History and foundations of states
When discussing power and inequality, one cannot avoid touching upon the role of states. As political institutions, states date back to the dawn of ancient civilisations that emerged more than 3,000 BC in Sumer (now Iraq), Egypt, and China. City-states were the dominant political institutions of classical Greek society. Historically, Kings and emperors have claimed supreme power within particular territories.
From their beginnings, states were involved in the accumulation and concentration of power (by rulers and elites) by exploiting and oppressing people. Arguably, states lie at the root of many of the evils that we associate with the concentration and abuse of power, including the creation of large inequalities, forced labour and slavery, and torture and killing for political purposes. States institutionalised these phenomena in ways that appeared to make them “natural” and/or “God-given”. From their early beginnings, states played a key role in legitimising hierarchy, oppression, exploitation, and inequality.
Cynics may ask: “What has changed?” And they do have a point, as many, if not all, states are still involved in, or quietly condoning and allowing, the continuation of such practices. Even when the modern state system was established, a feat often attributed to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 (although this has been contested), little changed in this respect. States continued to serve primarily the interests of unelected rulers who claimed to legitimately hold supreme (sovereign) power. It is only with the development of capitalism and the rise of the bourgeoisie that the absolute and supreme power of monarchs was contested and that states were no longer regarded as the exclusive property of monarchs. Gradually, the state came to be seen as a political institution that should serve the interests of all the citizens or people living within the state.
Although the purpose of the Westphalia Peace Treaty was not to deliberately create a new international order based on new principles, it led to greater recognition of the three main pillars that are now commonly associated with states: clear territorial boundaries, the principle of sovereignty, and a monopoly over the legitimate use of force.
First, states are territorially defined entities, which means that their legitimate power (authority) to make binding decisions applies (only) to all people within a geographically defined area. The government of a state cannot legitimately make binding decisions over people who do not officially reside within that state’s territorial boundaries. Although the boundaries of most states are clear and internationally recognised, that does not mean there are no disputes between states over particular areas or borders. Indeed, there are still many such disputes, some of which have led to violent conflicts, demonstrating that the territorial boundaries of states are still taken very seriously for several reasons, not least because of the natural resources located in a disputed area.
The second principle on which the state system is based is sovereignty. Although there are different interpretations of the term, I adopt the Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of sovereignty as “supreme power or authority”.[1] The term derives from the word “sovereign”, which means, according to the same source, “supreme ruler, especially a monarch”. Although initially, sovereignty was associated with monarchs (as reflected in Louis XIV’s expression “L’État, c’est moi” – “I am the State”), the idea that sovereignty lies with the people as a whole (popular sovereignty) became widely accepted after the French Revolution. Sovereignty has an internal and an external dimension: within the recognised borders of a state, supreme power and authority reside with the ruler or the people of the state (the internal dimension), while every state must respect the sovereignty of other states, which implies non-interference in the domestic affairs of others (the external dimension).
A third principle commonly ascribed to states is their monopoly over the legitimate exercise of (physical) force. This implies that only states can legitimately use physical power or threaten with such force. This principle also has internal and external dimensions: the internal dimension relates to the threat or use of physical force against the residents of the state (to maintain law and order, security or for any other reason), while the external dimension refers to the threat or use of such force against non-residents or other states.
Based on these principles, the number of internationally recognised states grew from the mid-17th century AD, spreading from Europe to other parts of the world. It rapidly increased after World War II, with decolonisation, leading to the present global system of more than 200 states. Thus, states have become the dominant political institutions through which power is formally exercised on behalf of countries and societies. While the specific institutions (rules and organisations) through which this occurs differ, creating a large variety of (more or less democratic or authoritarian) political systems, states are generally perceived to be the key political units through which collective decisions are legitimately made. This does not mean that modern states no longer play a role in legitimising hierarchy, oppression, exploitation, and inequality. Clearly, this differs from state to state. However, it is possible and useful to identify a range of functions that arguably all states must fulfil to remain legitimate or even to secure their continued existence. As such, adequately fulfilling these functions can be considered a state imperative.
The four main functions of states
Four main functions or imperatives of states can be identified: the security function, the economic function, demand and conflict management, and social integration.
The security function of the state can be described as protecting the state and society from internal and external threats. It is often regarded as the most fundamental function of the state, as failing can lead to the loss of territory, its break-up (into smaller states), political chaos, or its incorporation into another state. However, security can be, and has been, interpreted in more ways than the maintenance of domestic order and the safeguarding of the territorial integrity of the state. For instance, protecting the state from foreign interference in its domestic affairs (including elections), countering economic espionage, and preventing cyberattacks that have the potential to disrupt vital infrastructure have become other important security matters in which states play a crucial role.
The economic function of the state can be defined very broadly as the protection and promotion of the economic (material) interests of the state and its citizens. Throughout history, this implied foremost the accumulation and protection of the wealth of rulers (monarchs, elites, oligarchs), among others, by the exploitation of their subjects and the subjugation of other peoples (slavery has been a common phenomenon). However, as many rulers and governments have discovered, there are limits to how much the economic (material) needs of the “common” people can be ignored or neglected. Allowing or enabling people to meet their basic material needs has long been regarded as vital to maintaining domestic security.
The state’s demand and conflict management function stems from the inevitability of conflict between groups and individuals within society. Throughout history, all societies have had ways of dealing with such disputes, whether by rulers, elders, “wise men”, community meetings, or courts and legal procedures. Demand and conflict management became even more necessary in modern pluralist societies characterised by the proliferation of diverse interests and demands of all kinds. Contemporary politics, channelled through political processes and institutions, lies at the heart of this function, determining “who gets what, when, and how”. While legal institutions and processes (also part of the state) aim or claim to deal with conflicts in a “non-political” way, most societal demands and disputes are handled through the state.
The social integration function relates to the fundamental question of what binds and keeps groups and societies together. Kinship groups, clans, and tribes based on (the worship of) common ancestry, culture, and history have long provided the social glue for indigenous groups and societies. With the development of agriculture, urban settlements and larger polities, socio-cultural and political institutions (symbols, religions, kingdoms) became increasingly important in holding societies together. With the emergence of modern, pluralist societies based on the development of capitalism and industry, states came to play a key role in countering social fragmentation and divisions by forging national cultures and identities.
How these functions are interpreted, defined, and translated into policies and institutions depends foremost on who holds power over the state. They can be (and are) interpreted differently from state to state, even from government to government. Although to some extent, all four functions overlap, governments often assign more or less importance or priority to some over others. This can be attributed to political-ideological views (linked to socio-economic interests) and/or to contextual and situational factors. Not surprisingly, states are battlegrounds. To a large extent, who wins the state’s power determines how its functions are interpreted to advance and protect particular interests.
However, as these functions are essential not just to particular interest groups, rulers, or elites but to societies as a whole, there are limits to how much governments can neglect them with impunity. Of course, what meeting these functions “adequately” means is also open for interpretation. However, it is also evident from actual developments. Failing to adequately meet these functions often leads to serious societal problems, political unrest, and instability, ultimately resulting in the loss of legitimacy for governments and the state as an institution. They are discussed in different sections to further clarify the importance of these functions and illustrate how modern states have struggled to meet them.
The security function: protecting the security of state and society
Protecting the state and society from internal and external threats is often regarded as the most fundamental function of the state. Failing this task, a state is at risk of disintegration or incorporation into another state, as illustrated by many historical examples, including the two World Wars.
However, these examples are at the extreme end of the threat to state security. What is perceived as a threat to a state, both within and outside the state, is open to the interpretation of situations and developments, but also depends on the interpretation of security. Defined narrowly, security is often described as the absence of, or protection against, threats of a physical nature involving the use of force and violence. Given the state’s traditional monopoly over the legitimate use of force, this imperative sanctions the creation of state institutions, such as police forces, courts, and armies. However, the concept of security is often interpreted more broadly to encompass aspects such as maintaining law and order, protecting private property, and safeguarding national interests. It hardly needs pointing out that including such concerns can easily be used or abused by authorities. One example of the political manipulation of security threats can be found in the introduction of legislation and measures in many countries to combat terrorism. While there is no denying the violent attacks that have occurred in many countries on civilian targets by radicalised individuals and groups, these events have been used as a justification for increasing the powers of state executives, among other to arrest and lock up people without laying charges, to restrict civil liberties, to expand the surveillance of all citizens, and to declare a state of emergency under which rights and freedoms are suspended. In such legislation, terrorism is commonly defined so broadly and vaguely that it can be used to suppress legitimate protests, including those against environmentally damaging activities. In many liberal democracies, a growing emphasis on the security function of the state has contributed to the erosion of democracy.[2]
As in the case of internal threats, the interpretation of external threats has gone beyond threats of a physical or violent nature. For instance, the United States has often invoked the protection of national interests as a rationale for foreign intervention,[3] and it has not been the only big power to do so. Colonialism and imperialism have always been inextricably connected to the political economy of powerful states and the subjugation of other peoples, great power rivalry, conflicts and war. Advancing and protecting nation-states’ cultural values and identity against foreign influence has been another recurrent theme in security discourses, as reflected in political debates about immigration and the theme of “clashing civilisations”.[4] Cybersecurity and the growing vulnerability of communication and information systems to foreign hackers (government-sponsored and private) have become another plank in states’ security roles and operations.
Thus, the security imperative means quite different things depending on the country in question and its political, economic, and geopolitical position. However, whatever the real external threats to the security of countries and the world may be, the environmental costs of efforts to secure nations are tremendous. With global military expenditures in 2020 estimated at US$1,981 billion,[5] the military is responsible for the exploitation, use, and consumption of massive amounts of resources, including land, water, oil, steel, and minerals, many of which are considered strategic.[6] The U.S. military is the single largest consumer of oil, both domestically and globally, the largest generator of hazardous waste, and a major contributor to greenhouse gas emissions.[7] Accurately quantifying the military’s ecological footprint, resource consumption, and environmental impact is challenging due to the secrecy surrounding the military, which is often exempt from environmental legislation, regulations, and procedures. While environmental policy analysts commonly refer to agriculture, energy, transport and urban development as the main sectors or sources of environmental problems, the role of the military-industrial complex as a major driver of environmental pressure and degradation is often overlooked.
Similarly, quantifying the human suffering and environmental damage caused by war, directly and indirectly, is problematic if at all possible given the scarcity of research efforts undertaken in these matters, the difficulty of gathering information in (ex-) war zones and the lack of baseline data, the long-term effects, and the unquantifiable nature of much of the suffering and destruction of societies. While there have been some attempts to assess the nature and scale of the direct effects of war, including the use of nuclear weapons,[8] these cannot do justice to the scale of human suffering, the unravelling of societies, social and material infrastructures, the increase in human insecurity, and the long-term damage to the environment and resource-basis on which people depend. While preparing for and waging war to protect states (in practice, foremost, the interests of rulers and elites rather than societies) has always had a questionable rationale, it is increasingly self-defeating and irrational as a means of enhancing security for individual states as well as for the world as a whole.
So, the security function of the state has traditionally been and continues to be interpreted in ways that are antithetical to environmental protection and human well-being. Although, in principle, the notion of security can and should be redefined to make it commensurate with other interpretations, including human, common, and environmental security, doing so stumbles upon strong vested interests of the military-industrial complex that dominate the security discourse.
Yet, apart from the human and environmental costs associated with the pursuit of security by states, there are good reasons for arguing that states cannot achieve this goal by themselves. In part, this is because modern weapons have made state borders quite porous: even with very high levels of defence spending, states cannot (fully) protect their citizens from an attack by other states or by terrorists. This also applies to the increased threats and use of cyberwarfare, which has the potential to cripple crucial infrastructure and cause significant economic damage. However, perhaps the most important reason is the age-old truth that the security of any state, even when defined narrowly, depends on other states. Unilateral efforts to strengthen security often provoke similar efforts by other states, giving rise to the well-known phenomenon of the arms race, which ultimately leads to less security for all states. The United States, China and other major (let alone smaller) powers cannot achieve security independently. Ultimately, the security of states can only be achieved by creating an effective system of collective security at the global level.
The economic function: the protection and promotion of economic interests
States have always had both an economic and a security function. Here, the economic function is defined very broadly as the protection and promotion of the economic (material) interests of the state and its citizens. But this leaves open what and whose interests these are. Arguably, for much of history, the function of states has been to protect foremost the economic interests of the politically powerful. As wealth and power are closely intertwined, protecting wealth has long been a primary concern of the state. As Winters[9] argues, oligarchy – rule by the very rich – has been a predominant form of government throughout history and the world, arguably still today, including in liberal democracies. The main priority of the very rich is to protect their wealth. How they do that differs depending on the political context: oligarchs are more or less directly involved in government and shaping institutions and policies, depending on the threats they experience or perceive, including from competing oligarchs. As the very rich are not necessarily a harmonious bunch, their aim has often been to gain the state’s power (enabling them to use physical power legitimately) to protect their wealth from predators, notably competing oligarchs.
Yet, although the protection and promotion of their wealth is the primary concern of oligarchs, this does not mean that they can simply ignore the material needs and interests of all other people (“subjects”) in the societies they rule. All people have material needs and interests, and while throughout history most people worked (notably through farming) to provide for themselves, not expecting rulers to provide for them, there were limits to how much suffering and exploitation they were willing to endure. Rulers always had to respect a fine line between how much they could exploit the people (including via taxes) and giving the impression that they cared about them, especially in times of food shortages. While enriching themselves, they often also made gestures to keep the people happy, among other things by providing them with the proverbial “bread and circuses”. Nonetheless, it is surprising how rulers, throughout history, have been able to get away with inflicting suffering on people, which can arguably be attributed to the fact that the poorest and weakest are also the least able to stage successful rebellions or revolutions.
A limitation of defining the economic imperative of states solely, or even mainly, in terms of protecting the wealth of oligarchs is that this approach does not sufficiently account for systemic factors. How wealth is generated, and can be, largely determines who becomes rich and how that wealth (and its sources) is protected by the state. As production systems evolved from hunting and gathering to agriculture and from agriculture to industrialisation, the opportunities for generating and accumulating wealth also changed, giving rise to changes in political-economic systems. Of particular significance to our present situation in this respect is the evolution of industrial capitalism, which became the driving force behind the unprecedented growth of production and accumulation of wealth. Modern oligarchs operate within a broader economic system (markets, capitalism, numerous interactions between interdependent but competing actors) that is not fully, if at all, under their control, even though they know very well how to extract profit and wealth from that system. States and governments have played, and still play, a significant role in nurturing economic, now predominantly capitalist, systems on which the economic well-being of citizens and the wealth of oligarchs depend.
However, although the protection and promotion of capitalist interests became a core function of states in countries with capitalist economic systems, there is still scope for interpreting these interests in different ways, linked to historical and contextual (political, economic, socio-cultural) factors, as history has shown. After World War II, Keynesianism and social-democratic views on the economic functions or imperatives of the state prevailed for more than three decades in much of the capitalist world. The policy and institutional changes introduced during this period were foremost the result of the growing power of the labour movement and the appeal of socialism and socialist parties in the second half of the 19th century, culminating in the Russian revolution of 1917 and leading to widespread fears among the elites in many countries for similar uprisings. Furthermore, with the discreditation of capitalism and economic liberalism as a result of the disastrous social, economic, and political effects of the great depression in the 1930s, and the material and moral devastation caused by WWII, the post-war political climate shifted the balance of power in the direction of the advocates of social democracy and the welfare state. As a result, for the first time in history, public expectations of the state came to include the protection and active advancement of the well-being of all citizens, not just the interests of capitalists. States came to be regarded as crucial institutions for collective decision-making and actions aimed at serving the interests of the whole of society and creating better societies. Rather than viewing the state as an instrument in the hands of the capitalist class, people came to consider it a benevolent collective agent promoting the common good. Although countries and governments have assigned different meanings to the notion of social welfare and welfare states,[10] not meeting the vital social and economic needs of a large proportion of the population has come to be widely regarded as a case of state failure that undermines a state’s legitimacy.[11]
Yet, also during the three decades in which social democracy put its stamp on the economic functions of the state, economic growth, an imperative of capitalism, remained a priority. The high economic growth rate achieved during this period enabled the expansion of social welfare states. If anything, Keynesianism provided the theoretical foundation of economic policies aimed at guaranteeing continuous economic growth and preventing deep economic crises. Arguably, it enabled social democracy to become the manager par excellence of capitalism, smoothening the tensions between the capitalist and working classes and mitigating the alternating economic booms and busts inherent to capitalism. During the 1970s, when economic growth stagnated and inflation increased (a phenomenon referred to as stagflation), the neoliberal interpretation of the economic function of the state, which had been held up as the necessary and only solution to restoring economic growth, could make political headway. It was defined (again), in line with the ideology that prevailed in the 19th and early 20th centuries, as serving the needs of the “free market”. This time, it was interpreted as the need for deregulation and reregulation in support of private investment, the privatisation of state assets, and assigning responsibility for monetary policy to independent central banks, among other things. It also meant breaking the power of trade unions, shrinking the social welfare state, and promoting “free trade” and the free movement of capital globally.[12] The economic function of the state reverted to serving a purer and harsher version of capitalism. Although, in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, many economic analysts and commentators criticised the neoliberal paradigm or even proclaimed its demise, it has proven remarkably resilient. [13] Although economic protectionism has re-emerged as a practice in many countries, it is ironically done to protect key export industries. The promotion of exports and the free movement of capital have remained the top political-economic priorities of most governments. Domestically, business interests continue to dominate over worker and collective interests.
This also applies to environmental interests. Continuous economic growth has been and remains a core function of states with capitalist economic systems. This makes environmental protection highly problematic because, as even those with a basic understanding of environmental issues know, continuous material economic growth is unsustainable and impossible in the biophysical reality. Yet, businesses, governments, the media and much of the public cling to the idea that economic growth and safeguarding environmental values are compatible and that capitalism can be “greened”. This belief hinges largely on blind faith in science and technological innovation. If questioned at all, economic growth is often characterised as an “addiction” rather than an imperative inherent to capitalism and industrialism. These issues are elaborated upon on the page: Greening Capitalism: Myth or Reality?
This brief account indicates that interpretations of the economic function of the state, and which interpretation prevails, can change. Although changing economic conditions play a role in this process, these do not explain why or how particular interpretations of economic problems and developments, including views on how the state should handle these, become dominant. How the state’s economic functions are defined depends foremost on the interests, ideologies, and relative power of the leading political actors. This is the subject of an ongoing struggle in society and within the state. Rather than looking at the state as a unitary or homogeneous institution, it is better regarded as a battlefield on which competing interests fight for supremacy over the definition of the government’s functions.[14] While some groups (capitalists, elites, the wealthy, upper classes, vested interests) tend to have the advantage in these battles, sometimes the balance of power shifts towards competing groups and interests, with the result that the (core) functions of the state are redefined, amended or extended.
Demand and conflict management
Conflict is an inherent and unavoidable phenomenon in all societies, even more so in so-called modern and pluralist societies, and lies at the heart of politics.[15] Conflict can be linked to both material and non-material matters, as well as to differences that people or groups find important, such as rights and entitlements, the impacts of the behaviour, actions, and practices of others, and differences between economic interests, ideologies, cultures, religious beliefs, and many other factors. All societies need and have developed mechanisms to regulate and deal with conflict. States play a key role in this area, not just through the courts, but foremost through the political processes and institutions by which often conflicting views, interests, and demands are accommodated and/or aggregated, influencing who gets what, when, and how. Although authoritarian or totalitarian political systems, by definition, tend to suppress conflict and claim the existence of consensus or harmony among citizens, they cannot completely suppress demands or eradicate conflict. The art of governing is foremost about dealing with (often) conflicting demands in ways deemed legitimate, acceptable, or satisfactory by those affected. Any ruler or government that seriously fails in this respect loses legitimacy and is unlikely to survive long term. Relying on brutal force to suppress demands, conflict, and discontent and stay in power only makes matters worse.
Economic problems, such as unemployment, inequality, and poverty, can be significant sources of discontent, demands, and conflict. Dealing with economic demands and conflicts constitutes a significant part of a state’s role, as discussed under the economic function of the state. However, governments are not only confronted with material demands and interests but also with a broad range of other (values-based) issues and demands. Some of the main categories of demands that, in many countries, have come to be regarded as core functions of the state include meeting the health needs of citizens, creating opportunities for educational advancement, cultivating arts and culture, and protecting the rights of citizens. The latter can relate, among other things, to political freedoms, public participation, and many other issues such as abortion, gender discrimination, euthanasia, freedom of religion, ethnic identity, and environmental protection. In many Western countries, the rise of social movements in the 1960s led to the questioning of established social norms and practices, which became the subject of political demands, often sparking new controversies and conflicts. In the same period, environmental issues also became a source of public concern and conflict, providing a new focus for public policy.[16]
How states or political systems fulfil this core function is strongly influenced by their political-institutional history, including political culture and features often referred to as policy styles. Comparing policy development (and effectiveness) in different countries based on such political-institutional differences has been the mainstay of comparative politics and policy, with comparative environmental politics and policy being a largely separate branch. Explaining the policy performance of particular states requires a specific and in-depth analysis of those states, given the enormous diversity and variety of institutions between countries, even to the point that, in combination, the political system (state) of each country is unique. Arguably, the main conclusion that can be drawn from this literature is that “institutions matter”.[17] However, generalisations on this front can only point towards factors that, in many cases, are likely to be relevant rather than building blocks for developing a general theory about states.
One of the most significant and widely recognised research findings is that democracy matters. Democracy matters not just in a normative sense, as many people assign intrinsic value to democratic forms of government, but also in respect of a political system’s ability to accommodate a wide range of often conflicting demands in ways that tend to be seen as acceptable and legitimate by the public at large. Although specific institutions vary widely between democratic systems, the main idea underlying the notion of democracy has been that “humans could decide for themselves as equals how they were to be governed”[18] or, in Robert Dahl’s words, that people have “the inalienable right” to govern themselves.[19] As Lummis argues,[20] the idea or ideal of democracy should not be confused with specific political systems and institutions commonly labelled democracies, as these are often a poor translation, or even a travesty, of the idea. But this does not mean, as Lummis seems to suggest, that it is not possible to institutionalise the idea of democracy in stronger and more meaningful forms.
A stronger democracy is commonly associated with political institutions offering a wider range of opportunities for public input and participation in decision-making and policy-making.[21] Among these are opportunities for citizens to present submissions to governments on proposed policies or legislation and low thresholds for individuals or groups to be elected to representative bodies, such as in countries with systems of proportional electoral representation compared to majoritarian (or “first-past-the-post”) systems. The former significantly enhances the chances of green parties gaining seats in parliaments and even participating in government. Additionally, rules that prescribe openness and transparency in decision-making, public accountability, and reporting, as well as providing for public access to official documents and information, are crucial to environmental advocates. For this reason, they have pushed for the adoption of legislation enshrining public access to official information in many countries. In general, Lijphart argues, “consensus democracies”, characterised by “inclusiveness, bargaining, and compromise” and “broad participation and broad agreement on the policies that the government should pursue” have a superior record in effective policy-making than majoritarian democracies which concentrate power “in the hands of a bare majority” [in Parliament, but often not representing a majority of the electorate] that is “exclusive, competitive and adversarial”. This also applies to environmental performance as measured by the Environmental Performance Index.[22] Even among liberal democracies, it has been argued, more democracy is conducive to, or even a requirement for, environmental protection.[23]
However, while these arguments are plausible, it also seems that liberal-democratic systems can only achieve limited environmental protection. While they may have reduced some forms of pollution, many others remain unaddressed, and new forms (for instance, fine particles such as PM2.5 and nanoplastics) have emerged. In most countries, environmental pressures and problems continue to increase. At the same time, the demands on governments for more effective action to combat these problems (including climate change and the decline of biodiversity) have become stronger. The failure of liberal democracies to address these issues effectively has led some people to argue that authoritarian political systems are better equipped to do so. I address this argument on the page “More or Less Democracy to Save the World?”
Social integration: managing social fragmentation
Conflict is inherent to all societies and is a frequent phenomenon between societies. In modern, pluralist societies, states play a key role in accommodating conflicting needs or demands, many of which are of an economic nature. However, from their emergence, states have also been confronted with what arguably has been an equally important source of tension and conflict: social fragmentation.[24]
Social fragmentation and its opposite, social integration, refer to the forces that bind and hold people together. For a long time since the emergence of Homo sapiens, heavy dependence on kinship groups for survival provided the basis for strong social bonds. Families expanded into extended families, clans and tribes that shared (beliefs in) a common ancestry, culture, and oral history. With the evolution of agriculture, urban settlements, and larger polities, symbols, common belief systems, socio-cultural institutions, and political institutions became increasingly essential to hold societies together.[25]
It would be wrong to dismiss socio-cultural institutions, as Harari[26] seems to do, as simply figments of the mind and merely arbitrary constructions produced by people’s imagination. Such institutions meet (basic) social or human needs, such as belonging, finding meaning in or giving purpose to life, finding partners, sharing burdens, misery and adversity, fears, pleasure and joy, and ideas and hope, among many other things. Additionally, socio-cultural institutions evolved in widely diverse environmental contexts (geography, climate, resources), shaping how people met their needs, including the types of food, housing, and clothing they used. Thus, how and why socio-cultural diversity has evolved is far from arbitrary. Cultures and social institutions serve (and have served) many social needs and purposes and have been essential to the functioning of societies, both materially and by providing their members with a sense of belonging, identity, and purpose.
At the same time, the ways in which social institutions have shaped and continue to shape individuals can be considered limiting or even oppressive. As individuals are socialised within a particular society and culture, they get little if any choice regarding the dominant social norms and rules to which they are expected to conform, for instance, related to the place and role of women, the exercise of power by authoritarian institutions, and the norms prescribed by the dominant belief system. Thus, while humans are social animals that depend on others to satisfy many of their needs, the social institutions through which they do so can be restrictive and hinder individual development, creating tension at the heart of sociology and social theory.[27] Effective social integration requires a sense of community, accepting shared social institutions, and recognising the importance of leaving or creating space for individuals to flourish. Cohesive and strong social institutions tend to leave little room for individual development. However, an extreme emphasis on individual freedom is incompatible with the existence of communities or societies.[28]
Throughout history, cultures have both united and divided people. As they provided common social-institutional and cognitive frameworks that bound groups and societies together, they also created cultural differences that were seen as important. With the emergence of larger states and empires, rulers and governments inevitably faced the challenge of dealing with tensions and conflicts linked to cultural diversity, a challenge societies and states face even more today. Few modern states are culturally homogeneous. Although cultural diversity has been accepted or even valued by many people and governments, virtually all states have played, and still play, a key role in promoting a particular dominant culture. Historically, states have done so mainly by introducing laws (which are always values-based), but from the 18th century onward, they developed a whole array of ways to forge, promote and uphold what was perceived to be the national culture. These included the adoption of a national flag and hymn, the teaching of national geography and history at schools, the introduction of national holidays and commemorative events, the building of museums and art centres to display cultural artifacts of national-historical importance, the provision of support for sports in which nationals tend to excel, and a variety of other ways to promote national culture and identity.
There is hardly a need to point out the enormous costs wrought by excessive nationalism and affirmation of cultural identity, especially when coupled with politically motivated interpretations of national security and integrity. While political-economic factors and developments lie at the root of many, if not most, conflicts within and between states, they tend to take on a more fanatic and lethal character when overlain with an ethnic-cultural and nationalistic layer. At times, swept up by feelings of both superiority and hatred for the “other”, governments and ethnic groups have committed, and still commit, atrocities against members of other groups or cultures. While such extreme forms of animosity between ethnic groups may be relatively rare, ethnic differences have often been a source of prejudice, discrimination and inequality within societies that give rise to social and political tensions and sometimes to demands for greater autonomy or independence.
Given the history of animosity, rivalry, and violence between cultural or ethnic groups, one might be tempted, like Harari, to downplay the importance of culture by pointing out that cultural institutions change over time.[29] However, cultural change does not make cultures less important as foci of social identification. When conditions change, cultures must adapt to remain relevant to their adherents. Cultural rigidity and the failure of societal elites to adapt cultural institutions to changing resource and environmental conditions have contributed to the collapse of societies in the past.[30] Arguably, the primary issue facing present-day cultures, both national and those of many ethnic groups, is that they are no longer relevant to the conditions in which they exist and are failing to adapt quickly enough to the rapidly eroding biophysical conditions.
As noted above, nation-states have played a crucial role in shaping national cultures and identities that unite people. These efforts became increasingly important with the social upheavals and disintegration caused by industrialisation, urbanisation, and capitalism. These processes weakened or even destroyed the traditional material bases and mechanisms of social integration, including economic systems that were foremost reliant on local and regional production and consumption. Newly created national cultures and identities became crucial for social integration and holding societies together. At the same time, nationalism played a crucial role in meeting the needs of capitalism by creating national markets and infrastructures, supporting the opening of new markets in other countries, including through colonisation and imperialism, and facilitating the exploitation of people and resources in many parts of the world. Not surprisingly, competition between nation-states, driven by their largely nation-based capitalist interests, led to new levels of international and global conflict, including two world wars, fueled by appeals to national pride and interests.
Industrialisation has been accompanied by other cultural changes, supported by national governments, as they served the needs of capitalism and/or modern development. Many of these changes are now taken for granted, such as the regimentation of work and life based on the clock, the value attached to extended schooling, the centrality of work (wage labour for most) in life, materialism, and the importance of income and wealth as yardsticks of achievement and status. Linked to these is an emphasis on competitive individualism as the driver of individual and collective progress and success. While most of these cultural elements are not intrinsic to particular national cultures, they were (and are) essential to the flourishing of nation-based (capitalist) economies and their international competitiveness. However, they have led to the erosion of social bonds and traditions in modern societies, forcing individuals to make their own choices in shaping their lives in the face of growing uncertainty and risk.[31]
Paradoxically, modern (mainly capitalist) political-economic systems have made individuals more interdependent and less materially self-sufficient than ever before while cultivating individualism and selfishness. While nationalism provides a basis for social identification and has inspired people to do their best or even sacrifice themselves for their country (in sports or war), it has proven to be an inadequate counterweight to the social differentiation, fragmentation, individualism, and alienation brought about by (mainly capitalist) development. While capitalism, aided by governments, has produced a dominant culture that serves its own needs, in many respects, it does not adequately serve the social needs of people. This is reflected, among other things, in the rise of mental illnesses, despite or because of rising standards of living and materialism.[32]
As a result of these developments, many countries face a social disintegration crisis, as well as environmental, political, and economic crises. The former manifests itself in a variety of ways, such as the decline in public trust in political institutions, the decline in support for the main political parties and the fragmentation of the political spectrum into a raft of smaller parties, growing political alienation and a withdrawal of political participation (including voting), and the rise of identity politics as people search for alternative bonds (to national ideologies) that tie them to others. These include emphasising gender, ethnicity, and regional cultures as more important sources of social identity and virtual forms of social integration through social media, often across national boundaries. But it has also led to much confusion and apprehension about what is happening in societies and the world. The social disintegration crisis is perhaps most acute in the member countries of the European Union. Here, the material basis that underlies national cultures has been largely lost, while Europeanism has failed to provide a convincing substitute. Although EU politicians and bureaucrats significantly impact the lives of EU citizens, the distant and opaque decision-making processes and the socially harmful policies they have produced have fed anti-European resentment and re-fuelled nationalism. Moreover, it has become increasingly apparent that the EU has limited power to protect and advance the interests of its citizens.[33]
While nationalism has provided an important ideological basis for social integration in much of Europe and the Americas for several centuries, it has been a more recent phenomenon in most other parts of the world. Most states were created in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia due to decolonisation, which only started in earnest after World War II. Many newly created states were given more or less arbitrary borders within which a (large) variety of ethnic groups faced the need to live together under the same political institutions, while some groups were split up between two or more states. Not surprisingly, forging nation-states based on a shared sense of identity has proven to be a major challenge in many of these countries, especially where ethnic differences overlap with socio-economic inequalities and a history of rivalry and conflict. But that social integration remains a significant challenge in all multicultural states, even in Europe, is illustrated by the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, the splitting up of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and the secessionist movements in Spain (Catalonia), Belgium (Flanders), and the United Kingdom (Scotland). Multiculturalism remains politically and socially problematic in most, if not all, countries, despite its celebration in liberal circles. While, at least in part, these problems can be attributed to political exploitation by ultra-nationalist right-wing groups, one cannot simply ignore the need for some socio-cultural ties or “glue” to hold modern societies together, especially politically.
Even though nationalism has supported, and still supports, nation-based capitalism, the gap between the culture of nationalism and the reality of growing international and global interdependence, which affects the material well-being and even the survival of people, has become wider than ever. With globalisation, which has been supported and promoted by governments and capitalist interests alike, the capacity of all nation-states to protect the economic well-being of their citizens has been steadily eroded. The growing gap between the international or global material basis on which countries and states depend and their ability to meet the expectations of their societies has led to an erosion of the legitimacy of national governments led by the dominant (establishment) parties, but also to a backlash against globalisation and the sharpening of anti-immigration feelings, fuelled and exploited by right-wing and populist parties. While it is easy to dismiss such reactions as misguided and deplorable, a good case can be made for the argument that this growing gap points to a need for citizens to reclaim their states and increase their collective power and capacity to meet their needs. Globalisation should not be seen as an end in itself, nor does it necessarily imply positive political, economic, social, and cultural outcomes.
In this context, of the four core functions of the state, the need for social integration arguably offers more opportunities for positive interaction with the need for environmental protection than with the other three functions. The reason for this lies in the possibility that all citizens of a state may (more or less) feel or develop a connection with the biophysical environment within the official borders of the state. This may be based on the particular features and beauty of that environment, its unique (endogenous) flora or fauna, its particular landscapes, resources, and the ways the human (urban, settled) environment has been shaped by history and culture. These features can be an important source of national (and regional and local) identity and pride that binds people together positively, without relying on xenophobia or hatred of other cultures or countries. On the contrary, these environmental values and diversity are commonly recognised internationally and are perhaps the primary motivation behind international tourism. They also provide a (potentially) powerful source for public demands, support and action for environmental protection, stewardship, and integration. Arguably, “environmental nationalism” is one of the key drivers of environmental protection and integration accepted by many governments, even if only to promote the tourism industry. However, the development of mass tourism (“over-tourism”) in many countries has created many environmental and social problems that raise questions about its sustainability, but that are often ignored or downplayed by vested business interests and governments.
Despite these challenges to the nation-state, it will continue to play a key role in social integration, perhaps even more so because of globalisation. Most people still look at their (nation-) states and governments for, among other, the provision of security, fulfilling their economic and other needs (especially in times of duress), the protection of their rights, the provision of public or collective goods and services, including health and education, the management of conflicts, the promotion of social harmony, and the protection of the environment. Although people increasingly depend on Transnational Corporations (TNCs) for goods and services, such businesses do not have a responsibility or obligation to meet the essential needs of people, let alone to look after the material (and broader) well-being of all the citizens of a country; rather, their first and main concern is to meet the (profit) expectations of shareholders.
It is equally irrational to think that global organisations or bureaucracies would be better able to meet people’s many and diverse needs than national-level (and local) governments, except perhaps when the latter are overwhelmed by disasters. Making super-sized global organisations responsible for meeting the diverse needs of billions of people around the globe and holding them accountable for (not) doing this makes no sense. States remain vital institutions for meeting the basic needs of their citizens and can be held accountable for that, a point recognised by most people. This remains true despite, and because of, globalisation, which has significantly increased most people’s vulnerability to global (financial-economic, social, health, environmental, and other) risks. It is the erosion of the capacity of states to deal effectively with the risks and harm inflicted by unaccountable globalisation, to the presumed benefit of the economy, that has generated widespread public concern, discontent, and protests in many countries.
It is, therefore, not surprising that nationalism is far from dead and, if anything, has made a political comeback. There are few, if any, countries in the world where nationalism has become less important as a means of social integration and identification. Some have argued that cultural or civilizational differences have supplanted ideological dividing lines, heralding an era of a “clash between civilisations” on a world scale.[34] This discourse does nothing but lift the issues of social fragmentation and integration to a higher level (civilisations rather than national cultures), fuelling division and (potential) conflict on a larger scale. However, a good case can be made for re-recognising the crucial importance of states and their functions in meeting the basic needs of people and societies, including the need for social integration. That does not imply supporting or condoning extreme nationalism, racism or fuelling hatred for the “other”. Rather, we must look at the capitalist forces that deliberately imposed globalisation on the world, forcing states to adapt their functions to the imperatives of transnational capital while disempowering citizens in the process, as the actors responsible for the extremist nationalist backlash.
Conclusion
Throughout history, states existed and functioned to serve the interests of the most powerful. States provided the means by which the accumulation of power in various forms (personal, physical, economic, and cognitive) was facilitated, legitimated and enforced. While rulers usually relied on personal and social power to gain the upper hand in a group, they also used physical and material power to gain institutional power (formal offices and titles) to consolidate and further strengthen their positions, while institutionalising belief systems (notably religion) to legitimate their position, powers, privileges and wealth.
Over the last few hundred years, with the development of capitalism and the rise of a wealthy bourgeoisie, the role of the state has been challenged and contested on ideological grounds. Rather than simply being a tool in the hands of rulers (mostly monarchs), the state was increasingly regarded as an institution for collective decision-making to serve the interests of the entire society, based on the principle of popular sovereignty. Nonetheless, states have remained tools under the control of relatively small groups or elites who put limits on the right to elect representatives and participate in decision-making. It was only during the 20th century, with the ascendancy of socialism, that the state’s role, powers, and functions were redefined to protect and enhance the well-being of all citizens, leading to the creation of welfare states.
However, not all states have undergone this process, and many remain under the control of small groups or elites, often led by a self-proclaimed ruler. Additionally, with the rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s, even in liberal democratic welfare states, the role and functions of the state have been redefined to serve primarily capitalist interests at the expense of most citizens. These developments demonstrate that states remain battlegrounds for the (re-)interpretation and definition of their functions, influenced by the distribution of power (in all its forms) within societies. Although all states can be said to have the same four core functions, the ways these are fulfilled and the extent to which the (basic) needs of most or all people living in a state are met are the subjects of an ongoing struggle.
States remain of vital importance to their citizens. With industrialisation and urbanisation, most people have lost the capacity to independently meet their basic material needs in families or villages. They have become heavily dependent on and vulnerable to economic forces beyond their control. If or when these economic systems fail to meet these needs, people inevitably fall back on states to keep them alive, except when the state has disintegrated and become a “failed state”. Therefore, much more so than in much of human history, how states fulfil their functions has become crucial to the survival of people and societies. Paradoxically, this is true even more so in an increasingly globalised economic system. People cannot rely on global economic actors, market forces, international organisations, or other states to meet their essential needs. Reclaiming their state is the only realistic option that most people have to enhance the chances that their individual and collective needs are met, especially in a deteriorating biophysical environment that makes it increasingly difficult to do so.
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[3] Chomsky, Noam (2000), Rogue States: The Rule of Force in World Affairs. London: Pluto Press; Duffy Toft, Monica (2017), “Why Is America Addicted to Foreign Interventions?”, The National Interest. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-america-addicted-foreign-interventions-23582; Nye Jr, Joseph S. (1999), “Redefining the National Interest”, Foreign Affairs. No.July/August, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1999-07-01/redefining-national-interest.
[4] Huntington, Samuel P. (1996, 1998 ed.), The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. London: Simon & Schuster: Touchstone Books.
[5] Lopes Da Silva, Diego, et al., Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2020. Solna, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, https://reliefweb.int/report/world/sipri-fact-sheet-april-2021-trends-world-military-expenditure-2020 (Accessed: 22 December 2021).
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[9] Winters, Jeffrey A. (2011), Oligarchy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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[18] Keane, John (2009), The Life and Death of Democracy. London: Simon & Schuster.
[19] Dahl, Robert A. (1985), A Preface to Economic Democracy. Berkeley: University of California Press, 57.
[20] Lummis, C. Douglas (1996), Radical Democracy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
[21] Kitschelt, Herbert (1986), “Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies.”, British Journal of Political Science, Vol . 16, 57-85.
[22] Lijphart, Arend, Patterns of Democracy. New Haven, United States: Yale University Press, 2.
[23] Doherty, Brian and Marius de Geus (eds.) (1996), Democracy and Green Political Thought: Sustainability, Rights, and Citizenship. London: Routledge; Jänicke, Martin, “Democracy as a Condition for Environmental Policy Success: The Importance of Non-Institutional Factors”, in Lafferty, W. M. and J. Meadowcroft (eds.), Democracy and the Environment – Problems and Prospects. Cheltenham and Lyme: Edward Elgar, pp.71-85.
[24] For a classic on the theme of social integration in the context of the development of modern society, see Tönnies, Ferdinand (1887; 2001), Community and Civil Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[25] For a Marxist interpretation of the history of the family, see Engels, Friedrich (1891), “The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State”, in K. Marx and F. Engels (eds.), Selected Works. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 191-334; and Zaretsky, Eli (1976), Capitalism, the Family & Personal Life. New York: Harper & Row.
[26] Harari, Yuval N., Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind. London: Vintage.
[27] For a few classics on this topic, see Tönnies, Ferdinand, Community and Civil Society; Fromm, Erich (1955), The Sane Society. New York: Fawcett World Library; Marcuse, Herbert (1964, 1969 ed.), One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society. Boston: Beacon Press; Sphere Books.
[28] A view which seemed to be held by UK Prime Minister Thatcher, who, in an interview, stated that “[…] who is society? There is no such thing! There are individual men and women and there are families”. Keay, Douglas (1987), “Margaret Thatcher. Interview for Woman’s Own”, Woman’s Own, 23 September.
[29] Harari, Yuval N., Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind.
[30] Diamond, Jared M., Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed. New York: Viking.
[31] Beck, Ulrich, Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage Publications.
[32] Hamilton, Clive and Richard Denniss (2005), Affluenza: When Too Much Is Never Enough. Crows Nest, N.S.W.: Allen & Unwin, Chapter 8. See also Erich Fromm on this theme. Fromm, Erich, The Sane Society. New York: Fawcett World Library.
[33] Tooze, J. Adam (2018, e-book ed.), Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World. United Kingdom: Penguin Random House. This also became apparent during the COVID-19 pandemic. Butler, Katherine (2020), “Coronavirus: Europeans Say EU Was ‘Irrelevant’ During Pandemic”, The Guardian, 24 June 2020.
[34] Huntington, Samuel P., The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. London: Simon & Schuster: Touchstone Books.