As discussed elsewhere, capitalism is inherently incompatible with effective long-term environmental protection. This raises the obvious question: are there any other (political-) economic systems that can meet this challenge? As socialism has been the leading contender as an alternative system, adopted in a wide range of countries until relatively recently, it seems logical, for a start, to examine the environmental credentials of socialism, in particular those that have actually been in existence.
Whether socialism is compatible with, or perhaps even conducive to, environmental integration, as commonly claimed by its advocates, is a question to which answers can be sought at two levels: ideological and empirical. At the ideological level, the principles of socialism as described on the Socialism page do not seem to be inherently or logically incompatible with environmental protection and integration. On the contrary, the abolition of capitalism would, in principle, eliminate or control the major drivers and forces responsible for much of the social and environmental harm already caused. Also, promoting more equal (or less unequal) societies aligns well with calls for environmental justice and the view that the world needs to move towards a more equitable sharing of environmental space and less unequal material, resource, and ecological footprints. Additionally, in a rationally planned and managed economy, provided that robust and ongoing mechanisms for environmental input and feedback exist, environmental protection can be incorporated as a fundamental condition or imperative for an environmentally sustainable economy.[1]
The environmental records of the Soviet Union and socialist China
However, notwithstanding the compatibility at the theoretical or ideological level, in practice, really existing socialist systems have not demonstrated a strong record when it comes to environmental integration and protection; on the contrary. In 1977, some Soviet scientists presented a very optimistic picture of the country’s rational-scientific capacity to solve environmental problems by changing production and consumption based on closed-loop and renewal cycles, the design of “clean technology”, moving towards ecological industrial and agricultural technology, and regulating population growth.[2] Yet, by most accounts, the environmental record of the Soviet Union has been abysmal. Although, in 1976, some authors opined that the environment in the Soviet Union had not reached crisis proportions on a nationwide scale (which arguably can be attributed at least in part to its size – being the biggest country in the world), they also noted that the promotion of economic growth was an overriding priority, that pro-environmental forces were weak and largely excluded from decision-making, and that environmental policies mainly were symbolic.[3] But the scale of the environmental problems affecting the Soviet Union only started to come to light around 1989, thanks to Perestroika and subsequent political changes that opened up access to public documents and data.[4] Although the information and data available were far from complete and reliable, they indicated that pollution and environmental degradation in the Soviet Union were at least as bad as in the West and could be characterised as catastrophic in some areas.[5] A similar assessment can be made of China’s environmental record, although this is complicated by the fact that from the late 1970s, China started to introduce capitalism to the effect that, at the start of the 21st century, its economic system is better regarded as either a form of authoritarian state capitalism or a hybrid system (discussed on the China after Mao page).
As in the case of the Soviet Union, the Chinese experience under Mao provides little or no support for the view that (previously existing) socialist economic systems were predisposed towards integrating environmental imperatives. On the contrary, as Shapiro discusses in her book Mao’s War on Nature, Mao saw nature as something to be conquered and subjected for human purposes, as reflected in a series of mass campaigns aimed at boosting production but with disastrous environmental and social consequences. Examples are the “Great Leap Forward” and the campaign to “Eliminate the Four Pests” (rats, sparrows, flies, mosquitoes), both undertaken in the late 1950s. Neither did Mao see any problems with China’s population size and growth, as this was not regarded as a problem for socialism. Mao was also suspicious of science. Scientists who dared to raise questions about the wisdom of his projects (like hydro dams) or who raised uncontrolled population growth as a problem were accused of being “rightist” and were persecuted.[6] That China did not treat its environment very well was also pointed out by Smil, who, in 1984, provided an overview of environmental problems and pressures in China, based foremost on Chinese official data released at the end of the 1970s. These contradict the claims made by China’s sympathisers during the 1970s that China took environmental issues seriously and treated its environment with care and respect. Overall, Smil sketches a gloomy picture based on a broad range of problems related to deforestation, land reclamation, water management, pollution, and species decline, among others.[7]
Notwithstanding these critical assessments, it should be pointed out that, in the 1970s, the Chinese government, like many governments in the West, began to recognise the need for new ways to tackle environmental problems. The first national conference on environmental protection was held in 1973, resulting in the introduction of several new environmental regulations. In 1974, the government established a “Leading Group of Environmental Protection” in the State Council. In 1979, the government promulgated a Law for Environmental Protection, which has been described as “the most comprehensive environmental protection law ever adopted in China.” [8] However, most analysts agree that these measures, although looking good on paper, appeared to have had little effect and that environmental issues were only taken more seriously after Mao’s death in 1978. This opened the door to the introduction of capitalist reforms and the gradual transformation of China from an authoritarian socialist regime into an authoritarian mixed regime.
Similarly, the Soviet Union introduced a range of official institutional and policy measures aimed at environmental protection. Already under Lenin, millions of hectares were officially set aside for protection [9], and it has been claimed that during the 1956-1985 period, many environmental laws were passed, many of which aimed at nature conservation.[10] The rate at which environmental legislation was introduced increased from the 1970s, covering a wide range of specific environmental issues, as in many Western, capitalist countries.[11] Yet, the Soviet Union did not introduce a comprehensive and integrated institutional framework (rules and organisations) aimed at environmental integration. As in the West, the dominant approach to tackling environmental issues was predominantly incremental and issue-focused, although, impressively, in 1977, the citizens’ right to a clean environment, as well as duties obligating them to adopt a responsible attitude towards the natural environment, was integrated into the Soviet Constitution.[12] Yet, it has been argued that in the Soviet Union, the role of legislation was essentially idealistic or symbolic: “Soviet environmental law is not so much a mechanism for resolving conflicts among contending parties as a set of idealistic and often unattainable principles, symbolising the regime’s professed commitment to environmental protection.”[13] In practice, implementation, mostly by departments that had other priorities than environmental protection, left much to be desired.
Based on these admittedly brief summaries, one may conclude that the experiences in these two socialist countries do not support the claim that socialist systems are more likely to take environmental integration and protection more seriously than capitalist systems. While, on paper, both the Soviet Union and socialist China introduced policies and institutions that suggested that their governments took environmental issues seriously, these official measures remained very much at the level of good intentions and were not backed up by the creation of the capacity (agencies, resources, power) needed to implement them. Arguably, they were largely symbolic exercises aimed at maintaining the legitimacy of the regimes. Nonetheless, theoretically or ideologically, there is no reason why socialism is incompatible with environmental integration. The inherent incompatibility of capitalism with environmental integration makes anti-capitalism a rational first step in overcoming significant obstacles. The reduction of socio-economic inequality is increasingly seen by many as a precondition for effectively addressing environmental problems, notably by advocates of the environmental justice movement, rather than as incompatible with environmental protection. There is perhaps less agreement on the merits of economic planning (versus a “market-based” approach) in advancing environmental protection, in particular as top-down planning and a reliance on bureaucratic rationality are considered incompatible with an ecologically rational approach that is regarded as necessary for effective environmental management.[14] However, as discussed on the Environmental integration page, effectively addressing the environmental challenge requires a comprehensive and integrated approach based on environmental principles across all three realms of collective action (the cognitive, policy and institutional realms), with green planning playing a key role in such an approach. The planning systems and approaches in the Soviet Union and socialist China definitely were not based on environmental principles. This suggests that factors were at play that prevented or posed obstacles to environmental integration in these countries.
Explaining the environmental failure of socialist regimes
Here, three factors are presented that appear to have played a significant role in preventing previously existing socialist regimes from adopting this approach. These are: the priority of economic growth, the political economy of socialism, and authoritarianism.
The priority of economic growth
First, the overriding importance of economic growth in the priorities of the governments and (most) citizens of these countries. This is not surprising given the political-economic and socio-cultural context in which socialism emerged as an ideology and was adopted by the political leaders of both countries. As noted above, socialist ideology is a response to the social exploitation and misery suffered by the working class, offering the promise of a decent standard of living for all. The capitalist system was seen as standing in the way of a rational and equitable approach to the management of the industrial production system that had the potential to lead to the land of plenty in which communism (“to each based on needs” rather than effort) could be achieved and exploitation and inequality would come to an end. The main aim of socialist governments was to demonstrate the superiority of the socialist system in delivering a high standard of living for all people by achieving higher levels of economic growth than countries with capitalist economic systems. Economic growth was an overriding priority for governments in both countries, while environmental considerations were often ignored, treated as afterthoughts, or addressed symbolically.[15]
However, we must also not forget that environmental concerns began to gain traction in the public and political agendas only in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In this respect, there is little difference in the degree to which the environment was of significant concern to most governments before the environmental era, apart from some specific issues raised primarily by experts and early conservationists. Economic growth was— and still is —of overriding concern in countries with both socialist and capitalist systems. It is often argued that this is understandable and legitimate in the context of “developing” or low-income countries. Given that both the Soviet Union and socialist China were economically far behind the Western countries, they were hardly exceptional in prioritising economic growth and improving living standards. But as the seriousness of environmental problems became increasingly apparent, this attitude (“pollute first, clean up later”) has also been challenged in low-income countries.
At a deeper level, the commitment of socialist regimes to economic growth can also be linked to the modernist worldview that accompanied the rise of scientific rationality, technology, industrialism, and capitalism. Early or utopian socialist thinkers did not have unqualified faith in science, technology, and industrial development; instead, they placed more emphasis on the social and political aspects of more desirable societies. However, Marxist-inspired socialism or communism viewed technological and industrial development, liberated from the contradictions and oppressive forces of capitalism, as the means towards achieving a better society. As both Russia in the early 20th century and China in the 1940s were predominantly agricultural societies (and therefore, according to Marx, less likely candidates for a successful socialist revolution), the socialist regimes in these countries emphasised the need for rapid industrialisation as a necessary step towards the socialist ideal. However, the other side of the coin of buying wholeheartedly into industrialism is that the imperative of continuous expansion, inherent to the industrial production method, was also built into these socialist political-economic systems.
At the same time, the development of (notably heavy) industry in these countries was also considered to be essential for building the military capacity to deter or defeat the anti-revolutionary powers that were keen to restore capitalism. Rapid industrial development, therefore, became a priority for fulfilling the security function of these socialist states, and for good reasons. In the early years following the 1917 revolution, the Soviet Union was attacked by the counter-revolutionary “White Army,” which was supported by the capitalist countries of the West.[16] It is unlikely that the Soviet Union would have been able to defeat the Germans in World War II had it not prioritised strengthening its military capacity. These events were a lesson for the Chinese communist regime established in 1949, the more so as anti-communist forces continued to keep hold of Taiwan, supported by the United States. Also, Sino-Soviet relations turned sour when Khrushchev became the Soviet premier in 1956, which caused China to feel increasingly isolated internationally and led Mao to emphasise the need for greater self-reliance and strengthening of China’s military power.
Economic growth, therefore, notably based on rapid industrialisation, has been an overriding priority for both the socialist regimes of the Soviet Union and China from their beginning. Arguably, delivering a high rate of economic growth became a cornerstone of the legitimacy of the regimes in these countries. The Soviet government’s failure to deliver on this front, as economic growth rates declined during the 1980s, was partly due to growing resource limitations and rising costs associated with their exploitation. This was a key factor in the regime’s demise.[17] In China, despite the rise in living standards and the improvements in health care and life expectancy during the Mao era, internal Party differences about Mao’s campaigns and about the way economic growth had been, and could best be, pursued, led to a political struggle that eventually opened the door to the introduction of capitalist experimentation after Mao’s death.
The political economy of socialism
A second reason why these socialist regimes failed to effectively address environmental issues relates to the links between economic and political power, in other words, to the political economy of socialism. In capitalist systems, economic and political power are closely tied to the ownership of the means of production, resulting in a highly unequal distribution of wealth, which grants large companies a privileged position in the political arena and the public policy process. In socialist systems, characterised by collective ownership of the main means of production, the link between economic and political power is much less obvious. Theoretically, given the absence of private ownership of the main means of production, the scope for accumulating wealth (economic power) by individuals is much smaller than in capitalist systems. Consequently, one would expect political-institutional power to be less influenced by (unequal) economic power, and decision and policy-making in socialist regimes to be more responsive to the distribution of social power (the ability to mobilise the support of groups) and of cognitive power (the ability and capacity to influence and persuade people in their thinking and behaviour).
However, analysts of the political economy of the Soviet Union and China have pointed out that the distribution of economic power in these countries has been far from equal. Formally, private ownership of the primary means of production did not exist in these countries (before the reforms in China), and the phenomenon of super-wealthy oligarchs was unknown in both the Soviet Union and China until the 1980s. Yet, it has been argued that in the Soviet Union, much of the power commonly associated with private ownership was concentrated in the hands of a relatively small group of people, notably top communist party members, high-ranking bureaucrats in economic ministries, and the chief executives of enterprises. Peterson notes: “[…] although natural resources were in theory collectively owned (and collectively protected), the state in reality assigned extensive property rights to firms to allocate and use (and abuse) resources granted to them as long as they fulfilled the plan.” He adds that “enterprise managers came to approximate ‘czars’ who controlled vast domains and who felled forests or fished out seas as they saw fit.” [18] Although in the early days of the Russian Revolution, factories were run by committees of workers, these were soon abolished as they were said to create anarchy in production.[19] Instead, the principle of one-person management was introduced. Sarkar notes that “managers of enterprises were vested with almost dictatorial powers as far as discipline was concerned, and they were not subject to workers’ control.”[20] So, while the power associated with economic planning was centralised in some of the ministries and the top echelon of the communist party, the powers vested in the managers of Soviet enterprises were similar to, if not even more draconian than, the powers assigned to chief executives of capitalist corporations.
As for China under Mao, it is less clear how economic power was distributed and exercised. Similar to the Soviet Union, China during the Mao era had no billionaires or extremely wealthy individuals, but a highly egalitarian society. However, although Mao was able to provide general direction to economic decision-making, as reflected in the campaigns and projects aimed at boosting production and economic growth for which he is commonly held responsible, he was inevitably dependent on numerous officials at all levels of government to implement his decisions. In a country the size of China, regional and local political-economic structures must have and apply a degree of discretion to account for differences in geographical, demographic, environmental and other conditions to make decisions and policies (and a centrally planned economy) work effectively. However, the hierarchically structured Communist Party, with branches reaching into the smallest communities, would have provided a degree of integration and consistency in decision-making on economic and other matters that may have been counterproductive by discouraging local initiative, input, and flexibility. Given the political leadership’s emphasis on economic development and growth, and the desire to lift masses of people out of poverty, those in positions of power, also in the economic area, had few if any incentives to assign much importance to environmental considerations. The introduction of capitalism, initially at the regional and local levels, unlocked the potential for local initiative, albeit at a price.
Authoritarianism
A third important factor that impeded environmental integration in the Soviet Union and socialist China was the authoritarian nature of their political-economic regimes. Given the formal and non-formal concentration of political and economic (decision-making) power in those regimes (at all levels), environmental advocates had minimal opportunities and power to bring about the kind of effective political change that was needed to give real teeth to environmental institutions that looked good on paper but that fell far short of effective implementation and enforcement. Environmental advocates may have had some influence on shaping these institutions, but they were not given the means or a role in bringing about real environmental integration in non-environmental areas and sectors, such as economics, science and technology, energy, agriculture, transportation, urban planning and development, and the military. In all these areas and sectors, environmental considerations were often added on in weak or symbolic ways that did not detrimentally affect the dominant interests and goals in these areas and sectors.
There appears to have been a difference between the Soviet Union and China in the extent to which the expression of environmental concerns and critique was allowed. In the Soviet Union, a long history of nature conservation was inspired by early ecological scientists and a romantic view of nature, which led to the creation of extensive ecological reserves during the 1920s.[21] However, under Stalin, who had a very instrumentalist view of nature, conservation advocates were marginalised and punished if they expressed criticism of grandiose but environmentally damaging development projects. Nonetheless, a more or less autonomous conservation organisation survived the Stalinist period. It became the nucleus of a broader environmental movement that raised concerns about the significant adverse effects of such developments, including those affecting Lake Baikal and the Aral Sea. But while environmental advocates and critiques were tolerated and even symbolically recognised in the form of the adoption of formal environmental legislation, they found their protection efforts frustrated by the lack of transparency and accountability of the government agencies that were responsible for these developments, by a lack of access to the mass media, and by their exclusion from decision-making and implementation processes. This meant that the opportunities for self-correction based on feedback about the real and perceived adverse environmental effects of development were largely closed off. It was only with the advent of Glasnost and Perestroika under Gorbachev that information about the state of the Soviet environment became publicly available, and environmental groups were able to mobilise concerns in the broader society.
In China, as noted above, Mao’s view on the environment led to the active pursuit of dominance over and exploitation of nature from the 1950s. When environmental scientists or advocates publicly questioned the wisdom of developments or policies affecting the environment, they became targets of retaliation and oppression, incurring significant personal costs.[22] This meant that there was no political scope for the development of a more or less autonomous conservation or environmental movement in socialist China. Although, like in the Soviet Union, the regime created impressive formal institutions for environmental protection, arguably out of concern for its international image and to show its superiority to Western capitalist countries (also) in this area, in practice, these were toothless tigers. As a result, the authoritarian regime blundered from one environmentally disastrous decision to the next.
Socialist environmental failure in perspective
It should be noted that such obstacles to environmental integration are not exclusive to socialist regimes; in liberal-democratic political systems, the power of environmental advocates to achieve effective environmental integration has also been weak and inadequate. The main difference lies in the fact that in socialist regimes, environmental advocates have often been deliberately thwarted and actively suppressed, or what has been euphemistically described as “circumscribed”.[23] While environmental advocates in liberal democracies are not formally constrained to raise any issues that they consider to be important, their opportunities and power to influence, let alone participate in, decisions affecting the environment (both by the government and the “private” sector) are also quite limited despite the greater transparency and accountability of governments. However, in liberal-democratic regimes, environmental advocates are at least free to exert their communicative and social (mobilisation) power, which provides at least some counterweight to the institutional and economic power of economic interests and may, occasionally, lead to some environmental victories or gains (or less damage).
Although accounts of the developments in the Soviet Union and Maoist China do not offer much, if any, support for the view that socialist political-economic systems are more likely to pursue effective environmental integration, they should not be taken as definitive evidence that socialist economic systems could not evolve or be developed in a way or ways that put environmental concerns centre stage alongside social values. However, both countries built their development on the adoption of an industrial system of production (first in agriculture, then heavy industry, and finally in the consumer industry sector), which is inherently expansionist and hence incompatible with long-term environmental protection and sustainability.
Capitalism, industrialism, and weak or hollow democracy are the most significant obstacles to addressing the environmental challenge. If socialism is to address this challenge more effectively, it must not only abolish capitalism and transform industrialism into a truly sustainable production system but also adopt a much stronger form of democracy. Arguably, these should be the main agenda items of democratic socialism.
References
[1] Whether the criteria of “ecological rationality” (negative feedback, coordination, robustness, flexibility, and resilience (See Dryzek, John S., Rational Ecology: Environment and Political Economy. Dryzek, John S. (1987), Rational Ecology: Environment and Political Economy. Oxford, UK: Blackwell) can be incorporated into a socialist “social choice” mechanism (or system) is more a matter of design than a question of (in-) compatibility with the principles of socialism as described. Actual socialist systems have no doubt failed on most or all of these criteria, but this does not mean all socialist systems have to fail. My argument is that, at the level of principle, socialist principles are compatible with these criteria. For a similar view, see Foster, John Bellamy (1999, Kindle ed.), The Vulnerable Planet: A Short Economic History of the Environment. New York: Monthly Review Press, Loc 1343-1346.
[2] Federov, E. and I. Novik (1977), “Man, Science and Technology”, in K. W. Deutsch (ed.) Ecosocial Systems and Ecopolitics: A Reader on Human and Social Implications of Environmental Management in Developing Countries, Paris: Unesco, 45-58.
[3] Kelley, Donald R., et al. (1976), The Economic Superpowers and the Environment: The United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 271-277.
[4] Ziegler, Charles E. (1989), Environmental Policy in the USSR. London: Pinter; Demko, George J. (1990), “Two Reports on the Environment of the USSR”, Environment, Vol . 32, No.10, 25-26.
[5] Peterson, D. J., Troubled Lands: The Legacy of Soviet Environmental Destruction. Boulder: Westview Press; Sarkar, Saral, Eco-Socialism or Eco-Capitalism? A Critical Analysis of Humanity’s Fundamental Choices. London and New York: Zed Books, Chapter 2.
[6] Shapiro, Judith (2001), Mao’s War against Nature: Politics and the Environment in Revolutionary China. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
[7] Smil, Vaclav (1984), The Bad Earth: Environmental Degradation in China. Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe.
[8] Jan, George P. (1995), “Environmental Protection in China”, in O. P. Dwivedi and V. D. K. (eds.), Environmental Policies in the Third World. A Comparative Analysis. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 71-84, 75.
[9] Gare, Arran (2002), “The Environmental Record of the Soviet Union”, Capitalism Nature Socialism, Vol . 13, No.3, 52-72, 60.
[10] Zaharchenko, Tatiana R. (Undated – 1990?), Environmental Policy in the Soviet Union (Accessed: 30 September 2019).
[11] Ziegler, Charles E., Environmental Policy in the USSR.
[12] Ibid., 95.
[13] Ibid., 79.
[14] Dryzek, John S., Rational Ecology: Environment and Political Economy; Paehlke, Robert and Douglas Torgerson (eds.) (1990), Managing Leviathan: Environmental Politics and the Administrative State. Peterborough, Ont: Broadview Press.
[15] Kelley, Donald R., et al., The Economic Superpowers and the Environment: The United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan; Peterson, D. J., Troubled Lands: The Legacy of Soviet Environmental Destruction, 14; Jan, George P., “Environmental Protection in China”; Ryan, Megan and Christopher Flavin (1995), “Facing China’s Limits”, in L. R. Brown (ed.) State of the World 1995. London: Earthscan, 113-131; Shapiro, Judith, Mao’s War against Nature: Politics and the Environment in Revolutionary China, Loc 1356; Watts, Jonathan, When a Billion Chinese Jump: How China Will Save Mankind–or Destroy It. London: Faber & Faber, Loc 7289; Economy, Elizabeth, The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China’s Future. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, Loc 412-426.
[16] Wikipedia (2019), White Movement (Accessed: 4 October 2019).
[17] Sarkar, Saral, Eco-Socialism or Eco-Capitalism? A Critical Analysis of Humanity’s Fundamental Choices, Chapter 2.
[18] Peterson, D. J., Troubled Lands: The Legacy of Soviet Environmental Destruction, 13.
[19] Sarkar, Saral, Eco-Socialism or Eco-Capitalism? A Critical Analysis of Humanity’s Fundamental Choices, 66.
[20] Ibid., 67.
[21] For a discussion of the ideas and influence of early ecological thinkers in the Soviet Union see Gare, Arran (1993), “Soviet Environmentalism: The Path Not Taken”, Capitalism Nature Socialism, Vol.4, No.4, 69-88; Gare, Arran (2002), “The Environmental Record of the Soviet Union”; Chattopadhyay, Kunal (2014), The Rise and Fall of Environmentalism in the Soviet Union (Accessed: 8 November 2019).
[22] Shapiro, Judith, Mao’s War against Nature: Politics and the Environment in Revolutionary China, Chapter 1.
[23] Shapiro, Judith. China’s Environmental Challenges. Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press, Loc 1218.