the Chinese state. However, not surprisingly, the policies aimed at the assimilation of ethnic groups into the dominant Han culture have themselves become a source of social and political resentment and opposition.

These illustrations show that (nation-) states continue to play a vital role in social integration, despite or perhaps because of globalisation. There are few, if any, countries in the world where nationalism has become less important as a means of social integration. In part, this can be attributed to the continuing attachment of people to cultural and ethnic differences, which may have become even more important in the wake of the end of the Cold War and the alleged “end of ideology” as the primary basis of social integration and division. Some argue that cultural or civilizational differences have supplanted these ideological dividing lines, heralding an era of clashing civilisations.[7] The revival of nationalism and the perceived threats of migration to the dominant cultures in many countries support this argument. Although much of this is fuelled by right-wing groups, (neoliberal) economic globalisation created fertile soil for this revival by eroding the economic basis for societies to look after themselves and by downplaying the importance of states in meeting the material and psycho-social needs of their citizens.

An ongoing challenge

Social integration is an ongoing challenge that provokes different and ambivalent responses. On the one hand, it provides grounds for emphasising the importance of language, culture, history, traditions, and ideas about the existence of ethnic or national identity. Although such views are often attributed to the political right, the importance of cultural values is also commonly recognised in liberal or left-wing circles, emphasising tolerance for diversity. At the same time, other characteristics, such as those related to class, profession, age, wealth, race, gender, sexual orientation, and consumer preferences, also provide a basis for social identity, fragmentation and integration, often across national borders. The emergence of global consumer culture and growing international support for human rights and environmental values, facilitated by global communication media, arguably provides the basis for increasing support for a cosmopolitan outlook based on recognising a shared humanity. However, the material (economic) basis on which societies have come to depend is highly precarious (prone to crises) and environmentally unsustainable, hence headed for collapse. Environmental decline and imperatives will increasingly force states to prioritise maintaining and restoring their natural resource bases if their citizens are to survive, and will intensify (resource) conflict. Although all countries have a common interest in global environmental protection, there is no sign that they are willing to sacrifice their national priorities and sovereignty.

It seems unlikely that economic globalisation will be wholly reversed, given the imperatives of capitalism, even though global markets are rearranged. The dominant values associated with capitalism (competition, materialism, individualism) and modernity (the belief in technological progress) will likely keep societies in their grip. However, given the inherent contradictions and unsustainability of the existing political-economic systems, the continued dominance of this cultural belief system will only speed up their demise. We can only speculate about what follows, but one thing seems certain: bringing and keeping groups or societies together while containing conflict between them will remain a formidable challenge for as long as the human species exists.

References

[1] Clark, Mary E. (2002), In Search of Human Nature. London and New York: Routledge.

[2] Narvaez, Darcia (ed.) (2018), Basic Needs, Wellbeing and Morality, Fulfilling Human Potential. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.

[3] Based on extensive research, Joram Mayshar, Omer Moav, and Luigi Pascali (2020) argue that hierarchical states primarily emerged in areas where farmers cultivated grains, as these crops could be stored, unlike more perishable crops such as roots and tubers. These stores were vulnerable to robbery and thus needed protection, which was provided by an emerging elite that imposed taxes in exchange for this service. Mayshar, Joram, Omer Moav and Luigi Pascali (2020), “The Origin of the State: Land Productivity or Appropriability?”, https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/omoav/mmp_15_nov_2020.pdf.

[4] Allen, Robert C. (1997), “Agriculture and the Origins of the State in Ancient Egypt”, Explorations in Economic History, Vol . 34, No.2, pp.135-154.

[5] Jacques, Martin (2009), When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order. New York: Allen Lane, 299.

[6] Ibid., 310.

[7] Huntington, Samuel P. (1996, 1998 ed.), The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. London: Simon & Schuster: Touchstone Books.

A social species, but…

What binds people together?

Social integration in history

The ugly side of social integration

Speeding up social disintegration

Nation-states refuse to die

An ongoing challenge

References

Leave a ReplyCancel reply