Sweden is widely regarded as an environmental leader and pioneer. There are several grounds for supporting this view: First, Sweden arguably was the first country to take a comprehensive approach to environmental issues, in particular to pollution control; second, it has gained a reputation as an environmental leader because of the strong support for the environmental cause expressed by its governments, both internationally and in the domestic context; and third, it has been depicted as a leader, particularly in the development of comprehensive environmental policy (policy-internal environmental integration), and sectoral greening (policy-external environmental integration). It has also created an institutional framework with strong and enduring backing for environmental integration.
Sweden was the first country to establish, in 1967, an Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA), responsible for pollution control, the management and protection of national parks, and the implementation of environmental policy. The agency also came to play a key role in undertaking and advancing environmental research, gathering information, and reporting on environmental matters. While the Ministry of the Environment, established in 1987, is primarily an environmental policy agency, much of the capacity for environmental policy development has been concentrated in SEPA.[1]
Sweden has often been depicted as a pioneer and leader in environmental policy. In part, this reputation is based on the early steps mentioned above and on the fairly consistent record of Swedish governments expressing their support for and commitment to the environment, both domestically and internationally. Sweden’s favourable image is not just based on rhetoric but has been backed up by independent assessments of its environmental performance.[2] Despite the changes in the criteria underlying these assessments, Sweden is the only country that has consistently figured among the top ten in Yale’s environmental performance rankings. Although the environmental commitment of governments has been somewhat variable over time – with Social Democratic governments commonly being regarded as having been the most supportive – the OECD, in its 2014 review of Sweden’s environmental performance, concluded that the country “remains a front-runner in environmental policy and has developed approaches that will be of interest to other countries.”[3]
When assessing Sweden’s performance based on the environmental integration matrix and criteria, two areas stand out: the development of comprehensive environmental policy (policy-internal environmental integration) and its efforts towards greening non-environmental policy areas or sectors (policy-external environmental integration).
Comprehensive environmental policy
In 1999, the Swedish government adopted an ambitious set of environmental objectives. The 16 Environmental Quality Objectives (EQOs) (originally 15, with one added later) encompass issues across all three dimensions of the environment (ecological, resource, and human), including climate change and biodiversity, water and forests, toxins, and the built environment. The objectives were presented as part of the overall aim “to hand over, by 2020, a society in which all the major environmental problems facing the country have been solved” (a “generational goal”), while making sure that this is achieved “without increasing the environmental and health problems of other countries.”[4] The addition of the latter clause reflects a recognition of the importance of placing Sweden’s environmental policy in the global context, which is mirrored also in the country’s record in advancing collective action at the international level, from hosting the first world environmental conference in Stockholm in 1972 to the advocacy of ambitious climate change targets in recent years.
Sweden’s comprehensive environmental policy efforts bear a resemblance to Dutch green planning in many ways. Like the Dutch, the Swedes were not afraid to be ambitious – the Dutch also initially aimed to achieve sustainability within one generation. Like in the Dutch green planning approach, achieving these objectives was not seen as just the responsibility of the government but, in line the idea and principle that such responsibility needs to be internalised, was laid at the feet of those who contribute to the problems and/or have the capacity to address them, including government departments, local government authorities, and the business sector. The fact that the objectives were more than aspirational was reflected in the formulation of interim targets and in SEPA’s role in reporting on the extent to which progress was made (every two years, with a more in-depth assessment undertaken every four years). Similar to the Netherlands, these green planning efforts were accepted by successive governments as a desirable or even necessary (and thus largely non-partisan) long-term environmental policy framework.
However, the Swedish approach to environmental policy integration went further than that of the Netherlands, as the integration of environmental concerns and objectives set out by the EQOs was made a mandatory requirement for all government agencies. Hence, the integration of environmental considerations into non-environmental policies and sectors (policy-external environmental integration) was put on a legal footing, unlike in the Netherlands, where integration in this area relied foremost on a cooperative approach and on voluntary agreements, which eventually caused many of the more difficult targets to be watered down or abandoned altogether. Moreover, in Sweden, the government supported these policy-external integration efforts by adopting a broad range of environmental taxes, including a carbon tax, that were presented as part of a “green tax shift”, earning it the status of a front-runner in this area.[5] Thus, arguably more so than in many other countries, Swedish governments appear to have taken the sub-challenge of greening non-environmental sectors quite seriously, while holding a set of overarching objectives to guide efforts in this area.
Notwithstanding these stand-out efforts in environmental integration, there were weak spots. For instance, while Sweden (through SEPA) provided access to a wide range of environmental information and data via its website, annual progress reports on the EQOs and in-depth assessments every four years, there is no evidence that the efforts aimed at achieving the environmental objectives have been guided by a thorough analysis of the underlying causes and drivers of these problems. While a summary of the in-depth assessment in 2012 notes that “the study [of] the underlying reasons why they are not being achieved” is “Another way of looking at the conditions for meeting the objectives”,[6] the report itself hardly elaborates on these sources. It certainly does not offer an in-depth analysis. It primarily focuses on environmental policy instruments and how they can or should be improved to bridge the gap between the objectives and the current situation. This lack of analysis of causes, drivers, and pressures makes it difficult to take a more strategic and effective approach to environmental problems and achieve the EQOs. As noted by the OECD, the EQO system, in its current form, does not establish a platform for targeted, effective, and efficient action.[7]
As discussed on the Environmental Integration page, developing an overarching cognitive framework or vision involves more than understanding how the environment works. Inevitably, addressing environmental problems requires making (values-based) judgements about an acceptable or desirable state of the environment and society, the priorities, and the preferred means for advancing objectives. These are not primarily questions for science to answer but are political issues that, ideally, involve broad public debate and input. While the EQOs enjoyed widespread support across the political spectrum, it is debatable whether they reflected or represented a collective vision of a desirable future state of the environment and society. The same can be said about the vision of a green social welfare state proposed by Prime Minister Göran Persson in the late 1990s.[8] Arguably, the development of a Sustainable Development Strategy, which was adopted in 2002 and revised in 2004 and 2006 [9], was a move towards formulating a broad, collective vision. However, as a successive government considered these efforts redundant to the EQO system, work on the sustainable development strategy was abandoned.[10]
In practice, it seems, the environmental integration efforts of Swedish governments have been guided not so much by an overarching collective environmental vision as by the assumption that economic growth and environmental protection can be (made) compatible through technological innovation.[11] This idea, central to the concept of ecological modernisation, posits that environmental problems can be addressed through technological means, thereby creating new opportunities for economic growth. Addressing the environmental challenge does not require fundamental economic, political, or social change, as it is assumed that the existing systems are not inherently flawed. Hence, the notion of a green welfare state put forth by Prime Minister Persson did not imply an agenda for radical change, but rather a call for incorporating environmental values into existing systems and practices.
Greening knowledge
Like many other countries, Sweden has introduced environmental impact assessment (EIA) to integrate environmental considerations into the knowledge basis for project decision-making (cognitive-external environmental integration). The EIA regulations are outlined in the Environmental Code and a range of other Acts, providing for different levels of assessment depending on the type of project. No single organisation is responsible for EIA, and EIAs are implemented by various authorities. Although the business community complains about the administrative burdens imposed by the process, no evidence is available on EIA’s (in-) effectiveness and to what extent it has helped mitigate environmental impacts.[12]
Absent are also signs of government efforts towards greening non-environmental cognitive frameworks that guide economic and/or technology policy. Although Sweden has developed a system of environmental accounts [13], there is no indication that this has affected the general framework on which economic decision-making is based. As noted above, Swedish governments put much faith in technological innovation as a means for solving environmental problems (aligned with the ecological modernisation school of thinking), and no Swedish government appears to have given much thought to the idea that the assumptions and theories underlying the government’s economic decisions need a major review.
By comparison, more consideration has been given to the ways of thinking that guide the development of science and technology, as reflected in Sweden’s support for “eco-innovation”, which, in financial terms, has been one of the highest among OECD countries. Yet, much of this research and development has also been based on the “green growth” assumptions referred to above, as reflected in the areas in which it is concentrated, like the development of clean energy technologies, including second-generation biofuels, smart grids, and carbon capture and storage (CCS), in which Sweden has been labelled a leader. The 2012 Swedish Innovation Strategy emphasised research and development in “strategic” areas, such as mining, steel, forest products, and biomass, as well as sustainable urban development. While seeking to reduce “the negative environmental impact of consumption and production”, it was also aimed at “promoting competitiveness and industrial growth”.[14] Moreover, it should be noted that expenditure on environment-focused research and development, although increasing, has been just a small fraction of total R&D spending (around 2 to 3%).[15] Most knowledge development continues to be guided by non-environmental priorities without a requirement to consider environmental aspects, and/or a system to independently assess the environmental effects of new technologies.
Institutional integration
In the institutional sphere, as noted above, Sweden was one of the first countries to establish an Environmental Protection Agency with a broad mandate, laying the basis for institutional-internal environmental integration, creating an environmental agency that theoretically was capable to guide and advance environmental integration in all the other five areas identified in the EI matrix. However, as noted above, although the Ministry of the Environment is formally responsible for environmental policy, much of the actual capacity on this front is concentrated in SEPA. Given its scientific capacity and its role in monitoring and reporting progress on the Environmental Quality Objectives, the SEPA has been able to maintain a broad overview of environmental problems and developments, and analyse and assess the gaps and shortcomings in efforts to achieve the objectives. The Environment Code, Sweden’s main piece of environmental legislation which came into force in 1999, provided a comprehensive legal framework that covers and regulates all forms of pollution affecting human health and nature, the protection of all valuable human and natural environments and biodiversity, the use of land and water and the physical environment in general “to secure a long term good management in ecological, social, cultural and economic terms,” and “reuse and recycling, as well as other management of materials, raw materials and energy” to establish and maintain natural cycles. Aimed at promoting sustainable development, it outlines the key principles and rules that govern all three dimensions of the environment.[16]
While these environmental institutions can be seen as a good basis for institutional-internal environmental integration, promoting coherence between environmental thinking, policy, and institutions, it is questionable whether they can ensure environmental integration in non-environmental areas. Neither SEPA nor the environment ministry has a formal role or power to ensure environmental integration in non-environmental sectors, despite this being mandatory. Responsibility for this has been delegated to the relevant authorities in various policy areas or sectors, as well as at the local and county levels of government. This confines SEPA to an advisory role and limits its ability to strongly lead and coordinate environmental integration across government policies and institutions. Neither SEPA nor the Ministry of the Environment has formal responsibility for overseeing the implementation of EIA, the development of research and development policy, technology assessment, or the greening of the economy, among other crucial areas of environmental integration. Overall, the environmental institutions make for a reasonably well-integrated “environmental sector”, but do not make it a strong and powerful advocate or driver of environmental integration across all areas.
The primary means by which Swedish governments promote environmental integration in non-environmental policies and institutions is the promotion of Environmental Management Systems (EMS). In 2009, the adoption of an EMS (ISO or EMAS) became mandatory for all government agencies (at all levels). Moreover, since 2007, state-owned enterprises have been required to publish sustainability reports, which, as of 2012, must include targets and define strategies for achieving them. However, these requirements are not linked to the government’s Environmental Quality Objectives (or interim targets) and can be met at any level, which limits their usefulness and meaningfulness as mechanisms for environmental integration. Moreover, since 2009, the number of EMAS registrations declined, mainly due to “low market demand”, particularly among small and medium enterprises.[17] To what extent the EMSs adopted by government agencies brought about the greening of these institutions and their policies remains unclear.
Disappointing results
As the discussion above indicates, Sweden’s environmental integration efforts appear more impressive on paper than in practice. This applies not just to the area of policy-external integration, where the implementation of the formal requirement upon sectors to integrate environmental concerns has been left mainly to the sectors themselves, with variable and debatable results.[18] It also applies to the environmental quality objectives, most of which, according to SEPA’s assessments, were unlikely to be met.[19] In some respects, where meeting objectives depends on international cooperation and action, this is understandable and forgivable. However, meeting many of the domestic objectives, or at least achieving significant progress towards meeting them, in principle should be within the grasp of the Swedes themselves, such as in matters like the protection of wetlands, the improvement of water quality (of rivers, lakes and groundwater), the sustainable management of forests, the management of land and landscapes, and the protection of biodiversity (notably on land). However, all those objectives are also unlikely to be met, as reflected in worsening or neutral trends.[20]
In 2014, the OECD did not offer a pretty picture of Sweden’s environment and environmental pressures: the status of some 60% of the habitats and species listed in the EU Habitats Directive was judged to be unfavourable; 861 forest species were endangered, half of the surface water bodies had a moderate ecological status and 16% poor or bad; greenhouse gas emissions had increased by 16% if emissions embedded in trade are taken into account; total domestic material consumption had risen by 12% between 2000 and 2011; forests were unsustainably managed; total energy consumption had grown since 2000, and the production of waste (of the primary and municipal sectors) had increased by 16% between 2000 and 2012; farmland (soils) and grassland areas were in continuous decline, and several stocks of local fish were critically declining, while contamination of fish with persistent organic pollutants posed a significant health hazard. Although air pollution from a range of sources had decreased, several other forms of pollution (notably particulates) had increased and exceeded norms in twelve cities, posing a significant health hazard, while emission levels of lead, mercury and cadmium were also still of concern. Some 250,000 homes had radon levels that exceeded acceptable norms, and the population was now “exposed to many more chemicals because of a larger number of products [that] contain harmful substances.” There were also approximately 80,000 contaminated sites in Sweden, with 1,500 of them posing a significant environmental and health risk.[21] Altogether, this hardly paints a picture of a society that has made tremendous progress in reducing its environmental problems, let alone achieving sustainability.
The scoreboard
As summarised in the table below, Sweden’s environmental integration efforts have stood out in two areas of the EI matrix: the policy-internal area (the adoption of an overarching environmental policy – green planning) and the policy-external area (the integration of environmental concerns in non-environmental policies). However, they were insufficiently backed up in the institutional domain and inadequately guided on the cognitive front. Overall, Sweden’s integration efforts are somewhat disappointing when examined more closely, particularly in terms of outcomes, and do not align with the expectations generated by Sweden’s environmental reputation, creating a gap between rhetoric and reality. Whether this can or must be attributed to variability or decline in the political commitment of governments to the environmental cause, or other factors, is a question open to interpretation and discussion.[22]
Environmental Integration – Sweden
| Domain Dimension | Cognitive domain | Policy domain | Institutional domain |
| Internal dimension | Sustainable development, de facto ecological modernisation; good cognitive environmental capacity (in SEPA) | An overarching framework of environmental quality objectives (EQOs) exists, but most are unlikely to be met | Capable SEPA, but power confined to the “environmental sector”; comprehensive legal framework (Environmental Code) |
| External dimension | EIA; superficial greening of economic thinking (environmental accounts); marginal greening of science and technology | Official policy, but implementation left to government agencies and the business sector | Formal requirement for EI in sectors, but no central agency role; EMS mandatory for all government agencies |
As discussed on the Environmental performance of countries page, we should be careful to depict countries as environmental leaders (or, for that matter, as laggards) for several reasons. Sweden is a good case in point. While it scores high on many environmental performance scorecards, there are good reasons to be less than enthusiastic about the Swedish government’s environmental integration efforts and performance. Even though the general level of environmental awareness and commitment in Sweden may be high compared to that in many other countries, the assessment here indicates that Sweden’s environmental integration efforts fall short of the required standard. Given the obstacles, whether such a standard is too high or unrealistic is a question that is open to debate. However, whatever the answer, there is no denying that even Sweden, one of the countries often regarded as a leading light, has not come even close to solving its environmental problems after nearly 50 years of diligent effort.
References
[1] Lundqvist, Lennart J. (1997), “Sweden”, in M. Jänicke and H. Weidner (eds.), National Environmental Policies. A Comparative Study of Capacity-Building. Berlin: Springer, 45-71, 50-51; Kronsell, Annica (1997), “Sweden: Setting a Good Example”, in M. S. Anderson and D. Liefferink (eds.), European Environmental Policy: The Pioneers. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 40-80, 50-52.
[2] Knill, Christoph, et al. (2012), “Really a Front-Runner, Really a Straggler? Of Environmental Leaders and Laggards in the European Union and Beyond — a Quantitative Policy Perspective”, Energy Policy, Vol.48, 36-45; Scruggs, Lyle (2003), Sustaining Abundance: Environmental Performance in Western Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Liefferink, Duncan, et al. (2009), “Leaders and Laggards in Environmental Policy: A Quantitative Analysis of Domestic Policy Outputs”, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol . 16, No.5, 677-700.
[3] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2014), Environmental Performance Reviews: Sweden 2014, Paris: OECD, 3.
[4] Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (2012), Sweden’s Environmental Objectives – an Introduction. Stockholm, 1. https://www.naturvardsverket.se/Documents/publikationer6400/978-91-620-8743-2.pdf?pid=17381 (Accessed: 2 March 2017).
[5] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2004), Environmental Performance Reviews: Sweden. Paris: OECD, 17, 102.
[6] Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (2012), Overall Assessment and Analysis. Extract from the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency’s 2012 in-Depth Evaluation of Sweden’s Environmental Objectives, 10. http://www.miljomal.se/Global/24_las_mer/rapporter/malansvariga_myndigheter/2012/fordjupad-utvardering-2012/fu-2012-eng-chapter-2.pdf (Accessed: 8 March 2017).
[7] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Environmental Performance Reviews: Sweden 2014, 47.
[8] Lundqvist, Lennart J. (2004), Sweden and Ecological Governance: Straddling the Fence. Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 220.
[9] Nilsson, Måns, et al. (2007), “Introduction: EPI Agendas and Policy Responses”, in M. Nilsson and K. Eckerberg (eds.), Environmental Policy Integration in Practice: Shaping Institutions for Learning. London: Earthscan, 1-23, 8; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Environmental Performance Reviews: Sweden, 47, 98.
[10] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Environmental Performance Reviews: Sweden 2014, 47.
[11] Lundqvist, Lennart J., Sweden and Ecological Governance: Straddling the Fence, 77-78; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Environmental Performance Reviews: Sweden 2014, 89.
[12] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Environmental Performance Reviews: Sweden 2014, 49-50.
[13] Lundqvist, Lennart J., Sweden and Ecological Governance: Straddling the Fence, 136.
[14] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Environmental Performance Reviews: Sweden 2014, 89.
[15] Ibid., 85.
[16] Government of Sweden (1999), Environmental Code. http://www.government.se/49b73c/contentassets/be5e4d4ebdb4499f8d6365720ae68724/the-swedish-environmental-code-ds-200061, (Accessed: 9 March 2017).
[17] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Environmental Performance Reviews: Sweden 2014, 52-53.
[18] Eckerberg, Katarina, et al. (2007), “Institutional Analysis of Energy and Agriculture”, in M. Nilsson and K. Eckerberg (eds.), Environmental Policy Integration in Practice: Shaping Institutions for Learning. London: Earthscan, 111-136; Nilsson, Måns, et al. (2007), “Policy Framing and EPI in Energy and Agriculture” in M. Nilsson and K. Eckerberg (eds.), Environmental Policy Integration in Practice: Shaping Institutions for Learning. London: Earthscan, 85-110; Persson, Åsa, et al. (2016), “Institutionalisation or Wither Away? Twenty-Five Years of Environmental Policy Integration under Shifting Governance Models in Sweden” Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, Vol. 34, No.3, 478-495.
[19] Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, Overall Assessment and Analysis. Extract from the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency’s 2012 in-Depth Evaluation of Sweden’s Environmental Objectives.
[20] Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (2016), The Swedish Environmental Agency’s Conclusions, 26-27. http://www.miljomal.se/Global/24_las_mer/rapporter/malansvariga_myndigheter/2016/au2016-eng.pdf.
[21] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Environmental Performance Reviews: Sweden 2014, 22-35, 145-152.
[22] Persson, Åsa, et al. (2016), “Institutionalization or Wither Away? Twenty-Five Years of Environmental Policy Integration under Shifting Governance Models in Sweden”; Hysing, Erik (2014), “A Green Star Fading? A Critical Assessment of Swedish Environmental Policy Change”, Environmental Policy and Governance, Vol . 24, No.4, 262-274.